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ABSTRACT 
The globalization of irregular migration and its facilitation by transnational criminal 
groups, coupled with concerns of terrorism, has radically impacted the way in which 
States manage migration and national security. At the same time, the information age 
has placed the issue of privacy and confidentiality at the centre of public, legislative 
and media debates. While advanced technology facilitates migration management and 
data exchange, the emergent use of surveillance techniques to identify individuals and 
keep track of their movements is a growing concern. Advanced technology can help to 
protect and manage borders, but it can also threaten human rights and create 
vulnerabilities relating to data theft, data loss, inappropriate disclosure and misuse of 
personal data. In the absence of appropriate data protection safeguards, personal data 
can be used for reasons unrelated to its intended purpose, without the knowledge of 
the individuals concerned and contrary to their expectations. When applied to 
migrants, data protection has a cross-border dimension, and this gives rise to 
additional concerns related to unauthorized disclosure that could lead to a multitude of 
risks ranging from physical violence to profiling and discrimination. 
This thesis seeks to outline the points of intersection between data protection and 
migration. In so doing, it points out the important consideration of the threat to human 
life and safety, a practical reality when collecting and processing personal data of 
vulnerable migrants. States have an obligation to protect the human rights afforded to 
all individuals, regardless of their nationality or immigration status. States also have 
the sovereign right to protect their borders and the duty to keep their citizens secure. 
While acknowledging the delicate exercise of having to balance between protecting 
State interests and respecting individual rights, this thesis emphasizes that the two are 
not mutually exclusive and it can be balanced, albeit a delicate balance. To ensure an 
appropriate balance, individual rights should not be diluted or subjugated by the 
interests of States. Instead any restrictions to privacy and data protection should be 
justified and proportional to the state interest. Further, the parameters for using 
advanced technology should be firmly embedded in the law. Finally, as technology is 
not infallible a~d cannot be seen in isolation, the human factor is a key consideration 
to take into account when developing and implementing the law governing the use of 
advanced technology that may impact on individual rights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
'A man without privacy is a man without dignity; the fear that Big Brother 
is watching and listening threatens the freedom of the individual no less 
than the prison bars. '1 
This introductory chapter outlines the purpose of this thesis which is to assess the legal 
framework for the protection of personal data in the context ofmigration.2 To this end, 
it outlines the points of intersection between data protection and migration, introduces 
the use of advanced technology in migration management and humanitarian 
assistance, and highlights the consequent implication on privacy and other human 
rights. This thesis argues that although data protection stems from the right to privacy, 
it needs to be recognized as a separate right in light of advanced technology in the 21st 
century. Finally, by looking at the cross border dimension of migration and data 
protection from a regional perspective in Southern Africa and by examining the 
development of the data protection law and the criteria for balancing rights in the 
South Africa jurisprudence, it explores the line between State sovereignty and 
individual rights with the view to make recommendations for protecting the personal 
data of migrants. 
1 Cowen, Zelman 'The Private Man' The Boyer Lectures, Australian Broadcasting Commission ( 1969) 
in Malcolm Crompton, Federal Privacy Commissioner, What is privacy? Privacy and Security in the 
Information Age Conference, Melbourne, 16-17 August 200 I 
<http://www. docstoc. com/ docs/225 3 786/What-is-privacy> 
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the word 'migration' refers to international migration and includes the 
process of non-nationals moving, either across an international border, or within the territory of a State. 
There is indeed a legal distinction between the terms 'internal migration' and 'international migration.' 
For the internationally accepted definition of these terms, see: Perruchoud, Richard and Redpath-Cross, 
Jillyanne eds. (20 11) International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration 2"d Edition at 51, 52 and 62. 
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The information age 
The information age has placed the issue of privacy and confidentiality at the centre of 
public, legislative and media debates. This is due to the widespread use of the Internet, 
increase in computer capacity and storage mechanisms, and the fact that data is easily 
accessible through social networking sites. Factors that affect privacy in the 
information age include 'the volume, magnitude, complexity, and persistence of 
information; the expanding number of ways to collect information; the number of 
people affected by information; and the geographic spread and reach of information 
technology. '3 These factors are changing and expanding in scale with unprecedented 
speed and our ability to understand and contend with their implications often falls 
behind. In addition, 'the sheer quantity of information; the ability to collect 
information unobtrusively, aggregate, and analyze it; the ability to store it cheaply; the 
ubiquity of interconnectedness; and the magnitude and speed of all aspects of the way 
we think about, use, characterize, manipulate, and represent information are 
fundamentally and continuously changing. '4 
Data protection 
In the context of migration, advanced technology is being used as a tool to control 
borders, identify individuals, verify the authenticity of travel documents, and deliver 
3 Waldo, James; Lin, Herber S; and Millett Lynette I (2007) Engaging Privacy and Information 
Technology in a Digital Age at 27. 
4 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 30. 
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public services and humanitarian aid. There is, however, a growing concern that States 
are using surveillance techniques and biometric systems to keep track of the 
movement of individuals. Often the protection of personal data is absent in technology 
used to manage migration. If seen from a human rights perspective, that is, data 
protection stemming from the right to privacy, it becomes apparent that data protection 
includes the right to control personal data related to oneself. In recent years, privacy 
advocates have called for caution in the implementation of migration law and policy 
that focus on border control and overlook the human rights of migrants. While 
advanced technology facilitates migration management and data exchange, it also 
threatens human rights and creates vulnerabilities relating to data theft, data loss, 
inappropriate disclosure and misuse of personal data. 5 This has been exacerbated by 
globalization and the exercise of State sovereignty in the wake of terrorism. 
Migration 
The 2013 United Nations Global Migration Statistics reveal that '232 million people 
or 3.2 per cent of the world's population are international migrants when compared to 
the 175 million in 2000 and 154 million in 1990' and the 'forecast for the year 2050, 
four decades from now, is about 405 million migrants. ' 6 This unprecedented increase 
in the number of migrants around the world has gained saliency in political debates 
and this has heightened the concern that weak migration management systems may 
5 Martens, Ruzayda (2011) /OM Data Protection Manual at 3. 
6 
'Number of international migrants rises above 232 million' UN News Centre, New York, II 
September 2013 
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa!news/population/number-of-intemational-migrants-
rises.html> 
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encourage irregular migration and endanger the safety and security of nationals.7 The 
2011 World Migration Report projected at the time that there is around a billion 
migrants worldwide (215 million international migrants and 740 million domestic 
migrants) and this was 'expected to expand in size and complexity due to growing 
demographic disparities, new global and political dynamics, technological revolutions 
and social networks' .8 'The digital world we live in today demonstrates that almost 2 
billion of the estimated 3 billion migrants are connected to the Internet, and while 
technology keeps people connected all over the world, it is not without risk to 
infringement of individual rights. '9 The September 2011 attacks and subsequent 
terrorist threats have added to the complexity, resulting in automatic links between 
migration, security and terrorism. 10 Consequently, migration is perceived negatively 
and immigration officials often overlook the rights enjoyed by migrants. International 
agencies have stressed to governments that there is a need to shift the focus to the 
voice of the migrant and the positive contribution of migration. 11 This shift in focus 
will foster the development of national migration strategies and laws that aim to 
manage migratory flows without infringing upon human rights and it will help to 
alleviate social and economic pressures by eventually leading to the creation of 
opportunities for both migrants and nationals of a country. 
7 Redpath, Jillyanne (2005) Biometrics and International Migration at 5. 
g Appave, Gervais; Laczko, Frank et a! (2011) World Migration Report 2011: Communicating 
Effectively about Migration at 3. 
9 
'Interview with William Lacy Swing, 'Director General of the International Organization of Migration 
(10M)' UN News Centre, New York, 6 December 2011 
<http://www. un. org/apps/news/newsmakers. asp ?N ewsiD=46> 
10 Op cit note 8, World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration. 
11 See for example, Appave, Gervais and Laczko, Frank (2013) The World Migration Report 2013: 
Migrant Well-Being and Development. 
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The above-mentioned pertinent migration issues create diverse challenges linked to 
data protection, and as such, give rise to three interrelated questions. First, to what 
extent should States be allowed to intrude into the private sphere of the individual? 
Second, should advanced technology drive policy or should we rather adopt a 
cautionary approach and develop laws that are flexible in its reach? Third, where do 
migrants fall in the spectrum and is the current legal framework on data protection 
sufficient to address the rights of people on the move? This thesis will explore these 
questions in the area at the intersection between data protection and migration. 
1.1 Objectives 
This thesis covers two broad objectives. The primary objective is to identity gaps and 
loopholes in the current legal framework covering data protection and migration. The 
secondary objective is to look in detail at the challenge of having to balance between 
State interests and individual rights. The cross-border dimension of data protection 
will be highlighted to provide a better understanding of the nexus between data 
protection and migration, particularly in the context of humanitarian assistance and 
migration management where unwanted and inappropriate disclosure of personal data 
could result in a wide range of risks, including threat to life and safety. Moreover, a 
human rights based approach will be adopted to identity the gaps and help draw the 
line between balancing the exercise of State sovereignty and respecting the individual 
rights of people travelling within and across borders. 
14 
International migration law 
In the absence of a defined body of law on international migration, States are 
increasingly exercising their sovereignty to address globalization, combat terrorism 
and deter irregular migration. In addition to privacy concerns, this has given rise to 
migrant profiling, discrimination and limitations on the freedom of movement and the 
right to family unity. In this context, the core minimum standards to be accorded to 
migrants will be outlined, as well as policy imperatives with an emphasis on the 
principle of proportionality and accountability, which is necessary to limit the 
discretionary power of immigration officials when using advanced technology. By 
supporting the 2009 Madrid Resolution, 12 which calls for a legally binding instrument 
at the international level, this thesis argues that a firm legal basis is needed to clearly 
define data protection as a universal legal right. This will, in tum, give rise to 
corresponding State obligations. 
Data protection law 
A global assessment indicates that national data protection laws are increasing. 13 
Currie and Allan attribute this increase to the extraordinary influence of the EU 
12 The Madrid Resolution International Standards on the Protection of Privacy and Data Protection 
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, 5 November 2009 
<http://www .privacyconference2009 .org/dpas _space/space_ reserved/docu 
mentos _ adoptados/common/2009 _ Madrid/estandares _resolucion _madrid_ en. pdf>. 
13 See also op cit note 5, 10M Data Protection Manual at 107-108 which demonstrates at its date of 
publication that there were approximately 63 jurisdictions with specific laws on data protection, this 
number is in the increase with a number of draft Jaws in the making as seen in the recent global 
overview in DLA Piper (2013) Data Protection Laws of the World. 
<http://www. thelawyer.com/Joumals/20 13/03/20/t/b/1/Data _Protection_ Laws_ of_ the_ World_ 2013-
414865.pdf> 
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Directive, 14 which require adequate data protection systems outside the European 
Union for trade reasons. 15 The increase is also due to proactive steps taken by 
legislators to close the gap between the growth in technology and the absence of laws 
regulating the processing of personal data. However, with the exception of the 
European context, and unless covered by bilateral agreements between States, 16 
national laws are generally limited to the territory of one State. The law of one country 
is not binding on its neighbours, but there is a need to establish common legal 
standards when handing personal data of migrants travelling across borders. 
Arguably, certain rights extend beyond geographical lines, but should data protection 
extend beyond borders if it is recognized as a legal right? In the European Union, the 
answer to this question is unequivocally - yes - data protection is explicitly 
recognized as a fundamental human right afforded to all individuals within the borders 
of the European Union. 17 The EU Directive, while covering data protection, has an 
underlying purpose to facilitate data exchange across borders and between member 
14 The official name of the EU Directive is the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data 
and on the free movment of such data which is the most comprehensive legal instrument on data 
protection. 
15 Currie, lain and Allan, Kate (2007) 'Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating 
Proposals for an Information Protection Regulator' at 572. 
16 With regard to data protection, there is for example, the Safe Harbor Agreement between the United 
States of America and the European Union which aims to regulate trade relations requiring the flow of 
personal data provided adequate safeguards are in place to protect personal data in line with the EU 
Directive. The implementation of this Agreement is questionable, but the legal basis does exist. For 
further detail on the Safe Harbor Agreement see: Anneliese (2009) 'The Law of Data (Privacy) 
Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study', UN ISA theses and dissertations at 144 
<http://uir. unisa.ac.za/handle/ I 0500/1463 ?show=full> 
17 Article 8 of the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that: '(1) Everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. (2) Such data must be processed 
fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. (3) Compliance with these rules shall be subject 
to control by an independent authority.' 
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states of the European Union. Nonetheless, the European regional legal instruments on 
data protection are comprehensive and it is constantly evolving to better protect 
individual rights. 18 
Regional and domestic law 
This thesis will assess whether the European model can be translated to the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) in light of the different social, economic 
and political realities experienced in the fifteen Southern African States. 19 
Recommendations will be proposed to promote discussion on how to integrate data 
protection into the development of coherent migration strategies, law and policy in this 
region. Regardless of the region of focus, to protect individual rights effectively, it is 
important to continually monitor new developments and ask whether the balance 
between privacy and competing interests are right for today? This calls for a balanced 
approach, which on the one hand - recognizes the need to collect and process personal 
data to the benefit of both States and migrants, and on the other hand - respects the 
rights of people on the move. The criteria for this balancing test, which should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, will be established with reference to South African 
jurisprudence. 
For ease of reference key terms used throughout this thesis are defined and 
18 See chapter 3.2 for discussion on the European data protection reform. 
19 Currently SADC has fifteen Member States, namely: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For further detail see the 
SADC website <http://www.sadc.int/english/about-sadc/> 
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abbreviations are listed, in the attached Annexures Band C, respectively. 
1.2 Contribution to knowledge in the area of research 
The information age has given rise to increased debate on pnvacy issues and on 
protecting personal data from unauthorized and inappropriate disclosure. There is, 
however, little debate on the rights of migrants in this context. There are indeed 
several studies on privacy and increasingly on data protection, as well as extensive 
studies on migration. However, few studies have canvassed the intersection between 
data protection and migration. The right to privacy is protected as a universal right in 
numerous international instruments, but there is to date, no legally binding instrument 
on data protection. Nor is there an overarching legal instrument covering international 
migration. This thesis looks at the crossroad between data protection and migration 
and seeks to contribute to the academic knowledge and current developments in this 
field. It supports the 2009 Madrid Resolution calling for a legally binding instrument 
at international level because a firm legal basis will clearly define data protection as a 
legal right and give rise to corresponding State obligations. Moreover, by 
incorporating a human rights based approach into migration strategies, laws and 
policy; it will help States to draw the line between balancing the exercise of State 
sovereignty and respecting the rights of individuals travelling within and across their 
borders. The intention is to help legislators and policy-makers to urge States to 
proceed with promulgating a binding law on data protection that affords the legal right 
to all individuals including migrants while trying to achieve the objective of managing 
18 
their borders. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The research was based on library and on-line resources. Primary and secondary 
materials on data protection and migration at the international and regional (Europe 
and SADC) levels and within the South African context were relied upon. In addition, 
human rights legal instruments, case law and academic commentaries on data 
protection and international migration law were reviewed, as well as available policies 
at international organizations. The methodology included the collection of qualitative 
data. Since this thesis focuses on the point of intersection between data protection and 
migration, interviews were conducted with academics and practitioners in both fields. 
The following interviews were conducted in South Africa and in Switzerland during 
the period January 2011 -August 2011: 20 
Lawyers for Human Rights; Ramjathan-Keogh, Kaajal; Head of the Refugee and Migrant 
Rights Programme; 12 January 2011 at 11h30; LHR, 2nd Floor Braamfontein Centre, 23 
Jorissen Street, cnr Jan Smuts Street, Johannesburg 
20 The interviews were informal and semi-structured. During January 2011 back-to-back interviews 
were carried out in Johannesburg with the practitioners and academics and between December 20 II to 
August 2011 interviews were carried out in Geneva with experts from the International Organization for 
Migration. Informal discussions were also held with a representative of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees; Beck, Alexander; Senior Legal Officer at the Department of International 
Protection UNCHR Headquarters and a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross; 
Bircher, Romain; Head of Data Protection Unit ICRC Headquarters; and conducted in Brussels on 8 
November 2012. 
19 
University of Witwatersrand; Visser Cornelius; Lecturer, Privacy Expert; 12 January 
2011 at 13h00; Wits, office 83, Oliver Schreiner, School of Law Building, West Campus, 
Johannes burg 
Human Rights Advocate; Bizos, George; Senior Advocate, Constitutional Litigation 
Unit; Legal Resources Centre; 12 January 2011 at 15h00; LRC Senate House, 20 Albert 
Street, Johannesburg 
African Centre for Migration and Society; Landau, Loren; Director of Forced Migration 
and Refugees Studies Programme; 12 January 2011 at 17h00, Wits, South West 
Engineering building, Johannesburg 
Legal Aid South Africa; Mayet, Achmed; Senior Litigation Impact Lawyer; 13 January 
2011 at 14:30; 41 Fox Street Marshaltown, Johannesburg 
International Organization for Migration; Mariano, Bernardo; Regional Representative of 
East and Southern Africa; while on travel duty at the 10M Headquarters, 27 May 2011 at 
10h30, 1st floor, Avenue des Morillons, Geneva 
International Organization for Migration; Martens, Jonathan; 21 Senior Specialist on 
Migrant Assistance; 24 July 2011 at 11h30, 10M Headquarters, 4th floor, Avenue des 
Morillons, Geneva 
International Organization for Migration; Perruchoud, Richard; Former Legal Advisor 
and Director of the Department of International Migration Law and Legal Affairs; 24 
July 2011 at 14h30; 10M Headquarters, 1st floor, Avenue des Morillons, Geneva; and 4 
August 2011 at 21 h30 by email 
Interview questions, as outlined in the attached Annexure A, where developed for the 
semi-structured interviews with experts to address policy level issues and the 
21 It should be noted that Martens, Jonathan is my husband and the interview was conducted in his 
professional capacity at the 10M offices. 
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challenge of implementing human rights in the context of migration. The informal 
interviews focused on legal/policy considerations including the practical realities when 
collecting and processing personal data of migrants. The expertise, experience, views 
and opinions of the interviewees were particularly useful in identifying important 
policy considerations and this informed the analysis in this thesis. It also helped to 
outline the practical challenges and good practices associated with protecting personal 
data of migrants. The outcome of the interviews is filtered throughout this thesis. 
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1.4 Limitations 
This thesis provides a legal analysis from the international law perspective. However, 
due to the lack of directly applicable positive law on the specific topic, the focus 
turned to domestic law with the view to use the South African jurisprudence as a guide 
to illustrate criteria that could be applied at the meeting point between data protection 
and migration. Since data protection and migration are both cross-border issues, 
domestic law cannot be looked at in isolation, it is for this reason that materials 
available at the regional level in Europe were analysed with the view to explore 
whether the practice of European States can be replicated by States in the SADC 
region. 
It should be noted that there were limited materials available on the nexus between 
data protection and migration and this resulted in an inference being drawn from 
resources in the data protection field on the one hand, and the migration field on the 
other hand. Further, in the absence of directly applicable positive law, the research 
turned to soft law at the international level and relied upon on-line resources and case 
law at the European and South African levels. The analysis of such materials, 
supplemented by expert interviews, helped to address the pertinent issues lying at the 
interface between data protection and migration. 
22 
CHAPTER 
TWO 
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2. NEXUS BETWEEN DATA PROTECTION AND MIGRATION 
This chapter provides a background to the challenge of having to balance between 
States interests and individual rights and sets the stage for the remaining chapters. 
Specific examples in the context of humanitarian operations and migration 
management are used to provide a better understanding of the complexities arising at 
the nexus between and data protection and migration. 
1.2 Background 
The globalization of irregular migration and its facilitation by transnational criminal 
groups, coupled with concerns of terrorism, has radically impacted the way in which 
States manage migration and national security. As a result, the last decade has 
witnessed the increased use of advanced technology to manage large volumes of data 
and monitor migratory movements, but often without due regard to the impact on 
individuals and their human rights. 
Normative approach 
While migration management is a means by which to protect State borders, it should 
not be at the expense of individual rights, including the human rights enjoyed by 
migrants. As outlined in this thesis, any limitation to individual rights should be 
properly balanced against States interests and it should be necessary and proportionate. 
24 
This thesis focuses on a normative approach, which emphasizes migration and data 
protection from a human rights perspective. Waldo, Lin, Lynette link the 'formal 
normative basis for data protection laws to catalogues of international and regional 
treaties that expressly recognize the right to privacy as a human right' and emphasize 
that this is central to the rationale for protecting personal data.22 Bygrave stresses the 
normative importance of data protection as it provides legal and ethical counter-
weights to technological imperatives and says even though data protection instruments 
are not binding at the international level, the principles contained therein 'form a field 
of law and policy that has attained considerable maturity, spread and normative 
importance over the last four decades. '23 
Human rights perspective 
According to Cholewinsky, Perruchoud and McDonald international migration law 
exists as a source of law dispersed among already established areas of law and this 
gives rise to a normative approach to migration, which is comprised of two aspects. 
Firstly, principles and standards that derive from State sovereignty including 
protecting borders, conferring nationality, admission and expulsion, combatting 
human trafficking and smuggling, and safety of national security; and secondly, the 
22 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 381-382. 
23 See: Bygrave, Lee A (2002) Data Protection Law, Approaching its Rationale Logic and Limits 
generally and,Bygrave, Lee A (20 1 0) 'Privacy and data protection in an international perspective' at 
166. Hornung, also recognizes privacy and data protection as fundamental human rights and cautions 
that the emergence of new technologies are an increased threat to privacy and data protection, for 
further detail see: Hornung, G (2013) 'Regulating Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Seizing the 
Opportunity of the Future European Data Protection Framework.' 
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human rights of those involved in migratory movements.Z4 According to the United 
Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'there is 
relatively little research from a human rights perspective into the reasons why 
migrants [as opposed to refugees] move. 
There is a need to go beyond economic explanations of migration which focus on 
income poverty and focus also on human poverty, which takes into account the lack of 
health care, food, education, and inequality of opportunity, discrimination, etc. If seen 
in this way, the link between poverty and human rights is clear. '25 The distinction 
between economic migrants and vulnerable migrants are sometimes blurred and this 
calls for greater caution when handling personal data of migrants in general. For 
example, migrants who leave their home to seek better economic opportunities may be 
subject to human trafficking during their migratory route and are vulnerable to 
traffickers who may exploit them to make a profit through the sale of human lives. 
Although migrants may move for economic reasons, migrants should not be viewed as 
commodities themselves.26 They should be seen as individuals who are entitled to the 
full enjoyment of their human rights, regardless of the root cause of their movements. 
Privacy, on the other hand, can sometimes be seen as a commodity when private facts 
and information are shared across borders and it is used for trade purposes. Cavoukian 
notes that privacy remains a fundamental human right even if a degree of control is 
24 Cholewinski, Ryszard; Perruchoud, Richard and MacDonald, Euan (2007) International Migration 
Law: Developing Paradyms and Key Challenges at ix. 
25 United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) 'Migration and 
Development: A Human Rights Approach' at 2 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/docs/HLMigration/MigrationDevelopmentHC'spaper.pdf> 
26 Ibid, OHCHR 'Migration and Development: A Human Rights Approach.' 
26 
lost once it becomes a commodity.27 Similarly, human dignity is intrinsic to 
individuals and this remains intact regardless of whether an individual travels in a 
regular or irregular manner. 
Human rights for migrants 
At the international level there is a shift towards focusing on the human rights of 
migrants as evidenced by the establishment of human rights mechanisms in this area, 
namely, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the Committee 
on Migrant Workers, both of which have been clear in stating that 'although countries 
have a sovereign right to determine conditions of entry and stay in their territories, 
they also have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of all 
individuals under their jurisdiction, regardless of their nationality or origin and 
regardless of their immigration status. ' 28 The OHCHR goes further to argue that the 
'human rights of migrants are central and not ancillary because the effect of respecting 
human rights has far reaching impacts on society as it goes beyond the individual 
migrant'. 29 Xenophobia, for example, not only affects migrants negatively but it also 
threatens the very principle of a free and open democracy built on the recognition that 
all individuals have dignity and are equal in society. Moreover, with globalization 
27 Cavoukian, Ann (1999) Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. an Economic Right: An Attempt 
at Conciliation. Anneliese Roos, also acknowledges that personal data has become a commodity for 
both the State and the private sector, for further detail see: Roos, Anneliese (2000) 'Data Protection for 
South Africa: Expectations Created by the Open Democracy Bill' at 41. 
28 See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 'Migration and 
Human Rights' 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/MigrationAndHumanRightsindex.aspx > 
29 Op cit note 25, OHCHR 'Migration and Development' at 2. 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/docs/HLMigration/MigrationDevelopmentHC'spaper.pdf> 
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one's society extends beyond borders and it can no longer be limited to a geographical 
line. 
The United Nations Secretary-General also recently urged States to achieve policy 
coherence at the national, regional and international levels regarding the various issues 
associated with migration in order to protect the human rights ofmigrants.30 'Ensuring 
that all migrants, regardless of their immigration status, enjoy their internationally 
recognized human rights at all stages of the migratory processes in countries of origin, 
transit and destination should be the guiding principle of migration governance. ' 31 
Cholewinski emphasized, as early as 1997, that 'the right to equality and non-
discrimination are all encompassing with reference to race colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin and it applies equally to 
migrants because international human rights law in principle applies to all persons 
regardless of nationality and immigration status. ' 32 
State obligations 
States have rights and obligations under international law. This includes the right to 
sovereignty and the duty to protect and keep its citizens secure within its borders. A 
30 United Nations 'Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Including Ways and Means to Promote 
the Human Rights of Migrants' Report of the Secretary-General (A/641156), 21 July 2010 
<http://daccess-dds-ny. un.org/doc/UN DOC/G EN IN 1 0/459/22/PD FIN I 045922.pdf?OpenElement> 
31 Bustamante, Jorge A. 'Human Rights of Migrants' Report ofthe Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants (A/65/222) 3 August 2010 <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/474/88/PDF/N1047488.pdf?OpenElement> 
32 Cholewinski, Ryszard ( 1999) Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law: Their Protection 
in Countries of Employment at 48. 
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challenge, however, arises when States have to strike a balance and take progressive 
steps to equally protect the rights of individuals, including the rights of non-nationals 
travelling within and across its borders. It is indeed a delicate exercise to balance State 
sovereign rights and individual rights in the context of migration. Notwithstanding this 
challenge, when it comes to data protection, it is important to consider the bounds of 
privacy, especially in a world where information technology continues to grow. This 
thesis does not look into the philosophical aspect of privacy or the classical theories 
related to this concept. Instead, it views privacy as a fundamental human right as 
recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and related 
international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966).33 As outlined by Cavoukian, 'privacy is a core human value that goes to the 
very heart of preserving human dignity and autonomy,' 34 and as a fundamental right, it 
is equally afforded to all migrants. 35 
Migration law 
According to the statistics of the OHCHR, 'there is an estimated 214 million people 
who currently live outside their country of origin, many having moved for a variety of 
reasons in which the search for protection and the search for opportunity are 
inextricably entwined. ' 36 Despite this large number, there is no overarching 
international law covering the movement of migrants, nor are migrants referred to as a 
specific group in one international legal binding instrument. Instead, the rights of 
33 See chapter 3 for further detail. 
34 Op cit note 27, Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. an Economic Right: An Attempt at 
Conciliation at 4 iqcludes a detailed discussion on privacy as a human right. 
35 See chapter 3.1 for a further discussion on privacy. 
36 For further detail, see op cit note 28, OHCHR 'Migration and Human Rights.' 
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migrants are dispersed across various branches of international law, including human 
rights law, criminal law, labour law, humanitarian law, refugee law, nationality law 
and the law of the sea. While State sovereignty envisages the right to protect borders 
and to determine conditions for admission, stay and removal; once non-nationals are in 
their territory, States are bound by their international obligations to protect, respect 
and enforce human rights without discrimination. 
The importance of the human rights of migrants is evidenced by the appointment of 
the Special Rapporteur on Human Right ofMigrants37 and by the High-level Dialogue 
on International Migration and Development (HLD) held in 2006 and most recently 
the HLD held in October 2013. The High-Level Dialogue brings together all Member 
States of the United Nations for policy discussions at the General Assembly and as 
emphasized by the current Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, 
Fran<;ois Crepeau, 'this High-level Dialogue should affirm that migration, human 
rights and development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. ' 38 The HLD did 
affirm this through the promulgation of the 2013 Declaration on the High-Level 
Dialogue adopted by the UN member states at the HLD, and this fruitful outcome 
'recognizes that international migration is a multidimensional and a crosscutting 
phenomenon that should be addressed in a coherent, comprehensive and balanced 
37 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants was created in 1999 
pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 999/44. See: United Nations Office of the 
High Commission for Human Rights: (OHCHR) 'Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants' 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/SRMigrantslndex.aspx> 
38 
'Preparing for the 2013 High-level Dialogue: A Human Rights Perspective' Presentation by 
Professor Franr;ois Crepeau Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants Tenth Coordination 
Meeting on International Migration, New York, 9-10 February 2012. See: 
<http://www. un. org/ esa/population/meetings/tenthcoord20 12/S RM%20Final %20statement. pdf> 
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manner, integrating development with due regard for social, economic and 
environmental dimensions and respecting human rights; confirms the need to protect 
human rights of migrants; condemns discrimination and xenophobia; and recognizes 
that international cooperation is needed to address the challenge of irregular migration 
with full respect for human rights.' 39 To further underscore the importance of the 
human rights of migrants, the United Nations proclaimed 18 December as 
'International Migrants Day' .40 
Privacy and data protection 
Even though the expression of the right to privacy differs across national jurisdictions, 
there is consensus that the sanctity of the private sphere should be protected from 
arbitrary interference. Moreover, the right to privacy includes information privacy, 
which is often seen to be synonymous to data protection. In this thesis the terms 'data 
protection', 'information privacy' and 'data privacy' are used interchangeably. States 
and humanitarian organizations inevitably engage in the collection and processing of 
personal data, whether to manage the flow of migrants within and across borders or to 
provide humanitarian assistance to individuals in need. It is, thus, important to ensure 
that data protection is recognized as an integral part of the development and 
implementation of migration law and policy that focus on the use of technology for the 
purpose of facilitating migratory movements. 
39 United Nations General Assembly 'Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development' (A/86/L.5) 1 October 2013. 
40 United Nations General Assembly 'Proclamation of 18 December as International Migrants Day' 
(A/RES/55/93) 28 February 2001. 
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Vulnerabilities in migration 
It should be noted that vulnerable migrant groups such as refugees and asylum-
seekers, trafficked persons, smuggled persons, unaccompanied minors and irregular 
migrants41 are particularly susceptible to the consequences of unwanted or 
inappropriate disclosure of their personal data as they often lack effective protection 
from their State and have little legal recourse. While national migration law and policy 
creates protection for different categories of migrants, State obligations toward 
individuals who travel in an irregular manner are often unclear. Consequently, 
decisions are left to immigration officials and law enforcement authorities who 
sometimes make arbitrary decisions. Such decisions are made through the immigration 
lens and without due recognition of the human rights afforded to all individuals. Even 
though irregular migration impedes the legitimate functioning of government 
initiatives to regulate conditions of entry and stay, the contravention of national 
immigration laws should not detract from the State's human rights obligations.42 This 
thesis emphasises that data protection is not restricted to nationals of a particular 
country; it applies to migrants as well, whether they travel in a regular or irregular 
manner. 
Nowadays, vulnerable migrant groups who need special protection often travel 
alongside economic migrants using the same migratory routes and crossing the same 
41 Op cit note 30. The Secretary General of the United Nations states that 'the term "illegal migrant" is 
broadly used in the context of the criminalization of irregular migration. It is however not recognized in 
international law [ ... ] "irregular" or "non-documented" migrant, as defined by Article 5 of the 
International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families ( 1990) 
are internationally accepted terms to describe the situation of not having, or having lost, the proper 
documents that allow migrants either to reside in a given territory or to work there.' 
42 Op cit note 8, World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration at 104. 
32 
borders without the requisite documentation. This increase in mixed migration43 has 
blurred the distinction between the root causes of migration. Travelling without 
documentation creates a space for human smugglers and human traffickers and this 
facilitates irregular migration. As stated by the Global Migration Group: 'Irregular 
migrants often face prolonged detention or ill-treatment, and in some cases 
enslavement, rape or even murder. They are more likely to be targeted by xenophobes 
and racists, victimized by unscrupulous employers and sexual predators, and can 
easily fall prey to criminal traffickers and smugglers. Too often, States have addressed 
irregular migration solely through the lens of sovereignty, border security or law 
enforcement, sometimes driven by hostile domestic constituencies [ ... ]. Although 
States have legitimate interests in securing their borders and exercising immigration 
controls, such concerns cannot, and indeed, as a matter of international law do not, 
trump the obligations of the State to respect the internationally guaranteed rights of all 
[ ] ,44 persons .... 
In the context of mixed migration, States and international organizations also collect, 
or attempt to gain access to, personal data of migrants in order to assess the protection 
needs of individuals travelling within mixed flows and to address the issue of deterring 
irregular migration. Having access to personal data is indeed a necessary component of 
assessing the needs of individuals and the protection interventions required, however, 
the collection and processing of personal data needs to be regulated to ensure that the 
43 Mixed migration is defined as 'the mixed flow of migrants, that is, complex migratory population 
movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants as opposed to 
migratory population movements that consists entirely of one category of migrants.' See op cit note 2, 
International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration 2"ct Edition at 63. 
44 
'Landmark Statement on Protecting the Human Rights of Migrants' Global Migration Group, 30 
September 2010 <http://www. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/MigrantslnlrregularSituation. aspx> 
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use thereof does not infringe upon individual rights or result in identification that 
could harm vulnerable migrants in particular. 
Data protection law 
The 1990 United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal 
Data Files (UN Guidelines) draw from the commonly accepted data protection 
principles as set out in the Council of Europe and European Union legal instruments 
and the Guidelines of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD),45 but it fails to oblige States to enforce data protection as a legal right. As 
evidenced by the 31st International Conference on Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, there is a need to strengthen the international character of data 
protection through the adoption of a universal and binding international instrument.46 
This thesis supports the Joint Proposal for Setting International Standards on Privacy 
and Personal Data Protection adopted at this Conference and has a closer look to 
determine if it sufficiently addresses data protection issues in the migration context. 
Generally, data protection concerns include, inter alia, unlawful and unfair collection 
without the consent of the person, lack of data quality, collection of excessive 
categories of data, unclear purposes which are not communicated to the person at the 
time of collection or disclosure, inadequate confidentiality obligations, unsafe data 
storage, lack of data security mechanisms, inappropriate and improper disclosure, and 
45 See chapter 3.2 fur futher detail. 
46 Op cit note 12, 'The Madrid Resolution International Standards on the Protection of Privacy and 
Data Protection.' 
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unauthorized use for purposes unrelated to the specified purpose for collecting the 
personal data in the first place. In the context of migration, if data protection 
safeguards are absent, the life and safety of individuals can also be threated. 
Data protection practice 
Ideally protection standards should be pre-empted by law, however, sometimes 
practice goes further than law and in the absence of a legally binding international 
instrument one has to look at the practice at international level. The United Nations 
agencies and other intergovernmental organizations47 generally adhere to the standards 
set out in the UN Guidelines, albeit non-binding. Some agencies simply follow the UN 
Guidelines but do not have comprehensive institutional policies, while others who may 
have internal policies in the making are still indecisive whether they should be made 
publicly available. Recently, at the 41h International Data Protection Workshop, the 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) presented their data protection 
policies on protecting personal data in the context of prosecutions and investigations. 48 
In addition, the International Organization for Migration published its Data Protection 
47 Relevant agencies operating in the migration context include the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) amongst others. 
48 The 41h International Data Protection Workshop was organized by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor and the World Customs Organization, 8-9 November 2012, Brussels, Belgium. Participants 
included representatives from 50 international and European agencies specializing in privacy and data 
protection. 
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Manual in 2010 and this provides guidance focused on protecting personal data of 
. 49 
migrants. 
It should be mentioned that while available policies and guidelines are indeed useful, 
there are new arising issues such as crises mapping that are yet to be addressed by 
international organizations. 5° This issue of crises mapping will be discussed in the next 
section. 
2.2 Points of Intersection 
This section aims to illustrate the meeting point between data protection and migration 
in the context of humanitarian assistance and migration management. It highlights the 
concern for protecting the life and security of the individual and the need to address 
human rights implications prior to using advanced technology, and discusses the 
emerging issue of crisis mapping and third party requests to access personal 
information collected during humanitarian operations. It emphasizes that migration 
management efforts require engagement in case specific sensitivity assessments and 
application of the proportionality test when using technology such as biometric 
49 The 10M Data Protection Manual was published to coincide with International Data Protection Day, 
see: '10M Publishes Data Protection Manual' 10M Press Briefing, Geneva, Switzerland, 27 January 
20 12<http://www. iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media!press-briefing-notes/pbnEU/cache/offonce?entry Id=31191 > 
5° Crisis Mapping can be described as the combination of information collection, visualization and 
analysis within the context of a dynamic interactive map. See Patrick Meier, 'What is Crisis Mapping? 
An Update on the Field and Looking Ahead' iRevolution, 20 January 2011 < 
http://irevolution.net/2011101/20/what-is-crisis-mapping/> and Patrick Meier's overview of the IOM 
Data Protection Manual with reference to crises mapping in his article 'On Crowdsourcing, Crisis 
Mapping and Data Protection Standards' iRevolution, 5 February 2012 < 
http :1 /irevo I ution.net/20 12/02/0 5 /iom-data-protection/> 
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systems to ensure that adequate data protection safeguards are applied after weighing 
the benefits and risks to individual rights. It also highlights means by which to reduce 
the risks to data protection with reference to privacy impact assessments and inclusion 
of 'privacy by design' into the technology itself, coupled with human intervention and 
complaints mechanisms, to address inherent fallibilities in the system. In addition, it 
supports the view that if migration is addressed from a human rights based approach it 
can help States to address migration issues more coherently. 
i) Humanitarian Assistance 
'Data collection in conflict zones is extremely sensitive as it may put 
people at risk, or distort reality in a way that may invoke harm. ' 51 
The collection and processing of personal data is an integral part of humanitarian 
operations. Often data collection is necessary to assess the target group and to identify 
the specific needs of women, children, elderly and persons with Human 
Immunodeficiency virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV I AIDS). 52 It is 
also needed to ensure that individuals are registered to receive international protection, 
emergency relief items such as food, shelter and medical treatment, and where 
necessary, to effect evacuation to safe-havens. In conflict situations, improper use and 
51 Ibid, 'On Crowdsourcing, Crisis Mapping and Data Protection Standards' at 3. 
52 United Nations Population Fund (2010) Guidelines on Data issues in Humanitarian Crisis Situations 
at 34. 
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unauthorized disclosure of personal data could result in a multitude of risks, ranging 
from physical violence to discrimination and social marginalization. 53 
Conflict situations 
To date, the Rwandan Genocide and civil war of 1994 was one of the world's worst 
humanitarian crises. 54 The personal data of Rwandan nationals in the context of the 
crisis was particularly sensitive, their names revealed their ethnicity, and any 
disclosure to the opposition ethnic group placed them in harms way. Amidst the 
catastrophic incidents, which resulted in the death of an insurmountable number of 
Rwandan nationals massacred because of their Hutu or Tutsi ethnicity, United Nations 
aid officials were also killed. 55 During the humanitarian assistance provided by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), one of its employees allegedly 
disclosed privileged and confidential information including the names, contact lists, 
safe-havens and whereabouts of UNDP beneficiaries and humanitarian aid workers, as 
well as the evacuation points at border posts. According to news reports, the UNDP 
employee was a computer technician who could have had access to the personnel 
records of staff and beneficiaries; alternatively, the confidential information could 
have been inadvertently revealed by one of his colleagues who viewed him as a trusted 
colleague. 56 Regardless of the manner in which he obtained access to the confidential 
53 Op cit note 5, 10M Data Protection Manual at 13. See also 'Data Collection in Humanitarian 
Response: A Guide for incorporating Protection', Inter-Action Protection Working 
Group <http://www .jointokyo.org/images/cms/Data _Collection _in_ Humanitarian_ Response.pdf> 
54 Of similar magnitude is the Darfur crisis and the current Syrian crisis. 
55 
'UN Worker Arrested Over Genocide' Reuters, 13 April 2001 
<http:l/tvnz.co.nz/view/page/425822/36358> 
56 See: Stein, Ginny 'Rwanda - Questions of Murder' SBS Dateline, 21 February 2007 
<http: I lwww. s bs. com. au/ dateline/story /transcript/ id/ 13 07 43/n/R wanda-Questions-of-Murder>. 
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information, the method was clearly deceptive and the disclosure resulted in the death 
of the persons identified on the contact lists. 
Rwanda case 
It is alleged that this UNDP employee was complicit in, or even, directly involved in 
killing 32 Rwandan beneficiaries and 27 UNDP staff. In 2009 the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) failed to sign an indictment against the alleged 
UNDP employee on the basis of insufficient evidence of genocide to warrant 
prosecution before the ICTR. However, he was arrested in Paris following a warrant 
issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for allegedly killing the 32 Rwandans 
based on their ethnicity and for identifying UNDP staff to be killed.57 In January 2011 
France extradited him to the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but in 
December 2011 the ICC dismissed the case on the grounds of insufficient evidence. 58 
Although the allegations remain unresolved after several United Nations and 
international criminal investigations, this case illustrates the potential dangers that are 
present when collecting personal data in the context of humanitarian assistance. Harm 
or threat to the life is a concern for both humanitarian aid workers and the 
beneficiaries they seek to assist. 
57 See: 'ICC - France Arrests Rwandan Rebel Leader Callixte Mbarushimana in Paris for War Crimes 
Committed in DR Congo's Kivu Province in 2009' Congo Watch, 31 October 2010 
<http://congowatch.blogspot.com/20 10/1 0/icc-france-arrests-rwandan-rebel-leader.html?m= I> 
58 See: 'Callixte Mbarushimana is Released from Custody' ICC Press Release, 23 December 2011 
<http: I lwww. icc-cp i. int/NR/ exeres/ 4 D4 FA 434-3 060-4 EF7 -8 ESC-AD 5 C5 3 540 E64. htm> 
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Risk assessments 
It is, thus, of great importance to take extra care in situations of conflict and to ensure 
that personal data is kept strictly confidential. In addition, strict access controls to 
information technology systems and adequate data security measures are necessary to 
limit access to only authorized persons and to prevent it from falling into the hands of 
unscrupulous individuals with malicious intent. The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) recommends conducting a risk assessment prior to data collection 
and throughout the data processing process to ensure that adequate data protection 
safeguards are in place. This means weighing the probability of harm against the 
potential risks and ensuring that the benefits significantly outweigh the risks. 59 
Technology in emergencies 
International organizations are increasingly looking into advanced technology as an 
added value in preparation of their emergency response operations. One such method 
is crisis mapping, which is not new to the humanitarian field. Crisis mapping can be 
defined as the use of population census maps, and most recently, satellite images 
through Internet access points as a tool to plan humanitarian intervention in crises 
situations.60 In the past it has been used as a pre-emptive activity to ensure effective 
and efficient rollout of medical assistance and emergency relief items at the right time 
and at the right place. However, it is fast evolving with advanced surveillance 
technology that has added the dimension of virtual interaction in real time as well as 
59 Op cit note 5, !OM Data Protection Manual at 16-17. 
60 See also op cit note 50 for an explanation of crisis mapping. 
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live mapping. In addition, crisis mapping is complemented with geolocation61 tools 
such as mobile phones and Internet access points that allow individuals in need to 
communicate with the international community for help. 
Humanitarian emergencies have been at a peak lately with the Arab spring starting in 
January 2011, the consequent political crises in Syria, Mali, South Sudan and the 
Central African Republic, as well as many other ongoing internal conflicts and 
territorial wars that have resulted in forced migration. When coupled with population 
movements resulting from national disasters such as the January 2010 earthquakes in 
Haiti, the Pakistani floods in July 2010, and the Japanese tsunami, earthquake and 
nuclear meltdown in March 2011,62 it is clear that humanitarian actors need more 
effective methods to ensure timely intervention. Indeed, crisis mapping can be an 
effective emergency preparedness tool and advanced technology can help to gather 
data more comprehensively and speedily. During the crises in Libya, for example, a 
crisis map was developed for the United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), thereby facilitating insight into conflict areas which 
helped to identify points of access to provide humanitarian assistance where needed.63 
In addition, surveillance technology can facilitate access to a humanitarian crisis when 
61 Wikipedia defines 'geolocation' as the identification of the real-world geographic location of an 
object, such as a radar, mobile phone or Internet-connected computer terminal. 
62 David, Anne-Sophie 'Le nouvelles technologies au service del'aide humanitaire' French weekly Le 
Novel Economiste, 12 April2012. 
63 See: Searle, Louise and Wynn-Pope, Phoebe 'Crisis Mapping, Humanitarian Principles and the 
application of Protection Standards: A Dialogue between Crisis Mappers and Operational Humanitarian 
Agencies,' Meeting Record, 17 November 20 II, Geneva 
<http:/ /irevolution. files. wordpress. com/20 12/02/world-vision-geneva-report. pdf> 
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infrastructures are destroyed and communication to the outside world is cut off. 
Telecoms Without Borders is active in this area and it facilitates satellite links when it 
is impossible for United Nations aid workers to be physically present on the ground. 
As part of the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster it provides technical means to 
other non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies within 30 days of 
a crisis and facilitates virtual connection in less than 24 hours.64 Since humanitarian 
presence is shrinking in certain countries due to inter alia terrorist abductions of 
humanitarian workers, more international agencies are looking into the use of such 
surveillance techniques. 
Sensitivities 
Indeed, the use of this advanced technology in humanitarian crises is far reaching, but 
it is not without risks. 'Do no harm' is a universal principle that permeates the 
collection of data in humanitarian interventions.65 It is equally important to ensure that 
sharing of personal data, where necessary to meet the specified purpose of delivering 
humanitarian aid, does not result in backlash to individuals in their communities.66 
Disclosure of HIV I AIDS status is, for example, very sensitive and the power to decide 
how, when, to whom, and to what extent such personal medical data can be shared 
vests with the individual. While there are legal and ethical reasons of disclosure that 
could be justified, those living with HIV I AIDS often suffer discrimination related to 
the unauthorized disclosure of their HIVIAIDS status. For example, if the HIVIAIDs 
64 Ibid, 'Crisis Mapping, Humanitarian Principles and the application of Protection Standards: A 
Dialogue between !=risis Mappers and Operational Humanitarian'. 
65 Op cit note 53, Guidelines on Data Issues in Humanitarian Crisis Situations at 44. 
66 Ibid, Guidelines on Data Issues in Humanitarian Crisis Situations. 
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status of an individual is inadvertently revealed in a community where it is seen as 
taboo, it could result in discrimination, or even in physical violence. 67 Yet, this 
sensitive personal medical data is necessary to ensure that proper medical treatment is 
delivered to those migrants living with HIV/AIDS. Inaccurate recording of personal 
data could also have a negative impact on service delivery. The personal medical data 
of a migrant might, for example, be a determinant factor for his/her resettlement to 
another country; therefore if the medical data incorrectly indicates that the migrant is 
HIV positive, it could hamper the migrant's resettlement application if the country 
restricts entry based on medical grounds.68 
Data collection 
Data collection through crisis mapping has the potential to result in the development 
of data centres with large storage capacities. When Telecoms Without Borders set up 
satellite communication centres during the Libyan crisis and provided estimates and 
data analysis to the United Nations,69 it greatly enhanced the rollout of emergency 
relief items as it allowed humanitarian aid workers to project the movement of migrant 
groups, enabled registration and identification of their specific needs, and improved 
response times to service delivery. The establishment of data centres does, however, 
have the potential to jeopardize the safety of the very people they seek to protect. 
67 Op cit note 49, '10M Publishes Data Protection Manual' 
68 This is often under the guise of protecting the public health of nationals. For example, the United 
States of America used to have an entry ban on medical grounds and migrants with HIV/AIDS applying 
for resettlement would not qualify for the resettlement programme. This ban was, however, lifted in 
2009. Today HIV/AIDs can be treated and concerns for public safety are no longer warranted. See: 
Peston, Julia 'Obama Lifts a Ban on Entry into US by HIV Positive People' The New York Times, 30 
October 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/l 0/31 /us/politics/31 travel.html> 
69 Op cit note 63, 'Crisis Mapping, Humanitarian Principles and the application of Protection Standards: 
A Dialogue between Crisis Mappers and Operational Humanitarian Agencies.' 
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Since it stores large volumes of valuable and sensitive data, including personal data, it 
is of utmost importance to protect the location of the data centre, even if the location is 
in a remote area. 
Data security 
Data centres need a high level of security with controlled access to the physical 
location. In addition, high levels of data security mechanisms need to be in place to 
protect the computer technology from being accessed remotely by hackers. Any 
unauthorized access to databases used during humanitarian assistance, or inappropriate 
disclosure of personal data and sensitive information stored therein, could result in 
harm or threat to life especially in the context of volatile situations. Of utmost 
importance is that tools aiming to assist in a humanitarian crisis should not end up in 
the wrong hands as it can help persecutors to trace the whereabouts of individuals, and 
in the worst case scenario, facilitate ethnic cleansing as seen in the Rwandan case. 
Thus, humanitarian actors should ensure that safety precautions and data protection 
safeguards are embedded into strategies that envisage the use of crisis mapping and 
geolocation tools. In particular, it is paramount to ensure that the location of data 
centres are kept strictly secure and the location details must be privileged to those 
authorized individuals who require access for the specified purpose of the 
humanitarian operation. 
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Restricted data access 
Another issue that arises in humanitarian interventions is third party access requests to 
the valuable information captured by different agencies. In the Libya crises, for 
example, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) requested 
access to databases in order to verify human rights abuses. The International Criminal 
Court also tried to gain information in support of international criminal law 
investigations.70 Humanitarian actors such as international organization, and 
governmental and non-governmental entities operating in humanitarian interventions 
should be careful not to take up an 'information sharing role,' even under conditions 
of confidentiality, as this could compromise, inter alia, the humanitarian principles of 
impartiality, neutrality and independence. 71 It may also negatively impact on 
humanitarian operations where there is limited access to certain areas and it could 
jeopardize the safety of humanitarian aid workers and beneficiaries of the aid. 
While it is often necessary to share information with humanitarian partner agencies for 
a specified purpose related to the humanitarian operation, a prior assessment is needed 
to ensure that the safety of individuals are protected. In the migration context, the 
sensitivity of the personal data should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and it is 
important to balance between the benefit of data collection and the risk of 
unauthorized disclosure, bearing in mind that the benefits should always outweigh the 
70 Ibid, 'Crisis Mapping, Humanitarian Principles and the application of Protection Standards: A 
Dialogue between Crisis Mappers and Operational Humanitarian Agencies.' 
71 Op cit note 53, Guidelines on Data Issues in Humanitarian Crisis Situations provides detail on the 
importance of upholding these humanitarian principles. 
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risks.72 
Determiningfactors in the balancing test 
Any limitation to the rights and interests of data subjects in the migration context 
'should always be proportional to, or appropriately balanced with, the benefits gained 
when intending to derogate' from applying data protection safeguards. The test is one 
of 'reasonableness and the derogation must be sufficiently justified' to avoid an 
arbitrary decision.73 The 10M Data Protection Manual draws from humanitarian 
principles and in the application of the 10M policy also puts forward factors to 
consider when weighing competing rights against data protection, these include the 
nature of the personal data, prevailing circumstances, whether there is a pressing need 
to derogate from the commonly accepted data protection principles, the purpose 
achieved by the derogation, the nature and extent of the derogation, the relationship 
between the derogation and the specified purpose for which the personal data was 
collected, the proportionality between the extent of the derogation and the purpose of 
the derogation, and ensuring minimal impairment on the rights and interests of the 
individual by considering alternative measures to achieve the desired goal. The benefit 
to, and impact on, the data subject and the target population is an equally important 
consideration and the threat to the life, health and safety of individuals and 
humanitarian aid workers in the migration context is paramount.74 
72 Op cit note 5, !OM Data Protection Manual at 16-17. 
73 Ibid, !OM Data Protection Manual at 42. 
74 Ibid, !OM Data Protection Manual at 103. 
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ii) Migration Management 
'If a regime of "migration management" is to be effective, not only must it be 
credible to States, but it must also be credible to migrants.' 75 
States are increasingly using biometric systems as a migration management tool in 
order to manage large volumes of migrant data and to verify travel documents, but if it 
is used inappropriately and without adequate safeguards, it can have implications on 
individual rights. 76 This section examines the use of advanced technology in migration 
management, in particular biometric systems. 
Biometrics systems 
Biometric systems are defined as 'applications that use biometric technologies, which 
allow the automatic identification, and/or authentication/verification of a person. It is 
used to capture biometric data and this changes the relation between the body and 
identity because characteristics of the human body become machine-readable and 
easily accessible.' 77 Since biometric data is derived from the human body, it is unique 
in identifying an individual. This unique character relates to the integrity of the body, 
75 Amnesty International (2006) Living in the Shadows: A Premier on the Human Rights of Migrants 
<http://www .amnesty .ch/it/ doc/temi/asi lo-e-migrazione/fatti -e-cifre/ en-savoir-pIus> 
76 See similar arguments by Redpath, Jillyanne op cit note 7, Biometrics and International Migration at 
I 0-17 and Thomas, Rebekah (2005) Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights at 3 78. 
77 For definition and further discussion, see: The Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to the Protection of Personal (Data Protection Working Party) 'Opinion 3/2012 on Developments 
in Biometric Technologies' (WP193), 27 April 2012 <http:/!ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/20 12/wp 193 _en. pdf 
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and thus, has the potential to interfere with human dignity. 78 Other implications on 
human rights include disrespecting the right to privacy and data protection, violating 
the undertaking to keep biometric data confidential, and limiting the right to move 
around freely and lawfully. For example, if the biometric data of a migrant does not 
match the record in the system, notwithstanding the fact that the migrant is travelling 
legally and with the requisite documentation, immigration officials can and often do 
impede the migrant's movement at the border and this could result in the migrant 
being detained for unjustified reasons due to the biometric system failure. 
Advantages of biometrics 
The process of globalization has dramatically increased the number of migrants 
travelling across borders. Consequently, States are faced with the challenge of 
handling an increase in migratory flows while maintaining a sufficient level of 
security, and at the same time, respecting individual rights. In response, States have 
introduced extensive application of biometrics systems as a migration management 
tool.79 This started in the Europe and has spread globally even to countries that do not 
have the technological infrastructure needed to support biometric systems. Due to the 
constant evolution of technology, research shows that biometrics data do not only 
include traditional fingerprints, iris scans, facial image, hand geometry, voice 
recognition and signature verification; it now also includes multimodal identifiers such 
78 Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs 'Progress Report on the Applications of the 
Principles of Convention I 08 to the Collection and Processing of Biometric Data' (2005) at 82 - 84 in 
Data Protection: Compilation of Council of Europe Texts, Strasbourg, November 2010 
<http://www. coe. int/t/ dghl/standardsetting/ data protection/ dataprotcompli _en. pdf> 
79 Gromovs, Juris (2008) A Compendium of Legal Instruments of the European Union and the Council 
of Europe concerning the Use of Security Features and Biometric Identifiers in Passport and Travel 
Documents, Residence Permits and Short-term Visas at 279. 
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as vein prints. 80 However, the most frequently used and commonly known biometric 
feature is still the fingerprint. 81 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) sets the international standards 
on the use and functionality of biometrics in passports to control cross border 
movements through secure methods82 and concludes that the face is in fact the most 
suited for travel documents, with fingerprints and iris scans as a second choice. 83 
Coats confirms that the ICAO has set the standard for passports to include biometrics 
and this will drive the legislative requirement for biometric passports domestically and 
internationally for all passports. 84 Since biometric data is unique to each individual, it 
can guarantee the authenticity of identification documents indicating that a photograph 
or fingerprint represents who the person purports to be. This is an advantage for States 
because it helps to reduce document fraud and it assists with preventing the use of 
multiple identities, the latter believed to be used by terrorists. 85 It is therefore 
increasingly being used as a tool for screening individuals against watch lists and for 
80 Op cit note 76, see Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights at 383-384. 
81 Ibid, Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights at 7. See also: International Civil 
Aviation Organization 'Accelerating a Worldwide Approach to Biometric Identity Confirmation in 
MRTD's as the Key Token of Entitlement for Simplified Passenger Travel' Twelfth Report, Cairo, 
Egypt, 22 March 2004 to 2 April 2004 <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/fal!fall2/docu-
mentation/fall2ip007 _ en.pdf> 
82 Coats, William Sloan et. AI. (2007) The Practitioner's Guide to Biometrics at 198. 
83 The ICAO standards introduce interoperable global standard of biometrics in Machine Readable 
Travel Documents. For the latest developments, see: Knopjes, Fons 'Total Identity: Latest 
Developments ICAO' ID Management Centre <http://www.idmanagement-centre.com/> 
84 Op cit note 82, The Practitioner's Guide to Biometrics. 
85 Op cit note 78, 'Progress Report on the Applications of the Principles of Convention 108 to the 
Collection and Processing of Biometric Data' at 83. 
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managmg illicit movements. To note, though, that the European Data Protection 
Supervisor in looking specifically at biometrics has warned that the use of biometrics 
systems indirectly develops a category of male fide travellers and this could lead to a 
migration system based on suspicion instead of the good faith of travellers.86 What is 
useful is that biometric systems allow for an audit trail in the issuance of travel 
documents and it can also assist in the delivery of services to migrant populations. 87 
Technological flaws 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned positive aspects, biometric systems have 
inherent flaws embedded in the technology. Weather conditions can result in failure to 
read biometric data correctly and the realities of different groups of migrants such as 
amputee refugees who lack fingerprints are likely not be accommodated by this 
technology. Therefore the possibility of alternative mechanisms for vulnerable groups 
such as disabled persons and persons with ethnic or cultural identifying characteristics 
on their faces or hands, as well as children and elderly, need to be taken into account 
to ensure that individuals are not discriminated upon by the use of technology that 
does do not cater for special needs and natural change in biometric features due to age. 
86 See: European Data Protection Supervisor 'Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Migration' (2012/C 34/02), 9 July 2011, 
Official Journal of the European Union at 25 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:034:0018:0026:EN:PDF> 
87 Op cit note 7, Biometrics and International Migration at 8. 
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To address inherent technical flaws and human error when using biometric systems, 
the technology should be kept up to date and stored in places where the weather will 
not affect it. In addition, biometric systems should include features to cope with bodily 
differences and provide alternative mechanisms for vulnerable groups such as 
children, elderly, disabled persons, and persons with ethnic, cultural or religious 
identifying characteristics. 88 
Human alternatives 
Training of border officials is essential to avoid infringement of human rights. To 
ensure that individual rights are adequately protected, measures should be taken to 
ensure that border officials are equipped to handle exceptions such as failure of the 
technology in reading the biometric data, improper functioning or damage of the 
storage medium and tampering with documents. There should be procedures for 
exceptional circumstances to ensure that individuals are allowed to travel by either 
accepting alternative biometric features or allowing for a different method of 
identification. This would also help to avoid discrimination against an individual based 
on physical features such as ethnic markings that interfere with biometric readings. 
The Data Protection Working Group in Europe goes further to emphasize that an 
impact assessment should be employed given the potential harmful effects on the 
88 See: Homeland Security, Biometric Identification & Personal Detection Ethics (HIDE) 'Project 
Report on Policy Forum on Body Issues' 
<http://www.hideproject.org/downloads/deliverables/D4.2aPolicy _Forum_ Report_ on_ Body _Issues.pdf 
> 
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human dignity, privacy and data protection of vulnerable persons resulting from the 
application of technology, in particular, and 'for the sake of the person's dignity and 
to ensure reliability of the procedure - the collection and processing of fingerprints 
should be restricted for children and for elderly people and the age limit should be 
consistent with the age limits used large EU biometric databases (as per enacted 
regulations).' In the event that such individuals are unable to complete an enrolment in 
the biometric system due to certain physical characteristics or change in fingerprints 
resulting from skin development or deterioration, specific alternatives with appropriate 
safeguards need to be in place to guard against the risks of stigmatization or 
discrimination of those individuals either because of their age or because of the 
inability to enroll their biometric data. 89 
Functional creep 
Equally important when using biometrics is preventing what is called a 'functional 
creep,' that is, biometric data that is used for purposes contrary to the specified 
purpose and without the consent of the individual.9° For example, the collection of 
biometric data for immigration purposes should not be used for discriminatory 
practices such as racial and ethnic profiling at airports. Another concern is that the 
collection of biometric data may divulge additional information that is not needed to 
meet the specified purpose of the data collection. For example, iris scanning can detect 
health conditions and the collection of such information is not related to identification 
89 Op cit note 77, 'Data Protection Working Party in Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric 
technologies' at 15. 
90 Op cit note 78, 'Progress report on the applications of the principles of Convention I 08 to the 
collection and processing of biometric data'. The concern of 'functional creep' was also raised by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor in its Opinion 3/2012 when discussing the introduction of large IT 
systems at border posts in Europe. 
52 
of individuals for immigration purposes. Moreover, creating large databases to store 
biometric data may enable governments to match data and engage in clandestine 
tracking to secretly monitor the movement of individuals within their borders. While 
the right of sovereignty enable States to control the movement of individuals by 
establishing entry and exit conditions, this big brother approach of surveillance 
monitoring is not compatible in a democratic society.91 This deepens the gap between 
the usefulness of biometric systems and the threat of using it for incompatible 
purposes .92 
Misuse of personal data 
A further danger lies in the potential misuse if biometric data is retained for unlimited 
periods. Thomas notes that there are a number of data security concerns related to the 
storage medium, this includes the 'risk of disclosing personal information (including 
through private agencies) to unauthorized persons and the lack of security measures to 
ensure appropriate protection against abuse, misuse and malfunction. ' 93 Biometric data 
is vulnerable to unauthorized use if no access controls are in place and data security 
concerns such as hacking is increased if large volumes of data are stored in a shared 
database at border posts. Interoperability at the international level, that is, absence of 
common standards may also lead to incompatible biometric systems.94 
91 Op cit note 1, 'The Private Man.' 
92 Op cit note 77, 'Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of Convention 108 to the 
Collection and Processing of Biometric Data at 85. 
93 Op cit note 76, see Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights at 395. 
94 Op cit note 7, see Biometrics and International Migration at II. 
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Balancing right and interests 
Data security, global exchange of information, interoperability, migrant profiling, 
arbitrary decisions based on incorrect biometric reading, as well as technological flaws 
and human error may impede the right to move around freely and lawfully within and 
across borders. Thus, an objective balance is needed, particularly because of the 
imbalance between the power of the State and the power of individuals to assert their 
rights. The collection of biometric data must be necessary to achieve the purpose of 
the national security and intrusions to privacy should be at a minimum. When looking 
into the balancing test it is important to ensure that national security issues are 
proportional to the intrusion on individual human rights and that data protection 
standards are not diluted when using advanced technology to protect the security 
interests of States. 
Proportionality 
The UN Guidelines recommend proportionality as a means to reduce the risks of 
impeding on individual rights and this can be applied directly to biometrics, which lies 
at the intersection between data protection and migration. Article 3 of the UN 
Guidelines defines the principle of proportionality as 'an assessment of the risks for 
the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and notably whether 
or not the intended purpose could be achieved in a less intrusive way.' This is usually 
seen in light of prevailing circumstances and the analysis of proportionality should 
commence prior to rolling out the use of biometric systems. 
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According to the Data Protection Working Party in Europe,95 an analysis of the 
proportionality of using biometric data involves four important considerations. 'First, 
the proposed biometric system must be necessary to meet an identified need and this 
means it should be essential to meet the need rather than merely being a matter of 
convenience or cost effectiveness. Second, for the biometric system to be effective and 
meet the need, specific characteristics of the technology proposed must be taken into 
account. Third, when weighing whether the resulting loss of privacy will be 
proportional to any anticipated benefit, the benefit must not be relatively minor 
because then the loss of privacy is inappropriate and likely not proportional (for 
example an increase in convenience or a slight cost saving is not a proportional 
intrusion on the right to privacy). Fourth, the adequacy of the biometric system must 
be assessed by considering whether less privacy intrusive means could achieve the 
desired need. '96 
The Working Party warns that the use of biometric data in central databases is risky 
because of the potential impacts on human dignity and the implications on the 
individuals' right to privacy and data protection. In line with case law of the European 
Court on Human Rights, it emphasizes that 'any interference with the right to data 
protection is only to be allowed on condition that it is in accordance with the law and 
that it is necessary, in a democratic society, to protect an important public interest 
which has a clearly specified purpose. If there is a legal basis, the collection and 
95 The Data Protection Working Party was set up under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC/. It is an 
independent European Advisory Body on Data Protection and Privacy, see: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ data-protection/index_ en.htm>. 
96 Op cit note 77, 'Data Protection Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies' at 8. 
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processmg must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive m relation to that 
purpose. In addition, the limited categories of personal data to be collected and 
processed to meet the specified purpose should be kept to a minimum and security 
measures must be adequate and effective. '97 In referencing case law at the European 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor pointed out that 'any interference with the right to private life 
must comply with the principle of proportionality and it must meet the standard of 
being necessary'. Moreover, 'necessity' is a higher burden of proof than just being 
'useful' and proof of necessity could be demonstrated by a privacy impact assessment 
based on sufficient evidence (statistics and estimates of irregular migration are not 
sufficient to invade privacy).' 98 
Privacy by design 
Of relevance to migration management is the concept of 'privacy by design' as 
introduced by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). Accordingly, The 
EDPS introduces 'privacy by design' as a technical necessity that should be built into 
large information technology systems gathering personal data at borders as this would 
mitigate the impact on privacy rights, restrict data collection to a minimum, limit 
retention periods and make the technological process generally more privacy friendly. 
The Data Protection Working Party in Europe also recommends 'privacy by design' as 
a high level of technical protection for the processing of biometric data because it 
97 Ibid, 'Data Proteytion Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric Technologies' at 
9. 
98 Ibid, Data Protection Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric Technologies.' 
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involves embedding privacy proactively into the technology itself.99 
If biometric systems are introduced at border posts, it should not only be a matter of 
convenience, it must be accompanied by stringent data security safeguards, it has to be 
reliable and accurate and there needs to be a fall back procedure to allow for 
alternatives in the event of system failure. 100 In addition, as a positive aspect, 
biometrics can also be used as a security mechanism to ensure that access to a database 
is limited to only authorized persons with unique identifying biometric data. Thus, 
biometrics can be used as a privacy-enhancing tool that monitors access to restricted 
data. 
Privacy impact assessment 
The Data Protection Working Party in Europe strongly recommends carrying out a 
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) in order to evaluate risks associated with processing 
personal data and designing additional measures to mitigate these risks before 
employing the use of biometric systems. Moreover, defining the purpose and the 
means of executing the PIA should be viewed as an integral part of the design phase of 
the biometric systems. It outlines the following factors to be taken into account when 
conducting the PIA: the nature of the personal data needed, the purpose of the data 
collection, the accuracy of the biometric system, the legal basis and legal compliance 
99 Ibid, 'Data Protection Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric Technologies' at 
71. 
100 Op cit note 86, 'Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Migration' at 20- 23. 
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requirements, whether consent is required, the access and internal and external sharing 
of information that is necessary, security techniques and procedures to protect personal 
data from unauthorized access, whether there are less privacy-invasive measures 
available to the use of biometric systems, the timeline for retaining and deleting the 
personal data, and most importantly, protecting the rights of the individual. Finally, the 
PIA should not only focus on identifying the risks, it should also provide adequate 
data protection measures and appropriate solutions to mitigate the data protection risks 
that are identified through the PIA. 
Consent for legitimate purpose 
It should be highlighted that consent is a core data protection principle and it is often 
the legal basis for collecting and processing personal data. Consent is, however, tricky 
to establish in the context of the use of biometrics, but the Working Group 
recommends that the option of providing alternatives to biometric systems as a lesser 
intrusive measure indicates free consent if individuals choose the proposed biometric 
system, moreover, consent is deemed valid only if sufficient information on the use of 
biometric data is given to the individuals. 101 National legislation can set out a 
legitimate purpose of rolling out the use of biometric systems in the absence of 
consent, but the fairness principle still applies and requires that the data subject be 
informed and be made aware of the purpose of the data collection and the identity of 
the data controller. 1 02 In addition, the purpose of the data collection still needs to meet 
101 Op cit note 76, 'Data Protection Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies' at 1 q. 
102 Op cit note 77, 'Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of Convention 108 to the 
Collection and Processing of Biometric Data' at 87. 
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the principle of proportionality and intrusion on the right to pnvacy and data 
protection should be limited to what is necessary to meet the specified purpose of 
using the biometric data. 
If processing biometric data without consent is an exception embedded in the law, at a 
minimum, individuals should be fully aware of the manner in which their biometric 
data will be used and they should be ensured of the confidential treatment of their data 
and the application of appropriate data security measures to protect their data from 
unauthorized and unwanted disclosure. In practice, the enrolment of the biometric data 
involves personal contact with the individual; this is the point at which the 
requirement of informing individuals can be met to ensure fairness in line with the 
principle of collecting and processing personal data for a lawful and fair purpose. 103 
Equally important is general public acceptance to the introduction of biometric 
systems; this could be achieved through consultations prior to enacting any laws 
. . h fb" . 104 mcorporatmg t e use o 10metnc systems. 
Law and use of technology 
In Europe the use of biometrics in passports and visas has given rise to the rapid 
expansion of regionallaws. 105 Inherently problematic in this approach is the fact that 
103 Op cit note 77, 'Data Protection Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies.' 
104 Op cit note 76, 'Data Protection Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on Developments in Biometric 
Technologies' at 28-29. 
105 Op cit note 79, A Compendium of Legal Instruments of the European Union and the Council of 
Europe concerning the Use of Security Features and Biometric Identifiers in Passport and Travel 
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the cross-border dimension of data protection seems to have been an after thought. 
Laws were developed in response to the use of biometric systems, and have until 
recently, not taken data protection concerns into account. Redpath emphasises that 
technology should not be driving law and policy because this creates a risk to 
impacting on the individual rights of both nationals and non-nationals as seen m 
government responses to the September 11 attacks. Accordingly, if it is not governed 
by a legal framework there will be no limitation to the use of such technology which is 
rapidly expanding based on government demand for reasons of State security and 
border contro1. 106 Thus, policy makers/legislators need to take the lead to ensure that 
there is a legal basis to process biometric data in accordance with adequate data 
protection safeguards. 
Alternative measures 
It is equally important to ensure that biometric systems are not used in isolation and 
that alternative measures are made available to cater for system failure. For example, a 
biometric system can fail to accurately read biometric data due temperature in the 
storage area and the system may reject matching the individual with his/her biometric 
data. 'In order to protect the individual's right not to be subject to a decision affecting 
him/her based solely on mistaken processing of data by automated means, appropriate 
safeguards must be introduced such as human interventions, remedies or mechanisms 
Documents, Residence Permits and Short-term Visas at 277 - 256. It includes a compendium of legal 
instruments in the European Union, legislative proposals, communications of the European Commission 
and Instrument on Personal Data Protection relevant to the use of biometric identifiers. 
106 Op cit note 7, see Biometrics and International Migration at 14. 
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allowing the data subject to put (forward) his/her point of view.' 107 This involves both 
human inspection of travel documents and technical comparison of biometric data 
stored in databases, as well as appropriate channels to report complaints. Having 
access to a human being to provide an immediate remedy in the event of system 
failure is essential and the procedure for recourse to the data subject should not be 
disproportionately burdensome for the data subject, for example, if a person has a 
physical disability and their hands are missing the system should not even be applied 
to that person if the system relies on fingerprints. 108 
Secondary inspection and review 
Redpath recommends that secondary inspections and the right to review and appeal 
decisions that deny entry and movement in a country could help to strike the balance 
between individual rights and the security interests of the State. It will also guarantee 
procedural fairness for migrants in decisions that affect them and reinforce 
accountability of decision-makers. 109 This is needed because biometric systems lack 
the human factor that provide for alternative immediate remedies and does not allow 
for review and appeal procedures in the event that the technology fails and reads the 
biometric data incorrectly. 
107 Op cit note 77, 'Data Protection Working Party Opinion 3/2012 on developments in Biometric 
Technologies' at I 0. 
108 Op cit note 78 'Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of Convention I 08 to the 
Collection and Processing of Biometric Data' at 90. 
109 Op cit note 7, Biometrics and International Migration at 17. 
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Interoperability 
Thomas argues that the 'elevated costs of biometric scanning and reading equipment 
will perpetuate the inequality between the more technologically advanced countries, 
and the less developed ones, leaving the latter more exposed (insofar as there exist less 
efficient border controls), while making the borders of the north ever more 
impenetrable.' 110 Without taking a particular view on this issue, the counter-argument 
is that developing countries tend to implement new biometrics systems, whereas the 
developed countries have to ensure compatibility of new biometric systems with their 
existing systems and this is sometimes more costly and it often results in additional 
technical flaws that cannot be remedied due to interoperability. What is clear is that 
the added costs of new biometric travel documents can be a deterrent for migrants 
wishing to travel, whether in the north or elsewhere. 
Impact on human rights 
The motivation by States to use biometric systems is primarily driven by heightened 
security concerns arising from the growth of transnational crime, irregular migration 
and terrorism, 111 and it is seen as a key tactic to effective border control. However, the 
collection and processing of biometric data has the potential to infringe upon the right 
to privacy and data protection if it is not regulated and used within the parameters of 
the law. It can also result in migrant profiling and discriminatory treatment if 
biometric data is read incorrectly and this could lead further to limitations on the 
110 Op cit note 76, Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights at 390. 
111 Ibid, Biometrics1 International Migration and Human Rights at 377-378. Thomas argues further that 
the future of biometrics is not restricted exclusively to travel and identification documents. It will 
inevitably extend into the commercial and private sectors. 
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freedom of movement and family unity. For example, refugee families can be 
separated at airports if one of them encounters a problem with their biometric reading, 
thereby resulting in the unnecessary legal and financial burden of unifying the family 
in the resettlement country which could take months or even years. Hence, policy-
makers/legislators should ensure that the use of biometric systems are regulated and 
that they do not adversely affect human rights, and any limitation to recognized 
individual rights has to be appropriately balanced to ensure that it is legitimate and 
. 1 . "fi bl 112 proporttona to meet a JUStl ta e purpose. 
As stated by Thomas, 'if biometric measures present a risk to an individual's private 
life, or are considered illegitimate or disproportionate to the ends sought, it will be a 
clear breach of the specified purpose principle. 113 In the European Data Protection 
Supervisor Opinion of 7 July 2011 it was highlighted that respect for the fundamental 
rights of migrants and refugees, including their right to data protection, should be part 
of comprehensive migration initiatives that envisage the use of technology and 
surveillance systems at borders, particularly because these groups often find 
h 1 . 1 bl . . 114 t emse ves m vu nera e positions. 
112 In the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 this is written in the limitation clause in section 36 of the 
Bill of Rights. See chapter 5 for further detail. 
113 Op cit note 76, Biometrics, International Migrants and Human Rights at 390. 
114 Op cit note 86, 'Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Migration.' 
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Biometric collection and processing 
Biometrics is a complex issue that is currently in discussion among European member 
states and in other international fora, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICA0). 115 Humanitarian aid agencies are consequently receiving requests from its 
member states to start using biometrics, while others are taking the initiative to 
introduce it into their programmes, for example, UNHCR and IOM collect biometrics 
to ensure equal distribution of emergencies supplies to asylum seekers and refugees. 
Similarly ICRC also uses biometrics in their operations when tracing family members 
of displaced persons. 116 
Even though there are risks to using biometric systems, State security interests and the 
right to privacy and data protection may not necessarily be incompatible, and the 
development of such technology can operate within a context that reconciles the needs 
and rights of both States and individuals. To do so, the use of biometric systems must 
be proportional to the limitation on individual rights and the consequent restrictions 
placed on freedom of movement. Thomson emphasizes that there is a need to approach 
immigration reform and anti-terrorism as two separate and distinct issues because 
there is no evidence that the use of biometrics deters terrorism. 117 This mistaken belief, 
115 Op cit note 78, 'Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of Convention 108 to the 
Collection and Processing of Biometric Data' at 81. 
116 Informal interview with Perruchoud, Richard, former Legal Adivisor of the Departement of Legal 
Affairs and International Migration at IOM Headquarters conducted in Geneva, and informal 
discussions with Beck, Alexander, Senior Legal Advisor at the Department of International Protection, 
UNHCR Headquarters; and Bircher, Romain, Head of the Data Protection Unit at the ICRC 
Headquarters cond~cted in Brussels. 
117 Op cit note 76, Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights at 398. 
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she says, detracts from the positive aspects ofbiometrics. 
Regulation of biometric systems 
The purpose of collecting biometric data and limitations on data sharing, as well as 
safeguards for ensuring confidentiality and data security needs to be clear if the use of 
biometric systems is to become a global trend. Moreover, addressing migration issues 
coherently at national level from a human rights based approach can help States to 
achieve the objective of managing the movement of individuals more effectively 
through the use of biometric systems. Although States look to the ICAO standards on 
the use and functionality of biometrics in passports, there is no legally binding 
international instrument that includes data protection safeguards for the use and 
exchange of biometric data. There is arguably no need for a separate international 
legal instrument on biometric data. The standard internationally accepted Data 
Protection Principles are flexible in that they allow for adapting to technological 
advancements through the introduction of code-specific rules/regulations, and 
biometrics could be elaborated in such a code that would have mandatory force. 118 
The regularization of biometric data is already being developed at the national level as 
legislators are inserting definitions of biometric data into data protection laws to 
ensure that it falls within the framework of the this law, but this needs further 
elaboration through regulations or codes given the complexities surrounding the use of 
118 Op cit note 77, see 'Progress Report on the Application of the Principles of Convention 108 to the 
Collection and Processing of Biometrics Data' discussing the flexibility and use of a regulatory system 
which relies on the core data protection principles. 
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biometric data in pursuit of State interests. 
To ensure a standardized approach by States, ICAO standards that take account of data 
protection could apply in the framework of a universally binding instrument on data 
protection instrument following the Joint Proposal for Setting International Standards 
on Privacy and Personal Data Protection. The proposal for a binding legal instrument 
on data protection will be discussed in next chapter 3 following arguments that privacy 
and data protection should be recognized as a fundamental right alongside other 
human rights. 
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3. PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
This chapter covers the right to privacy and argues that this fundamental human right 
forms the basis for establishing a separate right to data protection. In so doing, it 
adopts a human rights based approach to privacy, which in tum, invites the adoption of 
uniform and universal rules for protecting informational privacy.' 119 It emphasizes that 
the right to privacy alone is insufficient to address the myriad of issues arising out of 
the advanced technology in the 21st century and argues that unless the right to data 
protection is firmly embedded in the law and accepted as a human right, State interests 
will continue to trump individual rights without appropriate checks and balances. 
While privacy can be viewed as a commodity to benefit State interests, if an individual 
provides consent to the use of personal data, it does not result in complete loss of 
autonomy; instead there is a need for continued protection against arbitrary 
infringement and for preventing the misuse of personal data particularly for reasons 
unrelated to the purpose for which it was disclosed. The discussion then turns to an 
analysis of existing data protection laws and provides an overview of State obligations 
under the international legal instruments on human rights. 
3.1 Human Rights Based Approach 
'The right to privacy and the concomitant right to protect the content of our 
lives and move freely is what separates democratic societies from 
119 Op cit note 27, Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. an Economic Right: An Attempt at 
Conciliation. 
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. d b . s t ,120 autocraczes an over earmg ta es. 
Privacy is a fundamental human right as it is given expression in human rights law and 
the bill of rights or freedom charters the world over. 121 Rotenberg reiterates that the 
right to privacy is indeed a fundamental human right and warns that in the 21st century 
it may become one of the most critical human rights of all. 122 Even though national 
privacy laws may differ, the right to protect private facts from arbitrary interference is 
echoed in all privacy laws. It is clear in the legal texts that the right to privacy is 
twofold: it includes the right to positively assert one's right to privacy and the right to 
protect privacy from arbitrary infringement. This stems from Article 14 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks." 
Fundamental rights 
Since privacy supports the development of individual dignity and autonomy, it has 
been argued by Cavoukian, among others, that 'privacy is considered to be a 
fundamental human right, a moral and social "good," and it is recognized as such in 
12° February, Judith 'Border Controls May Cross Boundaries' The Cape Times, 29 July 2003 
<http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/migrationdocuments/commentaries/2003/cross.htm> 
121 This argument is supported by Waldo et. al. and Bygrave, op cit note 3 and 23 respectively. 
122 Rotenberg, Marc 'Data Protection Day: Joint High Level Meeting From European to International 
Standards on Data Protection' Remarks of Marc Rotenberg, President EPIC, Council of Europe and the 
European Commission Charlemagne Building, Brussels, Belgium, 28 January 20 II. 
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numerous international covenants and declarations. 123 Cavoukian argues correctly that 
privacy is not an absolute right, instead 'a balance must usually be struck somewhere 
along the continuum between an absolutist position of total privacy and complete 
anonymity versus one that denies or negates all privacy rights. While this view 
recognizes that personal privacy is valued as a fundamental right, deserving of the 
highest protection; it also recognized that at times, personal information is used in 
ways that may be considered comparable to a commodity.' The latin proverb scientia 
potentia est, i.e. knowledge is power, is most relevant in the information age, 
particularly when personal data is seen as a commodity. 124 
Privacy as a commodity 
The value of privacy as a commodity is often seen from the perspective of the State or 
private entities and the individual usually has little power to negotiate the boundaries 
of information privacy/data protection. Even though individuals may, for example, 
have little choice but to give photographs and fingerprints for the purpose of obtaining 
travel documents as prescribed by immigration laws, there should also be laws in place 
to ensure data protection and respect for privacy when handling personal data to meet 
the State's interest of managing migration and controlling its borders. Of course an 
individual can refuse to provide personal data to the State, but this would limit his or 
her ability to travel. Similarly, in order to receive a government benefit, individuals are 
required to give detailed personal information including their personal income and 
123 Op cit note 27, Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. an Economic Right: An Attempt at 
Conciliation. 
124 Ibid, Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. an Economic Right: An Attempt at Conciliation at 
I-IV. 
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living conditionso125 Since privacy is not absolute, for privacy advocates, the pertinent 
issue is for the State to ensure that individuals are fully informed and understand the 
different approaches to protecting the privacy of their uniquely identifiable 
information and to contribute to finding effective solutions that can truly enhance 
1 ' bolo 0 1126 peop e s a 1 Ity to exercise contro 0 
Freedom to choose 
Cavoukian states that 'privacy protection and economic interests should not be seen as 
an either I or- to varying degrees it can encompass both - provided the individual has a 
final choice' and that choice has to be made freely and voluntaryo127 The notion of 
consent is central to data protection and this is seen as the core principle amongst the 
commonly accepted Data Protection Principles, and since it forms part of the 
international and European legal instruments and is embedded in national data 
protection laws outside Europe, it can be seen as an international standardo 128 Consent 
ensures fair processing of personal data, minimal intrusion and limitations to the use of 
such data according to the conditions set by the individual.129 Even though privacy 
may become a commodity when one loses a measure of control, the limitations on 
privacy does not mean that no safeguards are needed to protect the handling of 
125 Ibid, Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vso an Economic Right: An Attempt at Conciliation at 
13. 
126 Ibid, Privacy as a Fundamental Huma Right vs. An Economic Right: An Attempt at Conciliation at 
27. 
127 Ibid, Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. an Economic Right: An Attempt at Conciliation at 
28. 
128 See the commonly accepted Data Protection Principles in the Madrid Declaration as set out in 
Chapter 3.2. 
129 Warren, A et al (2001) Sources of Literature on Data Protection and Human Rights 
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personal data. Regulation by law would give the State a firm legal basis for processing 
personal data and it would help to ensure an appropriate balance between the pursuit 
of State interests and adequate protection of the individual's right to privacy and data 
protection. 
Notions of privacy (and data protection) 
Waldo, et al emphasize that attitudes toward privacy is context based and it depends 
on who is processing the personal information and for what purposes. In their view 
what is needed for data protection is a 'deep, comprehensive and multidisciplinary 
examination of privacy in the information age, and this suggested approach involves 
assessing privacy in a manner that accounts for implications of technology, law, 
economics, business, social science and ethics.' 130 Even though privacy is contextual, 
it is deserving of protection because the loss of privacy often results in harm to 
individuals, to groups, and even to society as a whole. They agree that a balancing test 
is needed and emphasize that the test should account for context and nuance. 131 
Current legislative debate involves a discussion about whether data protection should 
be viewed as a separate individual right to solidify the safeguards needed to protect 
personal data or whether data protection should be interpreted as a part of the right to 
privacy. Banisar and Davies suggest that privacy can be divided into four separate, but 
130 Op cit note 3, see Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 3- 14. 
131 Op cit note 3, see Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 12-14. 
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related concepts; one: information privacy which involves rules for the handling of 
personal data through mechanisms of choice and consent; two: bodily privacy which 
protects our physical selves against invasive procedure, this includes assault laws and 
searching procedures; three: privacy of communications which involves security of 
mail and telephone conversations; and four: territorial privacy which sets limits on the 
. . f ' . h 132 mtruswn o one s property ng ts. 
Protecting the privacy of information about oneself does indeed stem from the right to 
privacy and this falls neatly into the first category of Banisar and Davies's theory on 
privacy, but data protection is somewhat broader and should not be limited only to the 
notion of privacy. This is because it covers the handling of personal data 
notwithstanding consent and focuses on legal parameters to avoid potential 
infringement on a number of other human rights (e.g. privacy, non-discrimination, 
freedom of movement); to ensure that personal data is kept secure and used for lawful, 
fair and clearly defined purposes; to prevent the pursuit of wide unlimited and 
unknown State interests that do not respect the individual's choice, consent and access 
and rectification rights, as well as confidentiality requirements; to ensure extra 
safeguards for special categories of sensitive personal data; and to avail the right to 
recourse to individuals in the event of unlawful data processing. Data protection 
extends to the right of an individual to choose under what circumstances to disclose 
personal data that is private and uniquely identifiable to that individual. Moreover, it 
132 Banisar, D and Davies, S (2000) 'Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy 
Laws and Developments.' 
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not only includes protecting privacy of the information after consenting to disclosure, 
it also involves setting conditions, safeguards and limitations for handling the 
information from the moment it is collected until it is erased or destroyed. 133 Kuner 
confirms that the concepts of 'data protection and privacy are twins but not identical. 
He says data protection law goes further as it seeks to give rights to individuals in how 
data identifying or pertaining to themselves are processed and to subject such 
processing to a defined set of safeguards.o~ 34 
Data protection defined 
Data protection is a developing area of law, which stems from the right to privacy, but 
what exactly is data protection? Given the lack of a binding legal instrument on data 
protection, there is no international legal definition of data protection, nor is there a 
definition in the soft law instruments. In the Glossary on Migration it is defined in the 
migration context as 'the systematic application of a set of institutional, technical and 
physical safeguards that preserves the right to privacy with respect to the collection, 
storage, use and disclosure of personal data.' 135 This recognizes the right to privacy 
and goes further to include the different phases of handling personal data that equally 
require protection. Therefore, it can be described as an all-encompassing term that is 
used to describe the handling of personal data under safe parameters, thereby 
recognizing the need to collect and process personal data, while equally protecting the 
rights and interests of individuals. 
133 Op cit note 129, Sources of Literature on Data Protection and Human Rights. 
134 Kuner, ChristOJ?her (2009) 'An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and 
Prospects' at 4. 
135 Op cit note 2, International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration 2nd Edition at 25. 
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The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) emphasize that 
data protection is not only about the right to privacy. It involves three interrelated 
concepts: 'First, privacy that is both a legal and an ethical concept. The legal concept 
refers to the legal protection that has been accorded to an individual to control both 
access to and use of personal information and provides the overall framework within 
which both confidentiality and security are implemented. Second, confidentiality that 
relates to the right of individuals to protection of their personal data during storage, 
transfer, and use, in order to prevent unauthorized disclosure to third parties. Third, 
security that is a collection of technical approaches addressing issues covering 
physical, electronic, and procedural aspects of protecting information collected.' 136 
According to the South African Law Commission, data protection entails the legal 
protection of the data subject with regard to the processing of data concerning him, her 
. lfb h . . . 137 or 1tse y anot er person or mstltutwn. 
Kuner says 'data protection can be regarded as a specific aspect of privacy that gives 
rights to individuals in how data identifying them or pertaining to them are processed, 
and subjects such processing to a defined set of safeguards.' 138 Thus, data protection 
can be seen as the handling of personal information that is uniquely identifiable to an 
136 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (2007) 'Guidelines on Protecting the 
Confidentiality and Security of HIV Information' at 22, Proceedings from a Workshop, 15-17 May 
2006 Geneva. 
137 South African Law Reform Commission (2005) 'Privacy and Data Protection: Discussion Paper 109' 
at 1-4 and 24 <http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm>. The Discussion Paper followed an earlier 
Issue Paper on the same topic (SA Law Reform Commission Privacy and Data Protection (Issue Paper 
24 August 2003) .. 
138 Kuner, Christopher (2010) 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and 
Privacy Law: Past, Present, and Future' at 12 <http://ssm.com/abstract=l689483 or 
http://dx.doi.org/l 0.2139/ssm.l689483> 
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individual and deemed confidential, and as stated by Cavoukian, 'it provides a 
baseline protection, particularly in terms of restricting secondary use of personal data, 
providing individuals with access rights and ensunng a mechanism for 
enforcement.' 139 
Data protection as a separate legal right 
Additional legal safeguards are needed to cover the following data protection 
concerns, inter alia, unlawful and unfair collection without the consent of the person, 
lack of data quality, collection of excessive categories of data, unclear purposes which 
are not communicated to the person at the time of collection or disclosure, inadequate 
confidentiality requirements, unsafe data storage and data security mechanisms, 
inappropriate and improper disclosure, and unauthorized use and access for purposes 
unrelated to the specified purpose. Thus, data protection needs to be a distinct right on 
its own as it goes further than the right to privacy as evidenced in the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter). Article 8 sets out the right 
to data protection as follows: 
Protection of personal data: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
139 Op cit note 27, Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. An Economic Right: An Attempt at 
Conciliation at 27. 
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has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority. 140 
The European Court of Human Rights has held that Article 8 is a fundamental human 
right. For example in Rotaru v. Romania the Court stated that 'Article 8 extends to 
confidential matters, such as medical and health data, sexual activity and orientation, 
family kinship and, possibly, professional and business relations and other intimate 
areas in which public intrusion would be an unwarranted encroachment on the natural 
barriers of self. Public activism in public political parties has little in common with the 
ratio which elevates the protection of privacy into a fundamental human right.' 141 
The European Charter is the only existing international legal instrument that explicitly 
recognizes data protection as a fundamental human right. While data protection may 
not yet be recognized as such at the international level, data protection itself 
encompasses the right to privacy which is recognized already as a fundamental human 
right and is accepted by many countries as echoed in their constitutions or freedom 
charters. Just as in Europe, international law needs to develop to keep up with the 
rapid growth of technology because this has a direct impact on individual rights. To 
give effect to data protection as a legal right, legislation needs to be enacted to give it 
14° Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000. 
141 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rotaru v. Romania (Application no. 2834/95) Judgement, 
Strasbourg, 4 May 2000 at 6. 
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force as a statutory right as seen in the growing body of national data protection laws. 
Since States are recognizing the need for data protection laws, it is an opportune time 
to establish a binding legal instrument at the international level as recommended by 
the 31st International Conference on Data Protection and International 
Commissioners. 142 Commentary on the Resolution resulting from the international 
conference is covered in the next section. 
Countries are increasingly enacting laws to gtve effect to their international 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
amongst others and this includes protecting the right to privacy, but they need to go 
further at the international level, to establish adequate legal regimes confirming the 
legal right to data protection and facilitating the trans border flow of information in line 
with the EU Directive. What is clear is that the information age has placed us at a 
crossroads because personal data is now easily transferable and the right to privacy 
and data protection in national legislations can no longer be confined to geographical 
borders. 
3.2 Data Protection Laws 
'Data protection law is an important part of preserving personal privacy 
rights, which otherwise could be easily overwhelmed by the power of 
142 Op cit note 12, The Madrid Resolution International Standards on the Protection of Privacy and 
Data Protection. 
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government agencies and corporations that hold information about 
individuals'. 143 
This section exammes the international legal instruments on pnvacy and data 
protection rights and highlights the cross-border dimension of data protection with 
reference to the core Data Protection Principles governing the collection, use, 
disclosure, storage and disposal of personal data. It should be noted that this section, to 
some extent, overlaps with the preceding section which sets the theoretical argument 
for protecting data protection as a human right. 
Soft law on data protection 
The United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data 
Files (1990) 144 sets the international standards on data protection, albeit without legal 
force. The UN Guidelines, draws on the Data Protection Principles as set out in the 
Council of Europe and European Union legal instruments, the OECD Guidelines, but 
it fails to oblige States to enforce data protection as a legal right due to its non-binding 
nature. While it encourages the UN member states as well as governmental, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to respect the Guidelines when 
carrying out activities within their field of competence, it has carried little weight 
because it does not create any obligations to follow the Guidelines. In its overview of 
the existing data protection instruments around the world, the South African Law 
143 Open Rights Group 'Data Protection' <https://www.openrightsgroup.org/issues/data-protection> 
144 Guidelines Concerning Computerised Personal Data Files adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
14 December 1990, Doc E/CN .4/1990/72 20.2.1990. 
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Commission stated that the UN Guidelines has had much less influence on data 
protection regimes than the other instruments even though its intention was to 
. fl s d . 1 145 m uence tates to enact ata protectiOn aws. 
International trends of humanitarian actors 
The United Nations agencies and other international organizations146 generally adhere 
to the standards set in the UN Guidelines. International intergovernmental 
organizations are not subject to national laws due to their privileges and immunities 
accorded to it by its member states. Instead, they establish their own policies that form 
part of their internal laws. According to Amerasinghe 'international organizations have 
as a characteristic that with respect to their internal organization and functioning they 
are outside the jurisdiction of national law. Their life is governed by a set of rules and 
principles, which constitute their internal law.' 147 In establishing their internal laws, 
international organizations look to both hard and soft law at the international level. 
From informal discussions at the 4th International Data Protection Workshop it seems 
that there are a number of agencies contemplating developing specific internal policies 
on data protection because more detail is required than provided in the UN 
145 Op cit note 137, 'Privacy and Data Protection: Discussion Paper 109' 6-12. 
146 Relevant agencies operating in migration context include the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Labour Organization, the International 
Organization for Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
147 Amerasinghe, C F (2005) Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations at 272. 
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Guidelines.148 It is surprising that UN agencies have taken 20 years, following the 
incident that occurred during the Rwanda Genocide as mentioned in chapter 1.3 above, 
to place data protection on their agendas and to establish internal rules that govern the 
handling of personal data collected and processed within the scope of their mandates. 
Nonetheless, it is a welcomed initiative because once established it would help shape 
the international legal framework on data protection through capacity building 
initiatives, and this would in tum, encourage States to place data protection on their 
legislative agendas. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has an internal 
policy generally covering confidentiality of refugee information which refers to the 
UN Guidelines, but they are still in the process of developing a specific policy on data 
protection, most likely to be in force only in the latter part of 2014. 149 This incentive 
stems from the UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 91 (LII) (2001) on Registration of 
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers which stresses the 'confidential nature of personal data 
and the need to protect confidentiality whilst recognizing that the appropriate sharing 
of some personal data in line with data protection principles can assist States to 
combat fraud, to address irregular movements of refugees and asylum-seekers, and 
further to identify those not entitled to protection under the 1951 Convention and/or 
1967 Protocol on refugee protection.' 150 Similarly, even though the International 
148 The 4th International Data Protection Workshop organized by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor and the World Customs Organization, Brussels, 8-9 November 2012. 
149 Informal discussions with Beck, Alexander, Senior Legal Officer at the Department of International 
Protection, UNCHR Headquarters conducted in Brussels on 8 November 2012. 
150 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2003) 'Comments on the Source Country 
Information Systems (SCIS) of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).' 
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Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has a dedicated department to data protection, 
they are still in the process of developing a comprehensive policy covering beneficiary 
data. 151 
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) has Guidelines on 
Protecting the Confidentiality and Security of HIV Information which emphasize that 
data protection involves three interrelated concepts, namely privacy, confidentiality 
and security, all of which have an impact on the development and implementation of 
the protections available for securing sensitive personal data. In the scope of their 
work the 'public health goal of safeguarding the health of communities through the 
collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of health data, has to be carefully balanced 
with the individual's right to privacy and confidentiality and there is a need to have 
specific guidelines in place that are based on human rights principles. 152 In addition, 
the balancing test in the HIV context requires maximizing of benefits of data 
collection and protection from harm that can result from either malicious or 
inadvertent and inappropriate release of individually identifiable data.' 153 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has a policy as well as detailed 
guidelines, which are available publically in the IOM Data Protection Manual. The 
manual is comprehensive in providing guidance to organizations collecting and 
151 Informal discussions with Bircher, Romain, Head of Data Protection Unit, ICRC Headquarters 
conducted in Brussels on 8 November 2012. 
152 Op cit note 136,' 'Guidelines on Protecting the Confidentiality and Security of HIV Information' at 2. 
153 Ibid, 'Guidelines on Protecting the Confidentiality and Security ofHIV Information' at 6-10. 
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processmg personal data of migrants and IOM has been active m advising 
governments when strengthening their data protection laws to apply it equally to 
migrants. 154 The manual recommends that a risk-benefit assessment be conducted 
prior to data collection taking all surrounding circumstances into account, including 
inter alia, the prevailing social, cultural and religious attitudes of the target population 
group or individual data subject. 155 This means weighing the probability of harm 
against the anticipated benefits and ensuring that the latter significantly outweighs the 
potential risks. It also recommends conducting a sensitivity assessment to identify the 
categories of personal data needed for the specified purpose and to determine whether 
stricter data protection safeguards should be applied throughout the lifecycle of the 
data processing. The manual also states that data controllers should always put 
themselves in the shoes of the data subject and consider 'How would a reasonable 
person, in the position of that data subject, react to the data collection and data 
processing practices?' 156 While the guidelines in this manual are indeed useful, as 
illustrated in chapter 2, there are new issues arising from advance technology such as 
crisis mapping that pose a threat to the protection of migrant data. 157 
The International Criminal Police Organization-Interpol has published Rules on the 
Processing of Data adopted by its member states in 2011. The Rules aim to ensure 
international cooperation between criminal police authorities with due respect for the 
154 Informal interview with Perruchoud, Richard, former Legal Advisor at the Legal Affairs and 
International Migration Department, IOM Headquarters conducted in Geneva. 
155 Op cit note 5, 10M Data Protection Manual at 16. 
156 Ibid, 10M Data Protection Manual at 16-18. 
157 For an analysis ·of the IOM Data Protection Manual, see: Meier, Patrick 'On Crowdsourcing, Crisis 
Mapping and Data Protection Standards, iRevolution, February 2012 
<http://irevolution.net/20 12/02/05/iom-data-protection/> 
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basic rights of individuals afforded under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. A concerning issue with this policy is that the consent principle is absent and it 
allows for exchange of data among Interpol's member states with further disclosures 
to national central bureaus who are allowed access to the Interpol Information System 
to use personal data for broad police purposes. 158 Nonetheless, the Interpol 
Information System is an impressive data security tool and the confidentiality 
requirement, which is a fundamental rule, is underscored by a risk analysis and 
classification of categories of confidentiality. The absence of the consent principle is 
problematic because migrants would have no opportunity to decide whether or not 
they would want their personal data that have been collected by Interpol to be accessed 
by their governments who are member states to Interpol. 
Model regional data protection law 
Data protection as a legal right is rooted primarily in the European jurisdiction. The 
European data protection model has the most comprehensive legal framework that 
developed as a response to the challenge of exchanging personal data across borders. 
Most recently on 22 October 2013, the European Parliament voted in favour of the 
European Commission's Data Protection Reform which aims at strengthening, inter 
alia, privacy and data protection rights to ensure that such rights are not eroded by the 
ever increasing interests of the State and private entities. 159 This turns the focus to the 
legal instruments in Europe. 
158 De Villenfagne, Florence and Gayrel, Claire (2011) 'Data Protection at ICPO-Interpol: Assessments, 
Issues and Outlook.' at 11. 
159 European Commission 'LIBE Committee vote backs new EU data protection rules' European 
Commission Press Release, 22 October 2013 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release _ IP-12-46 _ en.htm> 
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Article 8 of the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms160 states that: '(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence, and (2) There shall be no interference by 
a public authority with the exercise of this right except as in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health of morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.' The 1950 Convention created the European Commission of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights to oversee the enforcement 
of rights. Both have been particularly active in the enforcement of privacy rights and 
have consistently viewed protections in Article 8 expansively and the restrictions 
161 
narrowly. 
EU Directive 
The 1995 European Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (EU 
Directive) aims to facilitate data exchange in Europe and the 1981 Council of Europe 
Convention aims to facilitate the trans-border flow of information while also 
protecting privacy rights; the latter is the only legally binding document at 
16° Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950. 
161 Privacy International 'Privacy & Human Rights' 28 May 2007. 
<http://www. privacyinternational.org > 
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supranational level and the former obliges European Union member states to transpose 
the EU Directive into national law in each country. 162 The EU Directive was the legal 
instrument that regulated data protection for the first time under European Union law 
and it is by far the most comprehensive and leading legal instrument on data 
protection. 
The EU Directive has been developed for the dual purpose of introducing parameters 
for the lawful and fair collection of personal data and for the sharing and free flow of 
such data across borders. It aims to harmonize data protection laws in the European 
Union by regulating the processing of personal data under conditions of transparency, 
legitimacy and proportionality. 163 Moreover, advisory bodies called 'Data Protection 
Authorities' have been established to ensure that laws are implemented properly. 
Necessary data protection safeguards that are introduced through the law include the 
common Data Protection Principles which aim to ensure that personal data is collected 
lawfully and fairly with the consent of the individual and used confidentially for a 
specified purpose under the guarantee of applying safe data security measures, even if 
transferred across borders. It serves as a model for good practice both within and 
outside Europe, and to date inspired over 70 countries to develop its own data 
protection laws that conform to the European and international standards, and this 
number is steadily increasing. 164 While examining conflicts of the proprietary right of 
162 See the objectives of the Convention on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data and the EU Directive. 
163 See overview of the EU Directive: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Protection_Directive> 
164 Op cit note 5, !OM Data Protection Manual at 196-107 for a global overview of national data 
protection laws in force at its date of publication. This number has increased and there are a number of 
countries at a similar stage as South Africa where comprehensive data protection laws are looming. See 
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data and the right to privacy, Campbell and Ban highlight the need for harmonization 
of national policies to encourage the flow of information. Bygrave examines the 
rationale, logic and limits of data protection law and questions the interests that this 
law purports to protect. He says most of the laws are general broad framework laws, 
and 'instead of stipulating in casuistic fashion detailed provisions for regulating the 
processing of personal information, they set down rather diffusely formulated general 
rules for such processing, thereby allowing for the subsequent development of more 
detailed regulatory norms as the need arises in the form of codes or regulations. 165 
Data protection is a well-developed area of law in Europe dating back to the 1980s and 
1990s. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) 
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of 
Personal Data and the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981) 
established the modem parameters for the principle-based regulation and security of 
personal data. 166 The most comprehensive piece of legislation on data protection, 
however, remains the EU Directive. At the time of its promulgation, the main 
objective of the EU Directive was to create a legal basis to facilitate the transborder 
flow of personal data without impeding on existing individual rights. Protection of 
also op cite note 13, Data Protection Laws of the World for an assessment of countries and their legal 
developments with to respect data protection laws. 
165 Bygrave, Lee A 'An International Data Protection Stocktake at 2000: Part 1: Regulatory Trends' 
(2000) 6 Privacy Law & Policy Reporter 129 at 130. 
166 Knoppers, Bartha Maria (2000) 'Confidentiality of Health Information: International Comparative 
Approaches' in Protecting Data Privacy in Health Services Research National Academy of Sciences, 
Washington DC< http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record _id=9952&page=173 > 
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personal data was a by-product of the data transfer objective and introducing an 
obligation for States to have adequate laws in force to protect personal data reinforced 
this secondary data protection objective. The requirement to ensure that adequate laws 
are in place prior to transfer is what has caused the growth of laws outside Europe in 
line with the EU Directive. Currie and Allan say that 'adequacy can be taken to mean 
equivalence. This means that EU member states need to be satisfied that personal data 
can safely be transferred to a third state provided it provides legal protection that is 
roughly the equivalent of the EU regime. In addition, the level of adequacy of 
protection is assessed in light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer or 
set of data transfer operations and particular considerations are given to the nature of 
the data; the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations; 
the country of origin and country of final destination; the rules of law, both general 
and sectorial, in force in the third country in question; as well as and the professional 
rules and security measures which are complied with in that country.' 167 
EU data protection reform 
Even though it is currently the global model on data protection, the European 
Commission recently proposed a revision of the EU Directive, calling for stronger 
provisions on individual rights in light of rapid technological change. 168 After a review 
of the current legislative framework, the European Commission confirmed that the 
167 Op cit note 15, 'Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an 
Information Protection Regulator for South Africa' at 572. 
168 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on Migration 'A Comprehensive Approach on 
Personal Data Protection in the European Union' COM (2010) 609 final 9, Brussels, 4 November 2010 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com _ 20 I 0 _ 609 _ en.pdf> 
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existing Data Protection Principles are still valid and that its technologically neutral 
character should be preserved. However, an increase in legal clarity is needed to make 
data controllers aware of the implications of advanced technology on individual rights 
and to ensure that the Data Protection Principles are enforced effectively. 169 
The focus of the EU data protection reform is to enhance data protection rights, 
particularly since the EU Directive was initially developed with the objective of 
facilitating the trans-border flow of personal data at a time when the internet was at its 
· f: 170 Th . EU . h h m ancy. ere 1s now strong support among countnes to strengt en t e 
protection of personal data relating to individuals, increase transparency and 
awareness of rights for data subjects, enhance notions of privacy through data 
protection impact assessments and using technology to protect privacy, re-examine 
categories of sensitive personal data and its prohibitions, protect the 'right to be 
forgotten' (i.e. to have no trace to the individual online) and the right of portability 
(i.e. to allow individuals to transfer personal data among service providers) and 
reinforce the power of Data Protection Authorities by reallocating resources to ensure 
effective provision of remedies and sanctions. 171 It aims at creating one single set of 
rules to be applicable to all countries across Europe as well as to European companies 
outside Europe. It also introduces a 'notification obligation' for companies to notify 
the Data Protection Supervisory Body within 24 hours of any breach or infringement 
on the rights of individuals and strengthens the role of the Data Protection Supervisors 
169 Ibid, 'A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union' 
170 See the European Commission website for the latest updates on the EU data protection reform 
<http:/ /ec.europa.e1,1/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120 125 _ en.htm> 
171 Op cit note 168 'A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union' at 
7-14. 
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appointed throughout Europe. 172 This lends itself to a human rights based approach 
with an objective to elevate respecting individual rights to the same level as 
facilitating the interests of State bodies and private companies. This objective of 
balancing the rights of individuals and interests of States can be achieved by ensuring 
legal protections for both. 
Data protection a sui generis right 
The European Court of Human Rights has g1ven strong recognition to the Data 
Protection Principles and data protection is increasingly seen as a sui generis right, 
given its expression in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. 173 The EU data protection model finds its strength in the explicit provision in 
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) (EU 
Charter) that provides for the right to data protection. 174 This confirms that data 
protection is a fundamental human right available to all individuals in the European 
Union and it confers an obligation on all EU member states to uphold the right. The 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (1981) (CoE Convention) builds on Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which sets out the simple premise that privacy is a 
172 European Commission 'Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to 
Increase Users' Control of their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses' European Commission Press 
Release, 25 January 2013 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46 _ en.htm?locale=en> 
173 Hammarberg, Thomas 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism', Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Strasbourg, CommDH/IssuePaper (2008) 3 at 5. 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=l469161> 
174 Article 8 states that:'(!) Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her, (2) Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified, and (3) 
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
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fundamental human right entitled to protection under the law and it gives effect to 
Article 8 of the EU Charter. 175 The European Commission recognizes that the CoE 
Convention is currently the sole international treaty with a binding character and it has 
as a result opened it to non-EU member states for signature. However, this has not 
been as successful and even though it is binding on 27 EU member states and the three 
member countries in the European Economic Area, it is unlikely that the CoE 
Convention will become the global binding international instruments on data 
protection. 176 
Need for global harmonization 
The UN Guidelines were promulgated because it was difficult to reach international 
consensus to create a binding law due to existing data protection laws around the 
world that either follow the EU Directive or the 1980 OECD Guidelines and the APEC 
Privacy Framework, thereby creating problems for global harmonization. Kuner 
argues that it is this very disparity that calls for a global legal instrument and this is 
what led to the Madrid Resolution. 177 National laws around the world that don't follow 
the EU model, draw on the OECD Guidelines and APEC Privacy Framework which 
focus more on a regulatory framework and provides a non-binding set of principles 
that member states may enact. The emphasis is still on 'achieving acceptance of 
certain minimum standards of privacy and personal data protection, and of 
eliminating, as far as possible, factors which might induce countries to restrict 
175 Op cit note 122, 'Data Protection Day: Joint High Level Meeting From European to International 
Standards on Data Protection, Remarks of Marc Rotenberg'. 
176 Op cit note 138, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: 
Past, Present, and Future' at 16-18. 
177 Ibid, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, 
and Future' at 25. 
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transborder data flows for reasons associated with such flows. 178 The Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights stressed that 'the Data Protection Principles 
in the EU Directive must be construed as fundamental, constitutional human rights 
principles, and applied in accordance with the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights which interprets data protection as a fundamental human right. 179 Since 
Europe has vast knowledge in this area, the drafters of an international legal 
instrument could draw from the European data protection model for guidance. 
A known concern with the EU data protection model is that it has been difficult to 
enforce compliance with the law because of jurisdictional boundaries. Even though a 
global legal instrument will not cure this, it will create harmony by imposing legally 
binding obligations and requiring the transposition of data protection safeguards into 
national laws worldwide. This is also relevant to migrants who travel across borders. It 
is therefore important that the provision allowing recourse to Data Protection 
Supervisory Authorities are applied without distinction and that it applies equally to 
persons within the territory who will have equal protection before the law, regardless 
of their nationality or immigration status. 
Kroner states that one of the arguments for the EU Directive requirement of adequate 
laws prior to data transfer was the concern for creating data havens, that is, 
transferring personal data outside the protective framework in the European Union to 
178 Ibid, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, 
and Future' at 16. 
179 Op cit note 173, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 6. 
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third countries to circumvent legal protections. However, there has been little evidence 
that data havens are a reality and with the increase of national laws this is less of a 
concern. 180 The creation of a global legal instrument will further do away with this 
concern because there would be a minimum standard that all States would have to 
comply with, whether or not, national data protection laws are already developed. 
Kuner warns that international harmony will depend on international cooperation and 
the need for countries not to extend their reach across borders as this will result in 
friction. This, he says, can be avoided if data protection is viewed as a human right 
and not merely as a commodity. 181 What governments need to realize to reach 
international consensus is that data transfer is an advantage to a globalized economy 
and promoting data protection as a right can facilitate this. Kuner argues further that 
'the economic, legal, and social importance of data protection is a niche area of 
interest to only data protection and privacy specialists, and it is not adequately 
recognized by the governments. Ministers and government officials at the highest 
levels need to grant international data flows the same attention as they do to 
international flows of capital and international trade.' 182 Indeed, this will help to put 
data protection on the political, policy and legislative table. 
Madrid Resolution 
The Madrid Resolution includes the commonly accepted Data Protection Principles 
180 Op cit note 138, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: 
Past, Present, and Future' at 31. 
181 Ibid, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, 
and Future' at 43. 
182 Ibid, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, 
and Future' at 8- 9. 
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and the appointment of Data Protection Supervisory Bodies with the power to set 
conditions for allowing data transfer to countries with existing data protection laws or 
on the basis of industry codes or contractual clauses. Since this is much in line with 
the EU data protection model, which recognizes data protection as a fundament human 
right, a global law could similarly have the quality of a legally binding human rights 
instrument. 183 Moreover, the shift toward focusing on responsibilities of the data 
controller as seen in Europe is compatible with viewing data protection as a human 
right because it allows remedies to individuals in the event of breach. Thus, creating a 
data protection law in the human rights framework will make it more difficult for 
States and private companies to circumvent the rights of individuals at the expense of 
State interests and economic interests. 
Even though there will be an inevitable tension between States since most existing 
laws are based on territorial needs and national legal frameworks, the Madrid 
Resolution proposes to codify the already commonly accepted Data Protection 
Principles and make them universal. It also provides useful guidance to create 
harmonization across borders by defining the form of the legal framework on data 
protection to be introduced by States, the standards on which it would be based and the 
scope thereof, and agreement on the appointment of international organization to assist 
in implementation. 184 Kuner says that since data transfer involves both benefits and 
risks it is important that the following measures be implemented to avoid inherent 
183 Ibid,' Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, 
and Future' at 27. 
184 Ibid, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, 
and Future' at 35- 39. 
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threats to privacy and data protection: ensuring pro-active compliance with the law 
(such as the promotion of privacy audits), granting sufficient resources and enhanced 
enforcement powers to Data Protection Authorities, and enacting rules to ensure the 
legal accountability of the parties involved in transferring personal data. 185 
Rotenberg emphasizes that the Madrid Declaration resulted from discussions on the 
need for an international framework on data protection with the 'full participation of 
civil society, based on the rule of law, respect for fundamental human rights and 
democratic debate." 86 However, the problem is that States and legislators where not at 
the table for this discussion which leaves a big gap. 187 The International Conference of 
Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners involved data protection stakeholders in 
Europe Canada, Latin America, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Japan and other 
jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific region, mostly privacy experts and the Data Protection 
Authorities or the equivalent bodies responsible for guaranteeing data protection and 
privacy. 188 The Department of Privacy Office and the Staff of the United States 
Federal Trade Commissioner noted that international conventions typically cover a 
narrow issue with broad consensus while the Madrid Resolution covers an extremely 
broad array of issues with which there is narrow consensus, yet it is a good starting 
185 Ibid, 'Regulation of Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, 
and Future' at 41. 
186 Op cit note 122, 'Data Protection Day: Joint High Level Meeting From European to International 
Standards on Data Protection, Remarks of Marc Rotenberg'. 
187 Department of Homeland and Security (DHS) (2010) 'Comments by the DHS Privacy Office and the 
Staff of the U.S. Federal Trade Commissioner on the Joint Proposal for International Standards on the 
Protection of Privacy with regard to the Processing of Personal Data' at 4. 
188 The Madrid Resolution 'International Standards on the Protection of Personal data and Privacy' the 
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, 5 November 2009 < 
http://www.justice.gov.ii/NR/rdonlyres/F8A 7934 7-170C-4EEF-AOAD-
155554558A5F/24464/2009l.pdf> 
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point for discussions on the feasibility of a global legal instrument. 189 Indeed a 
comprehensive approach involving dialogue between all stakeholders from both the 
private and public sector is necessary to ensure global consensus. 
Draft international law on data protection 
As evidenced by the 31st International Conference on Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, there is a need to strengthen the international character of data 
protection through the adoption of a universal and binding international instrument. At 
this conference, a resolution was adopted on a Joint Proposal for Setting International 
Standards on Privacy and Personal Data Protection. 190 The objectives of allowing for 
the cross border flow of information and establishing Data Protection Supervisory 
Bodies to monitor data protection practices, while at the same time protecting privacy, 
confidentiality of personal data and anonymity of individuals is echoed in national 
laws that do exist and there is no reason why this dual objective cannot remain in a 
legally binding instrument at international level. To ensure a uniformed approach the 
Draft Law identifies the core Data Protection Principles that has already received 
international consensus together with rights, obligations and procedures that should 
become legally binding. Accordingly, personal data should be processed: 
a. fairly, lawfully and in a proportionate manner in relation to specific, 
explicit and legitimate purposes; 
189 Op cit note 187, 'Comments by the DHS Privacy Office and the Staff of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commissioner on the Joint Proposal for International Standards on the Protection of Privacy with regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data' at 2- 3. 
190 Op cit note 12, The Madrid Resolution International Standards on the Protection of Privacy and 
Data Protection. 
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b. on the basis of transparent policies, informing adequately the data 
subjects and without any arbitrary discrimination against them; 
c. ensuring the accuracy, the confidentiality and the security of the data 
as well as the legitimacy of the processing, and the rights of data 
subjects to access, rectification, erasure of data and to object against 
their processing; 
d. implementing the principles of accountability and liability, even if the 
processing operations are carried out by service providers on behalf of 
the controller; 
e. offering more appropriate guarantees where the data are sensitive; 
f. ensuring that personal data transferred internationally benefits from 
the level of protection provided by the above-mentioned set of 
standards, 
g. subject to the monitoring of independent and impartial supervisory 
authorities provided with adequate powers and resources also in 
connection with their duty to cooperate among themselves; 
h. in a new and modern framework of proactive measures, such as those 
oriented in particular to prevent and detect breaches and based on the 
appointment of privacy officers as well as on efficient audits and 
0 0 191 pnvacy 1mpact assessments. 
The Draft Law seeks to reflect the many approaches to data protection by integrating 
legislations from five continents with the view to create one binding legal instrument. 
The purpose is two fold: firstly, to define a set of principles and rights guaranteeing 
the effective and internationally uniform protection of privacy with regard to the 
processing of personal data; and secondly, to facilitate flow of personal data needed in 
a globalized world. It would be useful if the first purpose could be narrowed to data 
protection specifically because privacy definitions differ in various jurisdictions, 
whereas most States would welcome a universal definition of the right to data 
191 Ibid, The Madrid Resolution international Standards on the Protection of Privacy and Data 
Protection at 31. 
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protection. Kuner agrees that since 'privacy is a broader concept than data protection, 
it would seem more practical to limit the scope of a legal instrument to data 
. ,)92 protectiOn. 
It is clear that a human rights approach is included in the text of the draft because 
unlike existing data protection laws, the emphasis is on creating uniform protection of 
personal data as the primary objective and facilitating of personal data as the 
secondary purpose. In addition, States are given the freedom to supplement the 
minimum level of protection with additional measures to better guarantee data 
protection. Restrictions are allowed in the interests of national security, public safety, 
for the protection of public health, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others, provided such restrictions are necessary in a democratic society and it is 
outlined in national legislation to appropriately guarantee and preserve the rights of the 
data subjects. 
The Department of Privacy Office and the Staff of the United States Federal Trade 
Commissioner rightfully point out that the provision relating to national security is 
problematic because it will lead to inconsistent exceptions due to differing legal 
frameworks and cultural differences. 193 This is because different jurisdictions may 
make different determinations as to whether there is a credible risk to national 
192 Kuner, Christopher (2009) 'An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and 
Prospects' at 6. 
193 Op cit note 187, 'Comments by the DHS Privacy Office and the Staff of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commissioner on the Joint Proposal for International Standards on the Protection of Privacy with regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data' at 4- 8. 
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security. To cure this, clear criteria for the exceptions should be embedded in the law 
to ensure uniformity. A safeguard embedded in the law is the principle of 
proportionality which provides that: '1) The processing of personal data should be 
limited to such processing as is adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes, and 2) The responsible person should make reasonable efforts to limit the 
processed personal data to the minimum necessary. Interestingly, it has a provision for 
a 'processing service provider' defined 'as any natural person or organization, other 
than the responsible person that carries out processing of personal data on behalf of 
such responsible person.' This makes it clear that outsourcing of State obligations to 
private companies would, for example, not detract from the obligations that will be 
applicable to those companies acting as de facto State agents. A right to object by the 
data subject based on the particular personal situation of the person is introduced as 
well as an explicit duty of confidentiality that extends beyond expiration of the legal 
relationship between the data subject and the data controller. 
To cover countries that lack existing data protection laws, contractual clauses in the 
form of bilateral agreements are allowed and cooperation agreements between 
appointed Data Protection Supervisory Bodies are encouraged to ensure effective 
application of the law. There are also proactive measure for compliance and provisions 
for liability and remedies; however, this should be carefully applied because it should 
not give rise to double damages if remedies are available in national laws. As per the 
explanatory notes to the Draft Law, 'the conference correctly considered the rights to 
data protection and privacy as fundamental rights of individuals, irrespective of their 
nationality or residence, while noting that the persisting data protection and privacy 
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disparities in the world, in particular due to the fact that many States have not yet 
passed adequate laws, harm the exchange of personal information and the 
implementation of effective global data protection.' 194 It is therefore clear that the 
drafters intended to have the law applicable to migrants crossing borders. 
To date the task to develop an international treaty has indeed been challenging. The 
Joint Proposal for a Draft of International Standards on the Protection of Privacy 
with regard to the processing of Personal Data is a big step that brings the 
international community closer to achieving this goal. The regulation of cross border 
data protection issues is an area of law where international cooperation and 
coordination can come together to address these issues from a global private 
international law perspective. 195 However, it is not limited to international private law, 
data protection is a mixture of various legal areas, such as human rights law, public 
law, private law, amongst others. 196 If seen in this way, it also caters for the 
intersection with migration. It is understandable that drafters require time, but the 
societal needs today are far too great to lag behind and legislators need to act in hast to 
keep up with the growth in advanced technology that are impacting on existing 
individual rights. Back in 2009 Kuner was of the opinion that a legally binding 
instrument on data protection was premature and suggested alternative harmonizing 
194 Op cit note 12, The Madrid Resolution International Standards on the Protection of Privacy and 
Data Protection at 33. 
195 See Permanent Bureau (2010) 'Cross-border Data Flows and Protection of Privacy' Note submitted 
by the Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law 
<http://www.hcch.~et/upload/wop/genaff20 I Opd 13e.pdf> 
196 Op cit note 192, 'An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects' at 26. 
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instruments including a model or uniform law that States can enact into their national 
1 197 aw. 
A model law is worth pursuing as good practice guidance, but what we need is legally 
binding obligations to ensure that such a model is transposed into national laws. Soft 
laws at international level are no longer sufficient and if States agree to international 
law obligations it can apply in the interim while country-specific laws are developed 
to take account of the complexities and legal regimes in different countries. Since 
States are increasingly interested in migrant data, it is important that data protection 
for migrants form part of the legislative process. This leads to a discussion on human 
rights framework and its extension to migrants. 
3.3 International Legal Instruments on Human Rights 
'We stand today at the threshold of a great event, both in the life of the 
United Nations and in the life of mankind. The UDHR may well become the 
International Magna Carta of all men everywhere.' 198 
This section provides an overview of the legal instruments on human rights, following 
197 Ibid, 'An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects' at 9-12. 
198 Rooseveld, Eleanor 'Address to the United Nations General Assembly on the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Right' Paris, 9 December 1984 in Rehman, Javaid International 
Human Rights Law (2010) at 75. 
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the argument in the preceding section that data protection as an established legal right 
should find itselfwithin the framework ofthis body of law, and emphasizes that States 
are obligated to ensure respect for the human rights of all migrants. 
Customary law 
Even though the 1948 United Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a declaration 
with soft law force, over time, its substantive provisions have become customary law. 
To be considered customary law, the two key elements of: (1) State practice and (2) 
belief that such practice is binding amounts to law ( opinio juris) must be proven. 199 
Rehman and others confirm that most international lawyers agree that these two 
elements have been met, firstly it is widely accepted that the rights in the UDHR are 
acknowledged by most States as international norms, and secondly, the opinion juris is 
overwhelmingly evident in the text and travaux prepatoires of the United Nations 
(UN) Charter.200 The preamble of the UN Charter 'reaffirms faith in fundamental 
human rights and in the equal rights of men and women' and Article 1(3) states that 
'one of the purposes of the UN is to achieve international cooperation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and 
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction.' The incorporation of the UDHR into the UN Charter and 
its recognition by the 193 countries as member states to the UN demonstrates that the 
Charter is the leading international treaty recognizing the universal protection of 
human rights. It is also evident in the preambles of regional legally binding 
199 Rehman, Javaid' (2010) International Human Rights Law at 79- 80. 
200 Ibid, International Human Rights Law at 79. 
102 
instruments throughout the world, further replicated in national constitutions, and 
treated as binding in court jurisprudence at national, regional, and international 
level.201 
Steiner says 'no one document received the same moral and rhetoric force, or has 
exerted as much influence on the human rights movement throughout history. It is the 
parent of the International Conventions and the grandfather to many specialized 
treaties. ' 202 International human rights law is sui generis (of a unique character) in that 
it focuses on legal order based on the good towards all individuals within the 
jurisdiction of a State.203 A human rights based approach is therefore an affirmation of 
the basic and fundamental human rights and principles as embodied in the UDHR 
where the individuals are the right holders and the State is the duty bearer.Z04 In 1985 
the member states to the UN adopted the Declaration on the Human Rights of 
Individuals who are Not Nationals in the Countries in which they livi05 which aims 
to, inter alia, reaffirm the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and recognize 
that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in 
international instruments should also be ensured for individuals who are not nationals 
201 Ibid, International Human Rights Law at 81. 
202 Steiner 'Securing Human Rights: The First Half Century of the UNDH' Harvard Magazine, 
September- October 1998 in op cit note 132 International Human Rights Law at 83. 
203 Op cit note 199, International Human Rights Law at 14. 
204 Action Research on AIDS and Mobility, Global Alliance against Traffic in Women and International 
Women's Rights Action 'Report on Roundtable on using CEDAW to Protect the Rights of Women 
Migrant Workers and Trafficked Women in South and Southeast Asia' Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 6-9 
May 2009 
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of the country in which they live. Although this is a Declaration, it does signify the 
intention and commitment of the signatory States to afford human rights equally to all 
migrants. The UDHR outlines a wide range of rights which are traditionally classified 
into three generations of rights, namely: ( 1) civil and political first generation rights; 
(2) social, economic and cultural second generation rights, and (3) group/peoples third 
generation rights.206 The right to privacy falls under the first generation rights focusing 
on the autonomous individual and protection from interventions by the State.207 
Human rights are indivisible and inherent to the dignity of every individual and 
therefore all human rights have equal status without any hierarchy.208 Thus, the right 
to privacy, which encompasses data protection, should have equal respect to other 
guaranteed rights. 
Positive law 
Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the 'right to everyone to have their privacy, 
family, home or correspondence protected from arbitrary interference.' Similarly, 
Article 5 (1) (b) of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are Not 
Nationals in the Countries in which they live states that 'Aliens shall enjoy, in 
accordance with domestic law and subject to the relevant international obligations of 
the State in which they are present, the right to protection against arbitrary or unlawful 
206 Op cit note 199, International Human Rights Law at 77. 
207 Sehmer, Carolin 'Report of the Parallel Event 'Third Generation Human Rights-Reflections on the 
Collective Dimension of Human Rights' Palais des Nations, Geneva, 22 March 2007 
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interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence.' Article 2 of the UDHR 
states further that 'everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms, without 
distinction of any kind.' This is reiterated in Article 26 of the ICCPR which 'protects 
all persons from discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.' Emphasis is added to the preceding provisions to illustrate that the right to 
privacy is a universal fundamental right afforded to all individuals, regardless of 
nationality or immigration status, and it extends to all migrants whether in a regular or 
. 1 . . 209 1rregu ar situatiOn. 
The ICCPR is binding on the international community and even though some 
countries like South Africa have not ratified it, signing the Convention signifies its 
commitment to uphold the spirit and purpose of the provisions contained therein. 
Specific reference to privacy as a right can also be found in Article 14 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families ( 1990) (MW A) affording the right to privacy to all migrant workers; in 
Article 10 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (CRC) ensuring that 
the child has an equal right to privacy as an adult, and this is coupled with Article 12 
which states that the views and opinions of the child should be given due weight 
according to the age and maturity of the child; and in Article 22 of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (CRPD) the right to privacy is 
209 Op cit note 32, Migrant Workers in International Human Rights Law: Their Protection in Countries 
of Employment and op cit note 5, !OM Data Protection Manual at 13. 
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guaranteed to persons with disabilities.210 These international legal instruments 
essentially echo the right to privacy as stated in Article 12 of UDHR, without any 
difference in substance, except that Article 17 of the ICCPR adds the criteria of 
'unlawful interference' to emphasize that any limitation to the right to privacy must be 
legitimate and embedded in the law. 
The Human Rights Committee stresses, in General Comment No. 16 (1988), the 
importance of the right to privacy by stating that 'compliance with Article 17 (of the 
ICCPR) requires that the integrity and confidentiality of correspondence should be 
guaranteed de jure and de facto. '211 As a result, States are obligated to adopt 
legislative and other measures to give effect to the prohibition against arbitrary 
interferences with the right to privacy and any interference by States have to be on the 
basis of an enacted law. In addition, the concept of 'arbitrariness' and 'unlawful 
interference' means that such interference should not only be provided by law, but it 
must be reasonable in the particular circumstance.212 Specifically, 'the gathering and 
holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other devices, whether 
by public authorities or private individuals or entities, must be regulated by law. To 
this end, effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that information 
concerning a person's private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not 
210 Even though South African only ratified some of the international treaties giving legal effect to the 
right to privacy, it signed all of them and is therefore obliged to act according to its spirit and intention. 
See chapter 5 below for further detail on the right to privacy in South African law. 
211 United Nations Human Rights Committee 'General Comment No. 16: The Right to Respect of 
Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation (Article 17), 
04/08/1988, CCPR General Comment No. 16 (General Comments)' Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights <http://hria.equalit.ie/pdf/en/5/GC%20 16%20-%20privacy%20EN.pdf> 
212 Ibid, 'General Comment No.l6' at 4-8. 
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authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and that it is never used for purposes 
incompatible with the Covenant (i.e. ICCPR). ' 213 This clearly supports the view that 
data protection is included in the right to privacy and it is also line with Banisar's 
argument in chapter 2.1 that data protection is one facet of the right to privacy? 14 
Moreover, since human rights are afforded to all individuals without distinction, it also 
applies to migrants and thus privacy and data protection as fundamental human rights 
should be afforded equally to migrants. 
Limitation on rights 
Even though human rights are afforded to everyone, some rights are derogable and 
may result in different treatment between nationals and non-nationals. Any derogation 
from fundamental rights should, however, be based on reasonable and objective 
criteria and should be proportionate to meet a legitimate and justifiable need. The 
international human rights instruments state that the principle of necessity allows for 
limitations to rights, but this is not defined. Consequently, it has been given various 
interpretations, but in all interpretations it emphasizes the proportionate relationship 
between the right that needs to be protected and the importance of the objective to be 
achieved by limiting the right in question.215 This proportionality between the right and 
the objective of the limitation stresses that measures taken pursuant to a derogation of 
a right must be taken 'to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,' 
213 Ibid, 'General Comment No.l6 at I 0, 
214 Op cit note 132, 'Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and 
Developments.' ' 
215 Op cit note 7, Biometrics and International Migration at 12. 
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which sets a strict standard of being absolute necessity.' 216 The rationale for this 
proportionality test is that any derogation cannot affect the essence of the right. This is 
evident in the Article 5 of the ICCPR which provides that: 'Nothing in the Covenant 
may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in 
any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms recognized herein.' Higgens states that 'derogation does not mean an 
abolition of a right because while the State has leeway to derogate a right, the 
derogation clauses do not suspend the rule of law, instead they regulate the 
relationship between the rule and the exception.' 217 
Privacy not an absolute right 
Giving effect to human rights through the enforcement of national laws stems from 
international obligations of States under international human rights law. As a result, 
the right to privacy is legally protected in many national jurisdictions, but it is not an 
absolute right. Individual privacy competes alongside other recognized rights and can 
be limited by the legitimate interests of States provided it is proportional, justified and 
necessary to meet a legitimate purpose.218 The collection and processing of personal 
data, without the appropriate safeguards, can lead to a number of risks including, inter 
alia, infringement of the right to privacy and privacy, violation of confidentiality 
216 United Nations Human Rights Committee 'General Comment No 29: States of Emergency (Article 
4)' U.N.Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.ll (2001), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrc29 .html> 
217 Higgins, Rosalyn (1978) 'Derogations under Human Rights Treaties.' 
218 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on justifiable limitations to rights in the South African 
context. 
108 
requirements, migrant profiling and discriminatory treatment. It can also lead to 
limitations on freedom of movement and family unity, the right to seek asylum or 
contravention to the universal principle of non-refoulement.219 If, for example, 
confidentiality of personal data of refugees is not adequately protected, it could impact 
on the right to seek asylum due to fear of reprisals and it could also jeopardize the 
asylum process because asylum seekers may be reluctant to disclose necessary 
information due to lack of confidence and trust. Therefore, policy-makers/legislators 
should ensure that migration law and policy giving effect to State sovereignty do not 
adversely affect human rights including the right not to be refouled. Accordingly, any 
derogation to the right of privacy and data protection for the purpose of the national 
security of the State 'must be necessary and proportionate to the exigencies of the 
situation and must not involve discrimination in their application. ' 220 
Domestic data protection laws 
Some States have taken steps to give expression to privacy and data protection through 
enactment of specific data protection laws. In the absence of any regional laws and due 
to the non-binding nature of the 1990 UN Guidelines for the Regulation of 
Computerized Personal Data Files, African countries like most countries look to the 
European data protection laws for guidance.221 One might think that the Americas 
219 The principle of non-refoulement is in included in Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
relating to Status of Refugees which states that 'no Contracting States shall expel or return ("refouler") 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, regional, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.' 
220 Op cit note 7, Biometrics and International Migration at 12. 
221 See further discussion on developments of data protection in the African context in chapter 5. 
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would have a regional legal instrument comparable to the CoE Convention and the EU 
Directive, but as stated by Thomas 'the United States, as a modem democracy, has the 
weakest laws in terms of data protection. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
found that its Constitution contains 'penumbras' that implicitly grant a right to privacy 
against government intrusion.222 Although the United States is a signatory to the 
OECD Guidelines, which is non-binding, it has not implemented a data protection law 
at federal-level. Instead, data protection laws have developed on an ad-hoc basis 
through industry-specific codes of practice governed by a mix of legislation, 
1 . d lf 1 . '223 regu atwn, an se -regu atwn. 
Asian countries adopt similar practices to the United States by focusing on self-
regulation that follows a set of guidelines. States mostly follow the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans border Flows of Personal Data and 
2005 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework, both non-
binding in nature. More recently, the 2009 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
recognizes an explicit right to the protection of personal data in Article 21 which states 
that: 'Every person has the right to be free from arbitrary interference with his or her 
privacy, family, home or correspondence including personal data, or to attacks upon 
222 For example see Griswoldv. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
223 Op cit note 76, Biometrics, International Migration and Human Rights at 391. For a detailed 
overview of the legal regime on privacy and data protection in the United States, see also: Anne Iiese 
(2009) 'The Law of Data (Privacy) Protection: A Comparative and Theoretical Study,' UNISA theses 
and dissertations at 27- 150 <http://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/1463?show=full> 
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that person's honour and reputation. Every person has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks.' However, this Declaration is not binding and 
has not yet had much influence in the development of data protection laws in the 
region. Canada and Australia like other countries have independent data protection 
laws in place echoing the principles in the OECD Guidelines and drawing on the EU 
Directive. In Latin America, the law centres around the concept 'habeus data' literally 
translated it means 'you should have data.' There is a constitutional right to habeas 
data to protect data that is private and it is predominant in many national laws in the 
. 224 
regwn. 
Other countries without Constitutions have specific laws protecting data protection 
and privacy, such as the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act of 1998. The European 
model is the most comprehensive regional law and the European Union requires all its 
member states to legislate so as to ensure that citizens have a right to data protection. 
The African Union, or perhaps more specifically, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) should use the European model as a basis to develop a regional 
legally binding instrument on data protection that is suitable to the Southern African 
context. Whether or not the European model can be replicated in Southern African 
Development Community will be discussed in chapter 5. Before looking at the 
regional context, the international legal framework on cross border migration will be 
canvassed. The next chapter provides a legal analysis of existing international 
migration law from a human rights perspective. 
224 Salazar, Luis (2008) 'E-Commerce Best Practices: Online Privacy {Ten Keys to Latin American 
Data Privacy), Standford, Standford Law School. 
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4. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CROSS BORDER MIGRATION 
The chapter a1ms to provide a human rights based analysis of the existing legal 
framework on cross border migration with reference to rights and obligations of States 
under international law as well as best practice approaches which can help to shape the 
development of national laws. By looking at the exercise of State sovereignty rights in 
pursuit of national security interests it identifies gaps and highlights the importance of 
upholding State obligations toward individuals as guaranteed under international 
migration law. In so doing, it provides an insight into the meeting point and challenges 
at the interface between migration and data protection and argues that State interests 
and individual rights are not mutually exclusive; instead they can be balanced, albeit a 
delicate balance. 
4.1 International Migration Law 
'International Migration law, which is the international legal framework 
governing migration, is not covered by any one legal instrument or norm. 
Instead, it is an umbrella term covering a variety of principles and rules that 
together regulate the international obligations of States with regards to 
. 225 
mtgrants. 
225 The International Organization for Migration 'What is International Migration Law?' < 
http://www. iom. int/ ems/ en/sites/i om/home/what -we-do/migration -Ia w .html> 
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This section covers State responsibility and reviews the international framework for 
the protection of the rights of migrants. The following excerpts of rights and freedoms, 
which is customary law or find expression in international conventions, are amongst 
others relevant to the interface between data protection and migration: 
Right to integrity, non-discrimination and equality: 
'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood.' (Article 1 of the UDHR) 
~Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other 
limitation of sovereignty. (Article 2 of the UDHR) 
'All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination.' (Article 7 of the UDHR) 
Protection of privacy: 
'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks' 
(Article 12 of the UDHR) 
'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary and unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.' (Article 17 of the ICCPR) 
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Right to family unity: 
'The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State.' (Article 16 (3) of the UDHR). 
Freedom of movement: 
'Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders 
of each state.' (Article 13 ofthe UDHR) 
'Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have 
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.' (Article 12 
of the ICCPR) 
Right to seek asylum and non-refoulement: 
'Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.' (Article 14 (1) of the UDHR) 
No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social or political opinion" (Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention 
relating to Status of Refugees) 
The rights of trafficked persons: 
In appropriate cases and to the extent possible under its domestic law, each State 
Party shall protect the privacy and identity of victims of trafficking in persons, 
including, inter alia, by making legal proceedings relating to such trafficking 
confidential (Article 6 (1) of the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime) 
The rights of the child: 
No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or 
her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her 
honour and reputation. The child has the right to the protection of the law 
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against such interference or attacks (Article 16 of the CRC) 
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the 
age and maturity of the child (Article 12 of the CRC) 
The rights of migrant workers: 
States Parties undertake, in accordance with the international instruments 
concerning human rights, to respect and to ensure to all migrant workers and 
members of their families within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction 
the rights provided for in the present Convention without distinction of any 
kind such as to sex, race, colour, language, religion or conviction, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic 
position, property, marital status, birth or other status (Article 7 of the MWC) 
No migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, 
correspondence or other communications, or to unlawful attacks on his or her 
honour and reputation. Each migrant worker and member of his or her family 
shall have the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks (Article 14 ofMWC) 
State obligations stem from various sources 
The obligation of States to protect the rights of migrants stem from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and a number of international human rights 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1966), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
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(1965), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women ( 1979). All of these legal 
instruments extend to migrants because the rights embedded therein are not limited to 
nationals of the signatory States. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has 
emphatically stated that the enjoyment of these rights are not limited to nationals and 
that it 'must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or 
statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, 
who may find themselves in the territory or who are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
State Party. '226 In addition, entering into a country in contravention to the immigration 
laws and travelling without documents 'do not deprive migrants of fundamental 
human rights provided in the human rights instruments, nor does it affect the 
obligation of States to protect migrants in an irregular situation. ' 227 
The fact that all countries who are party to the United Nations have ratified at least one 
treaty that guarantees the right to non-discrimination to everyone demonstrates that 
this is a fundamental right that runs across all international human rights legal 
instruments.228 Similarly, the concomitant right to equality is an integral and 
indivisible part of such legal instruments and it is in essence the foundation of all 
human rights, including the right to privacy, which is applicable to all people around 
226 United Nations Human Rights Committee 'The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties', General Comment No. 31, paragraph 10 at 3. 
227 Global Commission for International Migration (2005) 'Migrating in an Interconnected World: new 
directions for actiou' at 55. 
228 See: OHCHR website 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/HumanRightsFramework.aspx> 
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the world irrespective of their nationality or immigration status.229 
The International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families (1990) (MWC) is a core human rights treaty and is the 
only legal instrument dedicated to migrant rights. Even though it focuses on the rights 
of migrants with residence permits in the workplace and their neglected family 
members, it does recognize the specific vulnerabilities of migrants. 230 The 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, and the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000 
and its supplementary Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling covers 
particularly vulnerable groups of migrants. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989) (CRC) is near universal ratification and the theme that pervades the language 
of the Convention is the 'best interest of the child.' Article 1 provides guarantees to all 
children under the age of eighteen, regardless of their nationality.231 
Article 16 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child emphasizes that children have 
a right to privacy and that the law should protect them from attacks against their way 
of life, their good name, their families and their homes that includes the right to 
equality and non-discrimination, and more specifically the right to privacy. Article 3 
states that 'Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
229 United Nations (2003) Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights 
for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers at 640. 
230 Op cite note 228, OHCHR website. 
231 South Africa ratified the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child in 1995. 
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recognized and guaranteed in this Charter irrespective of the child's or his/her parents' 
or legal guardians' race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.' Moreover, Article 10 
states that 'No child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family home or correspondence, or to the attacks upon his honour or 
reputation, provided that parents or legal guardians shall have the right to exercise 
reasonable supervision over the conduct of their children. The child has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.' Article 12 of the CRC 
requests that due consideration be given to the views of the child in accordance with 
the age and maturity of the child. While States have prerogative to limit certain rights 
to citizens, when it comes to children, no such limitation is allowed as migrant 
children should be treated equally and they must have equal access to all protections 
given to children who are citizens. 
As seen above, the obligation of States toward migrants stem from various sources that 
are dispersed across different branches of international law, including human rights 
law, criminal law, labour law and humanitarian law refugee law. In the absence of a 
defined body of law on international migration, there continues to be a number of gaps 
and grey areas. Goulboune examines the limitations of the law protecting non-
nationals and the conflict between human rights and the principle of sovereignty, 
which give States the power to control the entry to their borders. He argues that the 
lack of an adequate legal framework to take account of the intricacies of migration is 
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due to a global failure that goes beyond traditions legal norms.232 This is, for example, 
evident from the slow ratification of the MWC. Harzig and Hoerder survey the history 
of migration and note that the classic theories of migration are being challenged by the 
global phenomenon of migration. Indeed migration in today's world is a dynamic 
concept and States are grappling with the challenges that it presents. Castles and 
Miller argue that the 9/11 September terrorist attacks transformed security dilemmas 
in States, but it did not bring about fundamental changes in the age of migration which 
faces the rapid growth of labour migration and an increase in asylum-seekers as a 
result of violence linked to migration. 
Nexus between migration and human rights 
Even though national migration laws are important to regulate movements across 
borders and to protect State interests, the fundamental principle of international law is 
that it prevails over national law if it conflicts with human rights standards to which 
State are bound. The increased recognition of the nexus between migration and human 
rights has also been made evident through the establishment of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Human Rights of Migrants as mentioned earlier in chapter 1.233 The High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has called on States to promote and 
protect the human rights of all migrants and has made this a priority of the work of her 
office (OHCHR) stating that 'the protection of migrants is an urgent and growing 
232 Goulboune, S ( 1998) Law and Migration. 
233 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants was created in 1999 by the 
Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Resolution 1999/44 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/rapporteur/> 
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human rights challenge. ' 234 According to Loren Landau, 'legal status of migrants only 
matters in terms of legal identity, for example, refugees have different rights compared 
to undocumented migrants, '235 but they are all individuals who should be afforded 
equal application of human rights. Cholewinski argues that the 'last decade has 
witnessed an awareness of the difficulties migrants face in accessing the full panoply 
of rights during migration with the result that migrants' rights today are more clearly 
. bl h . h ' 236 recogmza e as uman ng ts. 
Migration governance 
Since there is no one body of law governing migration, States are left with discretion, 
and they often tum to migration strategies to regulate migration management. 
Migration is a politically sensitive issue, particularly in light of States' obligation to 
protect its citizens from threat or danger and the need to manage migration flows and 
reduce irregular movements. This political and economic approach to migration has 
the tendency to undermine the human rights dimension of migration. Cholewinsky 
emphasizes that when it comes to migration management and the protection of human 
rights, it is important to focus on the migrants themselves and not only on the 
. . 237 
mtgratwn process. 
234 Op cit note 28, OHCHR 'Migration and Human Rights.' 
235 Informal interview with Landau, Loren, Director of the African Centre for Migration and Society, 
University of Witwatersrand conducted in Johannesburg. 
236 Cholewinski, Ryszard (2010) 'Human Rights of Migrants: The Dawn of a New Era' at 614. 
237 Cholewinsky, Ryszard (2005) Study on Obstacles to Effective Access of Irregular Migrants: Access 
to Minimum Social Rights at 18. 
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Xenophobia 
Migration strategies are usually premised on State interests to protect its own 
nationals, but sometimes this lends to xenophobic attitudes and unequal treatment of 
migrants. As mentioned in chapter 2, migrants include both economic and forcibly 
displaced persons as well as vulnerable migrant groups that use the same migratory 
routes when searching for legal recourse to human rights abuses. The vulnerability of 
migrants is compounded by the fact that they live beyond the reach of the legal 
protection of their country of origin. They are frequently unfamiliar with the language 
and laws of the host country or transit country, and may not have the support of social 
networks in the community. This can impair their ability to assert their rights and to 
access available remedies.238 In the South African context, as in many other countries, 
there are additional sentiments of xenophobia that are echoed in comments by high 
profile ministers239 and this may eventually finds its way into the law because political 
agendas tend to drive the development of the law. On the positive side, political drive 
will provide a legal basis to enact much needed laws; but on the negative side, political 
agendas can also be fuelled by xenophobic attitudes toward migrants. 
Migrant profiling 
Migrants are also being treated with more suspicion and are often seen, unjustifiably, 
as potential enemies. The pretext for migrant profiling is often national security, but 
238 See: Statement by Simonovic, Ivan Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to the ECOSOC General Segment 2010, Item 14(g) Assistant Secretary-General for Human 
Rights, 22 July 2010 
<http://www .ohchr:org/EN/N ewsEvents/Pages/Display N ews.aspx?N ewsiD= 10231 &LanglD= E> 
239 Informal interview with Landau, Loren, Director of the African Centre for Migration and Society, 
University of Witwatersrand conducted in Johannesburg. 
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the reality is that decisions are being made arbitrarily on discriminatory grounds. Data 
collection during screening processes and migrant profiling at borders, without 
adequate safeguards, can be used as a tool to fuel discriminatory practices, as well as 
ethnic and religious categorization, which are contrary to human rights standards.240 
The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants recently found that migrant 
profiling is widespread, and in some instances, law enforcement officials routinely use 
generalization about ethnicity, religion, race, colour of the skin, or national origin in 
deciding who to target for identity checks, stops, search and sometimes arrest, rather 
than utilizing objective evidence as the basis for making decisions.241 This is clearly in 
contrast with the principle of human dignity and the prohibition of discrimination. 
Balancing rights and interests 
It is important to ensure that policy imperatives regulate the use of migration 
management tools that could potentially impede individual rights. An appropriate 
balance is necessary and this should find its way into the law by clearly outlining the 
legal justification for limiting rights if it is the only means by which to achieve a 
justifiable State purpose. This will involve taking account of political agendas and also 
ensuring that new laws will pass constitutional muster. Legislators need to be impartial 
when developing law and they are in a unique position to ensure an appropriate 
balance between the pursuit of States interests and legal safeguards that are needed to 
protect individual rights. The criteria for balancing State sovereignty and individual 
rights from the perspective of the South African law will be discussed in chapter 5. 
240 Op cit note 31, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants.' 
241 Ibid, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants.' 
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The next section looks in detail at the sovereignty rights and national security and its 
impact on human rights. 
4.2 State Sovereignty Rights and National Security 
'One of the biggest challenges faced by most States is that of striking the 
delicate balance between maintaining national sovereignty on migration 
issues and engaging in a whole spectrum of supranational initiatives, 
ranging from informal dialogues to international/ega/ instruments. '242 
The principle of State sovereignty derives from Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations 
Charter. This right to sovereignty is conferred upon States to give them legal 
personality, that is, the capacity to enter into a legal relationship with other States and 
to enjoy rights and corresponding obligations. State sovereignty is about control over 
territory as well as control over people within the territory. While States have the 
power to determine the conditions of admission, residence and removal from their 
territory, this power is not without limits and cannot be to the detriment of individual 
rights. The human rights and humanitarian laws including refugee law places limits on 
the exercise of this sovereign power and the distinction between nationals and non-
nationals can only be justified if they serve a legitimate State objective and if the 
distinction is proportional to the achievement of that objective. 243 As stated by former 
242 Op cit note 8, World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration. 
243 Perruchoud, Richard 'State Sovereignty and Freedom of Movement' in Opeskin, Brian; Perruchoud, 
Richard and Redpath-Cross, Jillyanne (2012) Foundations of international Migration Law at chapter 5. 
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United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Anna 'State sovereignty, m its most basic 
sense, is being redefined - not least by the forces of globalization and international 
cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their 
people, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty - by which I mean 
the freedoms of each individual as enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent 
international treaties - has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness 
of individual rights. When we read the UN Charter today, we are more than ever 
conscious that its aim is to protect individual human rights[ ... ].244 
Pertinent State interests 
Mills covers the relationship between individuals and the State in the context of 
human rights and humanitarian issues, and argues that global events question 
traditional concepts of sovereignty. He further argues that sovereignty is undermined 
by a wide variety of international practices and normative reorientations. By 
examining international practice in the areas of human rights, self-determination, 
refugees, migration and humanitarian intervention, he argues that respect for human 
rights are inherent in the social purpose of the State and calls for a new concept of 
sovereignty which protects individual and group rights, while addressing problems 
which transcend State boundaries. 245 Robbing argues that globalization and migration 
has an impact on border control, and this has resulted in the challenge of implementing 
high-tech equipment and biometrics while considering legal and ethical 
244 Anna, Kofi 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty', Former UN Secretary-General, The Economist 352, 18 
September 1999 at 49-50. 
245 See: Mills K A ( 1995) The New Sovereignty: The Changing Humanitarian Agenda in the Emerging 
Global Order and Mills K A (1998) Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty? 
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considerations.246 Redpath highlights that reinforcement of the security aspect of 
migration and the implications of biometric systems as a response to ensure tighter 
control of frontiers has given rise to concerns among privacy and civil liberty 
advocates. 247 The above-mentioned authors have raised pertinent issues that States 
face today, however, the scale always seem to lean toward State interests trumping 
individual rights. There is indeed a tension between State sovereignty, globalization, 
migration, and human rights, but they can be compatible if the exercise of States 
sovereignty is done in conjunction with the exercise of State obligations under 
international human rights and humanitarian law and in line with national laws 
protecting individual rights. 
Response to terrorism 
Many States have turned their policy and legal focus to combating terrorism and have 
used the right to sovereignty and the State's prerogative to protect its borders and its 
citizens as a justification. Waldo et al argue that the effort of States in achieving this 
goal gives rise to the apparent conflict between individual privacy and national 
security, but what is needed is a balance between the types of information necessary to 
ensure national security and the constraints imposed on those that gather the 
information.248 Mendel points out that one of the major problems with the justification 
of national security, is that unlike other interests that impose restrictions on rights, this 
246 Hobbing, Peter (2005) Integrated border management at the EU level. 
247 Op cit note 7, Biometrics and International Migration. 
248 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 279. 
126 
area is highly political. 249 The European Court of Human Rights stressed that crime 
prevention and control 'should be exercised in a manner which fully respects the due 
process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of the 
State's action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the 
guarantees contained in Article 8 on the right to privacy. ' 250 This applies to the 
international setting as well where States have the difficult job of having to balance 
their interests with competing human rights protections. On the one hand, they must 
protect their population against terrorist threats, and on the other, they must safeguard 
the fundamental rights of individuals, including persons suspected or convicted of 
terrorist activities. ' 251 
The first Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mr. Martin Scheinin, emphasizes 
that consistency with human rights is not sufficient when enacting terrorism laws, in 
addition, the conduct of agencies involved in countering terrorism must be in 
compliance with human rights and refugee law and applicable principles and 
provisions of international humanitarian law. To ensure this, monitoring mechanisms 
should be in place and 'where the law relating to terrorism confers discretionary 
powers upon public agencies, adequate safeguards, including judicial review, must 
exist for the purpose of ensuring that discretionary powers are not exercised arbitrarily 
249 Mendel, Toby (2003) 'National Security vs. Openness: An Overview and Status Report on the 
Johannesburg Principles' in Campbell Public Affairs Institute National Security and Open Government: 
Striking the Right Balance Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University, New 
York at 6. 
250 Osman v The United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 
251 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight 
against Terrorism', Strasbourg, CommDH/IssuePaper (2008) 3 at 12. 
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or unreasonably. ' 252 While measures taken to combat terrorism may indeed limit the 
enjoyment of individual rights, it is important for States to recognize that compliance 
with human rights is necessary to address the long-term conditions conducive to the 
spread of terrorism, and that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of 
human rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing goals. ' 253 Another rising 
concern is the role of private agencies in the event that the States outsource security 
measures at border points. If States elect to privatize their functions, the private 
companies should be equally accountable and held to the same standards because they 
. f h s 254 are actmg as agents o t e tates. 
Legal basis for limiting human rights 
The balancing of State interests in combating terrorism and protecting individual 
rights is complex and when laws are being developed legislators often need to look at 
international legally binding instruments together with best practice in implementing 
the rights and obligations thereunder to ensure a comprehensive approach. The Special 
Rapporteur says 'the identification of a best practice is based on three criteria: (a) a 
credible claim that the practice is an existing or emerging practice, and/or one that is 
252 Scheinin, Martin 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ten Areas of Best Practices in 
Countering Terrorism' (A/HRC/16/51), 14 February 2010 at 8 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Terrorism/Pages/Annual.aspx> 
253 Ibid, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ten Areas of Best Practices in Countering 
Terrorism' at 5. 
254 Ibid 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ten Areas of Best Practices in Countering 
Terrorism' at 9. l'his concern on outsourcing State responsibility was also raised by Perruchoud, 
Richard, Former Legal Advisor of the IOM Department of International Migration Law and Legal 
Affairs, in the informal interview conducted in Geneva. 
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required by, or has been recommended by or within, international organizations, 
international treaties or the jurisprudence of international, regional or domestic courts; 
(b) the practice relates to and promotes the effective combating of terrorism; and (c) 
the practice complies with human rights and/or promotes the enjoyment of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. '255 This assessment should be included in the 
balancing test which should not only come into play after legislation is in force; it is 
more effective if it is taken into account when laws are being developed. The Special 
Rapporteur puts forward a list that will help the Legislature in its balancing test, 
namely: 1) all proposals for new legislation or amendments to existing laws must 
include a written statement if there are apparent inconsistencies with the purposes and 
provisions of norms of international human rights and refugee law that are binding 
upon the State; 2) before the law is enacted the Legislature must review the proposed 
law in light of this statement and ensure that it conforms to the norms of international 
human rights and refugee law that are binding upon the State; 3) the Judiciary has a 
role to play and must be entrusted with the power to either adopt an interpretation of 
the law that is consistent with the purposes and provisions of norms of international 
human rights and refugee law that are binding upon the State, declare the inconsistent 
part of the law as invalid, or declare that the inconsistent law has no force or effect 
immediately or within a certain period of time to allow the Legislature to take 
remedial steps.' Ultimately the exercise of limitations on rights must be based on clear 
provisions of the law that exhaustively outline the obligations of those conferred with 
power and 'the exercise of such functions and powers may never violate peremptory or 
non-derogable norms of international law, nor impair the essence of any human 
255 Ibid, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ten Areas of Best Practices in Countering 
Terrorism' at 2. 
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right. ,256 
The judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and case law of the European 
Court of Justice underscore the following minimum standards for handing personal 
data when seeking to prevent terrorism. 'First there must be a legal basis for any 
collection, storing, use, analysis, disclosure and sharing of personal data for law 
enforcement and anti-terrorist purposes. A vague, broad general statutory basis is not 
sufficient; instead, the processing of personal data must be based on specific legal 
rules relating to the particular kind of processing operation in question. Secondly, 
these rules must be binding and they must lay down appropriate limits to ensure that 
the statutory powers have: 1) a precise description of the kind of information that may 
be recorded; 2) a precise description of the categories of people against whom 
surveillance measures are needed and why information gathering and storage need to 
be taken; 3) a precise description of the circumstances in which such measures may be 
taken with a clearly set out procedure to be followed for the authorisation of such 
measures; 4) limits on the storing of old information and on the time for which new 
information can be retained; 5) explicit and detailed provisions concerning the grounds 
on which files can be opened and the procedure to be followed for accessing the files; 
6) the persons authorised to have restricted access to the files; and 7) the nature of the 
files and the intended use thereof. 257 
256 Ibid, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Free~oms while Countering Terrorism, Ten Areas of Best Practices in Countering 
Terrorism' at 20- 21. 
257 Op cit note 251, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 7. 
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The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights goes further to outline that 
'personal data of persons not suspected of involvement in a specific crime or posing a 
threat should not be collected, and neither should the collection of information be 
through intrusive, secret means (such as telephone tapping and email interception etc., 
bugging, informers, agents).' In addition, the use of 'profiling techniques, and 
"preventive" policing, must generally be subject to a particularly strict "necessity" and 
"proportionality" tests and there must be strong "safeguards established by law" which 
ensure appropriate and effective supervision of the activities ideally carried out by the 
Judiciary, or otherwise, by particularly strong alternative supervisory mechanisms. ' 258 
Data collection for national intelligence 
The European Commission of Human Rights point to the new trend used by States to 
avoid international and national obligations. This relates to the use of administrative 
law as a way to bypass the criminal law and the safeguards of the criminal justice 
system because it allows for lower standards of proof and the rules on the admissibility 
of evidence are relaxed in ways that seriously affect the rights of individuals to due 
process and privacy. 259 Waldo et al are of the opinion that this is compounded by a 
greater challenge related to the blurring of the traditional separation between national 
intelligence gathering by law enforcement agencies and intelligence security agencies, 
as this in turn, creates further challenges to the legality of data collection for the 
f . d . 260 L .c: purpose o cnme an terronsm. aw en1orcement serves as a government actor 
258 Ibid, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 6-7. 
259 Ibid, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 12. 
260 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 32. 
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tasked to mainly help in conviction of suspects who have contravened the law, while 
national intelligent agencies are tasked with monitoring borders and protecting 
national security on behalf of the government. The inadmissibility of evidence in court 
based on information gathered by law enforcement that is obtained through unlawful 
means is a constitutional barrier and safeguard against potential police abuse.261 This 
means that information gathered by law enforcement agencies and subsequently used 
as evidence in the prosecution of an individual eventually becomes public and is open 
to challenge by the person being prosecuted. However, 'information gathered by 
intelligence agencies for national security purposes must be kept secret and this is 
required not only to keep an adversary from learning what is known about him, but 
also to ensure that the sources of information cannot be identified and compromised. 
The need for secrecy in this realm means that those who might be the subjects of 
interest for information gathering cannot know what information is gathered about 
them (or even if information is being gathered about them), much less check or 
challenge the accuracy ofthat information.' 262 
A particular concern is that information collected by intelligence agencies are 
collected under the broad guise of State security interests without any parameters for 
lawful collection. What we see nowadays is that law enforcement are also involved in 
investigations for State security purposes which often have no specified purpose and 
the data collected is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as evidence in a court of 
law. Yet, it can still affect the lives of those whose names appear on watch lists and 
261 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 275. 
262 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 279. 
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can potentially prevent freedom of movement of those travelling lawfully.263 There is 
also no balancing test required either because decisions of the police to collect 
personal information for wide-ranging investigatory reasons is not reviewable or 
appealable. Such phishing exercises intrude into the private sphere contrary to legal 
parameters that should be in place and it leaves the individual at a severe disadvantage 
when information is inaccurate or incomplete. 264 
European case law 
With reference to case law of the European Court of Human Rights case, in Leander v. 
Sweden, the Court highlighted the dangers inherent in the electronic links between the 
police registers and other States' registers or Interpol's register. It is therefore 
important that 'individuals have a right of appeal against a data entry resulting from a 
fundamental mistake, even if the source of the information is kept secret and is known 
only to the independent authority that has jurisdiction to determine the applicant's 
appeal. ' 265 In Rotaru v. Romania, the Court held that the exceptions to the Article 8 
right of data protection in the EU Charter has to be interpreted narrowly because the 
phrase 'in accordance with the law' does not merely refer back to domestic law, but 
also relates to the quality of the law and this implies that there must be a measure of 
legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences of rights by public 
263 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 253. 
264 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age. 
265 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Leander v. Sweden (Application no. 9248/81 ), Judgment, 
Strasboug, 26 March 1987 at 33. 
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authorities.266 The Court said further that the 'secret collection of personal data for 
State security purposes amounted to an interference with private life and that only 
necessary categories of persons to whom such interference applies and the types of 
personal data needed should be described beforehand by law in a sufficiently precise 
and foreseeable manner in accordance with legitimate criteria.Z67 Such criteria are 
useful for other jurisdictions as well. 
Gathering personal data for investigatory and intelligence purposes that do not have a 
clearly defined specified purpose conflicts with the specified principle, which is a core 
Data Protective Principle under the legislation governing the collection and processing 
of personal data. In addition, the technologies used for intelligence gathering is often 
very advanced and the public are not informed of data collection methods used given 
the secrecy requirements in intelligence gathering. A rising concern is that the same 
technology is also being made available to law enforcement agencies in their 
investigatory efforts. This is intrinsically linked to migration and border control 
because, once migrants enter into a country, some States use these government actors 
to engage in clandestine tracking even though the migrants may be lawfully in the 
country. There is no justified State security reason to treat migrants as suspected 
criminals if they follow the laws according to their obligations under international law 
and act in compliance with immigration laws. In the case of Leander v. Sweden, the 
266 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Rotaru v. Romania (Application no. 2834/95) Judgment, 
Strasbourg, 4 May 2000 at 55. 
267 Ibid, Case of Rotaru v. Romania. 
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European Court of Human Rights held that a system of secret surveillance for the 
protection of national security poses a risk of undermining or even destroying 
democracy on the ground of defending it, and the Court must be satisfied that there 
. d d ffi . . b ,268 exists a equate an e ectiVe guarantees agamst a use. 
Power of the State threatening individual rights 
Waldo et al argue that 'it is the sheer imbalance between the power of the State and 
that of the individual which makes people understandably anxious about the 
information gathering abilities of the State. Consequently, the disparity in resources 
for the State versus those that are available to most individuals also justifies the 
imposition of certain limits on government's information gathering, even if such limits 
complicate or impede the task of law enforcement agencies. ' 269 They argue further that 
the advance technology available for intelligence 'may define both the boundary for 
technology that can be privacy invasive, and the boundary for those technologies that 
can help to ensure privacy.270 Indeed technology can have a dual purpose to protect the 
rights that it may potentially infringe upon. To do so, safeguards have to be built into 
the technology itself and State interests must be complemented by their obligations to 
protect human rights to ensure that any potential infringements on individuals are 
within the confines of the law. 
268 Op cit note 265, Case of Leander v. Sweden at 60. 
269 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 277. 
270 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 278. 
135 
The historical distinction between law enforcement gathering information for 
detecting crime on the one hand, and intelligence agencies gathering information for 
national security reasons on the other hand, rested in the need to ensure privacy 
protections. This distinction has been blurred due to the September 11 attacks because 
as the argument goes 'had relevant information held by both the law enforcement 
agencies and the intelligence agencies been put together and seen correctly, the attacks 
could have been predicted and stopped. ' 271 As a result, laws were passed and policies 
were created in the United States to make it easier for data exchange without much 
scrutiny, and other countries have followed suit. Such invasive responses to criminal 
threats do not really deter the terrorist incidents from happening. Instead, it weakens 
traditional checks and balances and if intelligence is gathered collectively by different 
agencies without any legal parameters it threatens the foundations of democracy 
within the country and with relations abroad. 
As seen in the Snowden disclosures making news these days, if there are no legal 
barriers in place, the collection personal information for intelligence purposes can 
spread beyond border to other continents. Most recent news indicates that there is 
now also a threat to monitoring communications of the United Nations.272 This is 
contrary to international data protection standards and it contravenes the diplomatic 
principle of privileges and immunities as guaranteed in the United Nations 
271 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 284-286. 
272 AI Jazera 'US Promises not to Spy on the UN- UN says it has been assured the US does not and will 
not spy on it, but doesn't comment on whether it do so in the past' 30 October 2013 
<http://www .aljazeera.com/news/americas/20 13/1 0/us-promises-not-spy-un-
20 131 03019343943 770.html> 
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Conventions on Privileges and Immunities. 273 Such contraventions affect those UN 
agencies collecting and processing personal data of migrants because disclosures 
without the migrants' consent for purposes unrelated to humanitarian aid can 
jeopardize lives, especially in vulnerable situations as described in chapter 1.3 above. 
What is needed is the necessary reinforcement of privacy protections because it is 
possible that State security interests and the right to privacy can co-exist. 
Reconciling privacy concerns 
To ensure respect for privacy, transparency from the government and assurance that 
information gathered is accurate and appropriately treated and that it will only be used 
for genuine national security purposes is needed. In addition, clearly defined laws 
justifying any limitations and outlining oversight functions to monitor that appropriate 
data protection safeguards, and checks and balances must be in place to minimize 
inappropriate data intelligence gathering.274 This will help to build trust in society and 
alleviate the 'tension between the privacy and national security, which parallels the 
tension between privacy and law enforcement, '275 alleviating this tension could be to 
the collective benefit of the State and individuals. It is equally important for 
individuals to be proactive and become better informed about their rights. In the 
migration context, the humanitarian actors can be helpful catalysts in disseminating 
awareness of legitimate purposes and intended use of the information that would meet 
273 The 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and 1947 Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies guarantee inviolability of premises, 
documents and archives for the effective functioning of the UN agencies and this immunity should be 
respected by all signatory States. 
274 Op cit note 3, E~gaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 294- 296. 
275 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 292- 325. 
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the expectations of the migrants. The public opmwn Is important m changing 
perceptions, but the starting point IS the government being accountable and 
transparent. 
Waldo et al mention that if the policy choice results in a shift of the onus onto 
individuals to carry the burden of protecting their own privacy rights, then the law and 
regulation should assist individuals in asserting such rights. This is because privacy is 
at an inherent disadvantage when decision-makers weigh privacy against other 
interests where the benefits of the State appear to be more tangible. They recommend 
that the onus be on the governments to reduce this disadvantage by establishing formal 
mechanisms for institutional advocacy of privacy among government actors.276 In his 
report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur says that States no 
longer limit exceptional surveillance schemes to combat terrorism. Instead, they make 
these surveillance powers available for all kinds of unrelated purposes unknown to 
individuals and 'most worrying is that these technologies and policies are being 
exported to other countries where the most basic protections are lost in the process. 
Regulating security initiatives 
The need for terrorism laws and practice to be consistent with human rights was also 
reiterated by the current Special Rapporteur, Mr. Ben Emmerson?77 The problem with 
276 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 15. 
277 Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while 
Countering Terrorism at the International Seminar Terrorism and human rights standards, Santiago de 
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counter-terrorism measures, even if regulated in the law, is that the concept of 
terrorism is too open-ended. The European Commissioner for Human Rights notes, 
that unlike public emergencies that have a clear end, there is no end in sight to the 
fight against global terrorism and national laws tend to be semi-permanent.278 
Measures adopted on an emergency and temporary basis tum out to be permanent and 
are extended into law, but this is not compatible with the advanced technologies used 
for the surveillance of terrorist activities, which is rapidly changing all the time. To 
curb this, a narrow definition of State security, should be employed as recognized in 
the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access 
to Information (Johannesburg Principles).279 According to Principle 2, 'a restriction is 
not legitimate unless its purpose and effect is to "protect a country's existence or its 
territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the 
use or threat of force" from either an internal or an external threat. Mendel notes that 
this is probably an unrealistically high standard, for example, the September 11 attacks 
'could hardly be said to have threatened the existence or territorial integrity of the 
United States, unless this is interpreted very broadly, which would largely defeat the 
purpose of a narrow definition?80 In any event, the attacks did affect the State's 
capacity to respond to the immediate threat. To ensure a legitimate State purpose, any 
Chile, 15 November 2011 
<http://www .ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsiD= 1173 7 &LangiD=E> 
278 Op cit note 251, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism.' 
279 The Johannesburg Principles was adopted on 1 October 1995 by a group of experts on international 
law in Johannesburg and has been endorsed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and 
in the reports of the Special Rapporteure on Freedom of Expression. The principles are based on 
international and regional law and standards relating to the protection of human rights, evolving state 
practice (as reflected inter alia in judgments of national courts), and the general principles of law 
recognized by the community of nations. For further detail, see 
<http://www .artie le 19 .org/ data/files/pdfs/standards/j oburgprinc ip les. pdf> 
280 Op cit note 249, 'National Security vs. Openness: An Overview and Status Report on the 
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restrictions on the rights of individual must be prescribed by safeguards, and 
conditions for such restrictions must be embedded in the law. 
Intrusive data collection methods 
The European Commission on Human Rights cautions that 'computer profiling may 
lead to intrusive and punitive action, including administrative action, against large 
numbers of innocent individuals, without being effective in stopping real terrorists. It 
also poses risks to discriminating against minority groups and can have a devastating 
effect on the individual, who is likely to be spied upon, harassed, refused permission 
to travel, denied a job, or even arrested. This approach will also have a chilling effect 
on democracy itself and undermines the objective of security. ' 281 Data collection on 
terrorism, while aiming to target terrorists and criminals, involves broad sweeping 
collection methods which include collecting data on law abiding citizens and migrants. 
This has given rise to privacy concerns, particularly because in their efforts 'law 
enforcement agencies gather information about innocent individuals, or they use it for 
other purposes that are not related to investigations or prosecution, or even more 
concerning is when the very process of data collection or the knowledge thereof 
changes the behaviour of those who are clearly innocent. ' 282 Waldo et al acknowledge 
that data collection, storage and analysis of large volumes of information is vital to the 
law enforcement process, but the inevitability of collecting 'information on persons 
who are manifestly beyond suspicion'283 may end up changing behaviours thereby 
281 Op cit note 251, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 12. 
282 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 275. 
283 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 275. 
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contributing to crimes. This goes to the argument in chapter 2.3 that this approach by 
implication results in a group of male fide travellers based on suspicion and this takes 
democracy back in centuries. 
Balancing test 
Any intended restriction or limitation to individual rights in the name of State security 
must undergo a strict balancing test. In particular, 'the limitation to the individual 
rights should be to the least intrusive means possible to achieve security, it must be 
necessary in a democratic society to pursue the security interests as a defined 
legitimate aim in accordance with international law, and it must be proportionate to the 
benefit obtained in achieving the legitimate aim in question.'284 This is elaborated in 
Principle 1.3 of the Johannesburg Principles which provides that 'any restriction must 
apply only where the expression poses a serious threat, it is the least restrictive means 
available, and it is compatible with democratic principles. Mendel argues that this is a 
higher standard than applied by most international human rights courts and tribunals. 
It is, however, crucial because without the threshold barrier of serious harm and the 
requirement of the least restrictive means, States have less limitation and they will be 
able to make national security-based claims for restrictions in excessively wide 
circumstances. 285 
284 Op cit note 252, 'Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ten Areas of Best Practices in Countering 
Terrorism' at 20- 21. 
285 Op cit note 249, 'National Security vs. Openness: An Overview and Status Report on the 
Johannesburg Principles' at I 0. 
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The European Commission on Human Rights sets clear criteria when it comes to 
balancing State interests against fundamental individual rights, namely: 'inherent State 
security measures must be justified by the State as being: 1) in accordance with the 
law; 2) necessary in a democratic society, this means it is must be in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of crime or disorder, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of 
others; 3) proportionate; and 4) non-discriminatory. In the context of anti-terrorism 
measures taken by the State, data protection needs to be reinforced, and therefore the 
following additional requirements must be met when conducting a balancing test: 1) 
all processing of personal data for law enforcement and anti-terrorist purposes must be 
based on clear and specific, binding, and published legal rules; 2) the collection of 
personal data of individuals who are not suspects of a specific crime or of posing a 
threat; collection of information through intrusive, secret means; and the use of 
profiling techniques must be subject to particularly strict "necessity" and 
"proportionality" tests; 3) factual and intelligence data should be clearly distinguished 
from data on different categories of data subjects; 4) access to police and secret service 
files should only be allowed for a specified purpose on a case-by-case basis and be 
under judicial control; 5) there must be limits on data retention; 6) the collection of 
data on individuals solely on the basis that they have a particular racial origin, 
particular religious convictions, sexual behaviour or political opinions or belong to 
particular movements or organisations which are not proscribed by law should be 
prohibited; 7) reliance by private or public bodies on computers to take decisions on 
individuals, without human input is fundamentally contrary to the requirement of 
respect for the human identity and should only be allowed exceptionally under strict 
safeguards; 8) there must be strong safeguards established by law which ensure 
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appropriate and effective supervision over the activities of the police and the secret 
services in the fight against terrorism which should be carried out by the judiciary and 
through parliamentary scrutiny; and 9) all processing of personal data should be 
subject to close and effective supervision by independent and impartial data protection 
authorities. '286 One additional factor to add in the migration context is: 1 0) threat and 
harm to civilian life must be at an absolute minimum when pursuing the State interest 
to deter terrorism and a proper risk assessment should be conducted and recorded for 
legal scrutiny. 
Risks to data protection 
The direct risk to data protection is that this growing area of law is often seen as an 
'obstacle to effective anti-terrorist measures and this leads to the prime area oflaw that 
is often ignored, yet data protection is crucial to upholding fundamental democratic 
values and it is for this very reason that the tension between the desire to prevent 
terrorism and the importance of protecting human rights is a matter of pressing 
concern. '287 Waldo et al say this is not a new tension; governments have been 
confronted with this hundreds of years long before the September 11 attacks.288 
However, the challenge to strike the balance between acknowledging the needs and 
objectives of law enforcement or national security on the one hand, and the protection 
of privacy and data protection on the other hand, has increased exponentially because 
the 'confluence of technology makes it easier to erode privacy far more extensively 
286 Op cit note 251, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 13. 
287 Op cit note 251, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 3. 
288 Op cit note 3, 'Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age' at 11-12. 
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than ever before.289 
'Recording passenger names, credit card information and flight schedules relates to 
monitoring travel movements and migrant profiles that are based on sensitive personal 
data such as nationality, travel document, method and means of travel, age, sex, 
physical distinguishing features (e.g. battle scars), education, choice of cover identity, 
use of techniques to prevent discovery or counter questioning, places of stay, methods 
of communication, place of birth, psycho-sociological features, family situation 
etc. ' 290 Profiling based on some of these grounds is tantamount to discrimination based 
on race or ethnic profiling, but authorities tend to broaden the category of personal 
data to make it seem more acceptable. 
The fight against terrorism clearly intersects with data protection and the conflict that 
arises at this intersection has intensified over recent years. The EU Council 
Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data in the Framework of Police 
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters aims to address the tension created by 
the intersection. However, it falls short in 'setting the lowest common data protection 
denominator and it excludes national security from the listed data protection 
guarantees. It for this reason that the 'Framework received widespread criticism from 
the European Parliament, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), all the 
data protection authorities in the EU, civil society and a number of human rights 
289 Ibid at 12. 
290 Op cit note 251, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism' at 11. 
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,291 groups. 
Global data protection law to limit abuse 
After reviewing the expanding global use of surveillance measures and advanced 
databases by governments m their fight against counter-terrorism, the Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights, Martin Scheinin, urged the UN to create a global 
declaration on data protection and data privacy.292 Most recently in the wake of media 
reports relating to allegations that the United States is involved in spying on foreign 
dignitaries,293 Germany and Brazil urgently called for a Global Data Protection 
Declaration and this has gained support from the European Union. States elsewhere 
may also have incentive to sign up to a declaration, which although not legally 
binding, would signify in a global agreement that the right to data protection exists 
across borders and warrants international protection. It is not clear whether the form 
would indeed be a Declaration. 
The German Chancellor suggested that it could be a Protocol added to the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).294 If this follows suit it 
291 Ibid, 'Protecting the Right to Privacy in the Fight against Terrorism.' 
292 Williams, Christopher 'UN Issues Call for International Privacy Statement' The Register, 20 January 
20 I 0 <http://www. theregister.co. uk/20 I 0/0 I /20/un_ terror/> 
293 Saul, Heather 'Angela Merkel calls for Tighter Internet Data Protection Rules for Websites 
Registered in the UK Amid Allegations of US Surveillance' The Independent, 15 July 2013 
<http://www. independent. co. uk/news/world/ europe/ angela-merkel-calls-for -tighter-internet -data-
protection-rules-for-websites-registered-in-the-uk-amid-allegations-of-us-surveillance-8708975.html> 
294 Ibid, 'Angela Merkel Calls for Tighter Internet Data Protection Rules for Websites Registered in the 
UK Amid Allegations of US Surveillance.' 
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would be a big step in the right direction and it would create binding obligations to 
States who become signatory to the envisaged Protocol. Arguably, the introduction of 
a Protocol to the ICCPR elaborating the right to data protection may gain better 
support by States who are signatory to this Convention as opposed to creating a new 
Convention as envisaged under the Madrid Resolution, simply because new 
conventions take years to gain support as seen with the Migrant Workers Convention. 
If this route is followed data protection would be seen as an extension to the right of 
privacy that requires further elaboration on the details relating to the data protection as 
a human right. The format of a binding data protection law at international level 
remains to be seen, but recent concerns may steer States to place data protection on 
their legislative agendas, which could in tum, result in the long awaited universally 
binding legal instrument on data protection. 
As recent as 18 December 2013, coincidently on international migrants day, the UN 
General Assembly adopted the Resolution on The Privacy in the Digital Age 
reinforcing the right to privacy, emphasizing that unlawful or arbitrary surveillance 
and/or interception on communications as well as unlawful or arbitrary collection of 
personal data is highly intrusive acts violating the rights to privacy and to freedom of 
expression which may contradict the tenets of a democratic society, and calling on 
States to protect and respect the right to privacy including in the context of digital 
communication and to take measures to put an end to and prevent such violations by 
ensuring that national legislation complies with their obligations under international 
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human rights law.295 This Resolution was adopted without a vote and is only 
recommendatory with no binding force, but it demonstrates the growing concern on 
intrusions to privacy and data protection and the role that intergovernmental 
organizations can play in urging the development of much needed laws. 
Chapters 2 and 3 above cover a legal analysis of data protection and migration at the 
international level. In the absence of positive law on the interface between data 
protection and migration, the next chapter turns to the domestic law of South Africa 
for guidance. It looks specifically at the South African jurisprudence on data 
protection, which is developing in this area, and assesses whether it adequately 
protects sensitive personal data such as HIV/AIDS status and refugee claims. Finally, 
it seeks to establish whether relevant legal principles and criteria can be extrapolated 
to help inform the development of the law at the international level. 
295 The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 2013 [G.A. res. 68/167] adopted on 18 December 2013 
without a vote <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view _ doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/167> 
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5. BALANCING STATE INTERESTS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
'The concept of privacy is an amorphous and elusive one which has 
been the subject of much scholarly debate. The definition varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and differs according context. This does not 
imply that the right is not important, instead it illustrates the complex 
nature of privacy which is now compounded by the complexities of the 
. ,/', . 296 l11.JOrmatzon age. 
State interests and individual rights are not mutually exclusive. For this reason 
individual rights should not be diluted or subjugated by the interests of States. Instead, 
there should be an appropriate balancing test to ensure that any limitation to the 
enjoyment of rights are justified and proportional and that the measures taken to 
achieve the State interest is the least intrusive and only alternative available. By 
looking at constitutional jurisprudence and at gaps in the South African law, this 
section aims to identify the criteria for balancing between the right to data protection, 
which is synonymous to information privacy, and competing constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. In so doing, it seeks to find the line that strikes the balance between 
the two and goes further to argue that the criteria for the balancing test can be 
transposed into situations where States interests compete with individual rights. It 
should be noted that even though many of the cases mentioned concern freedom of 
information, it does puts forward good criteria for balancing conflicting rights and this 
296 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC), see judgment of former justice Ackermann at para 65. 
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test is arguably transferable when balancing the right to privacy with other competing 
rights such as the State's right to limit the enjoyment of the right to privacy for reasons 
of State security and public safety. After a brief discussion of the right to information 
privacy in common law, case law and statutory law, an analysis of the recently enacted 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 is provided with a view to determine 
if it addresses the current gaps on data protection in the South African law. 
Development in case law 
Michalson stated that 'there have been no reported cases on information privacy at 
common law or based on the constitutional right to privacy. ' 297 This statement is not 
entirely correct. Indeed, prior to 2007, the right to privacy has been ruled upon mainly 
in the context of free speech and defamation, but the analysis in the rulings and obiter 
in the judgements can be transferred to information privacy as seen in the cases of 
Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC), 
NM and Others v Smith and Others 2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC) and most recently in 
Mail and Guardian Media Limited and Others v Chipu N.O. and Others Case No 
136112, 27 September 2013 (as yet unreported). Even as early as 1993 in Jansen van 
Vuuren and Another NNO v Kruger1993 (4) SA 842 (A), the Appellate Division as it 
then was, upheld the confidentiality of a patient's HIV status stating that 'individuals 
are entitled to dictate the ambit of disclosure.' In National Jooste Ltd and Another, 
1996 (3) SA 262 (A), the Court also ruled that HIV/AIDS status cannot be revealed 
without consent and held that 'a right to privacy encompasses the competence to 
297 Michalson, L 'Guide to Data Privacy Law in South Africa' 
<http://securitysa.com/article.aspx?pklarticleid=3317 > 
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determine the destiny of private facts.' 
Constitutional jurisprudence 
Actually, constitutional jurisprudence has leaned towards the development of the law 
on information privacy rights since 1998. In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental 
Council of South Africa,298 the Constitutional Court noted that the 'degree of privacy 
that can be reasonably expected would vary significantly according to the activity that 
brings the person into contact with the State and the more public the interaction, the 
less is the expectation of privacy and this is due to the reasonable regulation and 
inspection which is an inseparable part of society with an effective regime of 
regulation. ' 299 As stated by former justice Sachs 'the new Constitution requires us to 
repudiate the past practices which where repugnant to the new constitutional values, 
while at the same time reaffirming and building on those that were inconsistent with 
those values. ' 300 The Court at that time already listed some important factors that are 
relevant to data protection: 'Whether the information was obtained in an intrusive 
manner? Whether the information was about intimate aspects of the data subject's 
personal life? Whether it provided for one purpose but was used for another? Whether 
298 Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 ( 4) SA 1127 (CC). 
299 Ibid, Mistry case at 345 -346 the Court stated that "[t]he more public the undertaking and the more 
closely regulated, the more attenuated would the right to privacy [be] and the less intense [the] 
invasion" and "[i]n the case of any regulated enterprise, proprietor's expectation of privacy with regard 
to the premises, equipment, materials and records must be attenuated by the obligation to comply with 
reasonable regulations and to tolerate the administrative inspections that are an inseparable part of an 
effective regime o( regulation". 
300 Op cit note 298, Mistry case at 317. 
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the data subject disseminated it to the press or general public? Whether it could 
reasonably be expected that such information would be withheld?301 
In the case of NM and Others v Smith and Others302 the Constitutional Court for the 
first time ruled on privacy in a matter not relating to defamation. The minority 
decision held that the common law Actio Iniuriarum 303 should be developed in order 
to give effect to the applicants' rights to privacy and dignity as guaranteed in the 1996 
Constitution. In cases prior to the NM Judgement, it was held that the Actio 
Iniuriarum was not automatically applicable to cases involving the disclosure of 
private facts? 04 In the Minority decision in the NM Judgement, however, former Sachs 
J acknowledged that HIV status called for special consideration of confidentiality, 
given the sensitivity of the information, and recognized that 'there is a greater need for 
caution when the private fact involved is significantly private to the individual 
concerned.' 
5.1 Constitutional Imperatives in the South African Context 
As stated in chapter 3.3, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR) 
is the foundation of the international law on human rights. The fundamental rights 
301 Burchell, Jonathan 'The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable Hybrid' 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 13.1, March 2009 <http://www.ejcl.org> 
302 NM and Others v Smith and Others 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC). 
303 For example: Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) and National Media Ltd v 
Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). 
304 Op cit note 302, NM case dissent judgment of O'Regan J. 
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contained in the UDHR, including the right to privacy, have been incorporated into 
international covenants such as the ICCPR, which are binding on the international 
community. South Africa's signature to the international legal instruments on human 
rights signifies its commitment to uphold the spirit and purpose of the rights by giving 
effect to it in national law. This section canvasses the importance of the right to 
privacy and data protection in the South African constitutional democracy. 
Practical realities in a constitutional democracy 
In June 2004 several major South African newspapers reported that the Post Office 
planned to make millions by selling personal data to private companies. This included 
personal data of all registered citizens contained in the National Address Database 
collected via census records, TV license payments, telephone accounts and national 
identity document records held by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Individuals were not 
aware of and would not have consented to the selling of their personal data for profit. 
As a result, members of the public were outraged. Not too long thereafter, in July 
2004, the Financial Mail reported that an employee of Sentech had mistakenly e-
mailed the company customer database to about 80 My Wireless customers.305 Again, 
the public was not happy. These examples illustrate that there was a growing public 
concern, about a decade ago, that protection of personal data was needed. 
Now South Africa has the Protection of Personal Information Act, which atms at 
305 See: De Kock Emmie 'Data Protection in South Africa' December 2005 
<http://www.dekock.co.za/data-protection-in-south-africa/> 
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regulating the handling of personal data by the State and by private entities. The 
continuous public outcry to the Protection of State Information Bill relates to concerns 
that question the foundations of democracy, which is founded on an open and 
democratic society, and the threat of moving toward a society where freedom of 
information is suppressed. The Protection of State Information Bill does not fall within 
the scope of this thesis, but it should be noted the public outcry resulted in fears 
among private advocates that the encroachment of the State is moving too much into 
the private sphere of the individual. The Protection of Personal Information Act has 
not been as controversial and this is probably because much research and public 
participation went into drafting this law.306 
Importance of the right to privacy 
The Constitution of South Africa Act, 1996, being the supreme law of the land,307 
forms the starting point for all fundamental human rights enjoyed in the country. The 
right to privacy (Article 14), equality and non-discrimination (Article 9), human 
dignity (Article 19), access to information (Article 32), as well as the limitation on any 
rights (Article 36) are particularly important in context of data protection and 
migration. Article 14 of the Constitution provides: 
'Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have-
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.' 
306 See: The Protection of Personal Information Act <http://www.search.gov.za/info/search.jsp> 
307 Article 2 of the Constititution of the South Africa Act, 1996. 
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Accordingly, 'everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have 
the privacy of their communications infringed.' Moreover, Article 32 provides for the 
'right to access information in the exercise or protection of any rights.' The right to 
privacy exists at common law, in particular everyone has the right to personality rights 
which include protecting the dignitas of the person, and any breach thereof can give 
rise to a an Actio Iniuriarum for wrongful intrusion on personal privacy or disclosure 
of private facts. 308 With reference to the constitutional right to privacy, it should be 
noted that Article 13 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993 (Interim 
Constitution)309 is similar in essence to Article 14 of the Constitution of South Africa, 
1996 (Final Constitution). The guarantee of the right to privacy is twofold. First, it 
protects the right to privacy positively, and second, it ensures non-interference with 
the listed protections in subparagraphs (a) - (d) as mentioned in Article 14 of the 
Constitution. De Waal, Currie and Erasmus emphasize that the second part is part and 
parcel of the general right to privacy.310 
Thus, the right to pnvacy exists m common law and it is now given force as a 
fundamental constitutional right. It is therefore up to the Courts to interpret and 
develop the common law to bring it in line with the Constitution. The preamble and 
the founding provisions in the Constitution clearly confirm the sovereignty principle 
308 De Waal, Johan; Currie, lain and Erasmus, Gerhard (2001) The Bill of Rights Handbook at 268. The 
reference is to the 4th Edition, however the Handbook has later editions, most recent is Currie, Iaian and 
de Waal, Johan (2013) The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th Edition. 
309 Op cit note 298,'Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa. 
310 Op cit note 308, The Bill of Rights Handbook at 267. 
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and the supremacy of the Constitution, while at the same reinforcing the country as a 
democracy founded on the value of human dignity, equality and advancement of 
human rights and freedoms. 311 
Privacy for everyone in the jurisdiction 
From the case involving the Certification of the Constitution, it is clear that South 
Africa recognizes that the rights outlined in the Bill of Rights are universal rights. As 
stated by the Constitutional Court: 'Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted 
fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and 
protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution. ' 312 Since the 
rights are afforded to everyone, this should be taken to mean that it applies equally to 
all migrants in the country without distinction, unless there is a justifiable limitation to 
the enjoyment of the rights. 
Balancing competing rights 
Although the right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution, it is 
not absolute and can be limited in accordance with the limitation clause in Article 36. 
This allows for a limitation to the right to privacy in terms of law of general 
application as the right to privacy has to be balanced with other rights entrenched in 
the Constitution. When balancing competing rights, a two-stage approach is adopted: 
first, the scope of the right is looked at in order to determine if there is an 
311 Article 1 (a) ofthe Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
312 Certification of the Constitution oft he Republic of South Africa 1996 (1 0) BCLR 1253 (CC) at 48. 
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infringement; and second, it is questioned whether the infringement to the right is 
justified in terms of general law of application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. For this balancing test the following factors are taken into 
account: the nature of the right, the importance of the limitation, the nature and extent 
of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and the less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 313 In S v Makwanyane and Another, the 
Constitutional Court held that there is no absolute standard for determining 
reasonableness and justifiability; instead, whether the purpose of the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable will depend on the circumstances to be determined on a 
b b . 314 case- y-case as1s. 
Privacy right includes data protection 
De Waal explains that the constitutional right to privacy is protected by the private law 
action Actio Iniuriarum and the common law right of privacy is protected by the law 
of delict. However, when it comes to data protection the situation is less clear. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution does not expressly refer to data 
protection, the most dominant argument is that information privacy is encompassed in 
the constitutional protection of privacy.315 They say that privacy is essentially what 
feels private, although that feeling has to be a reasonable one shared objectively rather 
than entirely personal or eccentric. 316 This is also evident in the definition adopted by 
313 Article 36 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
314 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 ( 6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 708. 
315 Op cit note 308, The Bill of Rights Handbook at 269. 
316 Ibid, The Bill of Rights Handbook at 269. 
157 
the Constitutional Court, as early as 1996, where it held in Bernstein v Bester Nd 17 
that: 'The concept of privacy in the Bill of Rights extends to those aspects of existence 
in regard to which a legitimate expectation of privacy can be harboured. A legitimate 
expectation of privacy has two components; one is a subjective expectation of privacy 
[ ... ] that the society has recognized [ ... ] and the other, is that it is objectively 
reasonable.' The Bernstein case was the first case to interpret the constitutional right 
to privacy. 
Burchell states that 'the very essence of the right to privacy is that individual citizens 
are able to move around freely, without their comings and goings being recorded 
somewhere and without the possibility of such information falling into the wrong 
hands.' This, he says, 'was one of the most hateful aspects of apartheid - the ability of 
the State to infringe on and control every aspect of citizens lives.' 318 Having drawn 
from constitutions and freedom charters in developed democracies and after a 
vigorous comparative analysis to gather the best practice principles that are most 
suitable to South Africa, it could be argued that the Constitution is one of the most 
advanced constitutions in the world. Article 14 specifically protects the fundamental 
right to privacy, which includes the right not to have the privacy of communications 
infringed upon. 
317 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 71 - 75. 
318 Op cit note 301, The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable Hybrid 
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Informational privacy I data protection right 
Neethling states that 'the processing of personal information threatens personality 
rights in two ways; firstly, compiling and processing personal information is directly 
linked to the individual's privacy; and secondly, the acquisition and disclosure of false 
or misleading information may lead to infringement of the individual's identity.319 He 
defines privacy 'as an individual condition of life characterised by exclusion from 
publicity. This condition includes all those personal facts which the person himself or 
herself at the relevant time determines to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders 
and in respect of which he or she evidences a will for privacy. '320 Thus, an 
individual's right to privacy entails control of personal information free from 
unwanted intrusions.321 
In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa (Mistry case) the 
Constitutional Court went so far as to assume that even though breach of informational 
privacy was not expressly mentioned the Constitution, it would be covered by the 
broad protection of the right to privacy as guaranteed in the Constitution.322 This 
allows for reading-in the right to data protection into the provisions of Article 14.323 It 
should be noted though that the Mistry case explicitly left open the issue of whether 
the right to informational privacy could potentially reside in the right to access 
319 Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ (2005) Neethling 'sLaw of Personality at 270- 271. 
320 Ibid, Neethling 'sLaw of Personality at 32. 
321 South African Law Reform Commission (2005) 'Privacy and Data Protection: Discussion Paper 109' 
at 1-4 <http://www.doj.gov.zalsalrc/dpapers.htm>. The Discussion Paper followed an earlier Issue 
Paper on the same topic (SA Law Reform Commission Privacy and Data Protection (Issue Paper 24 
August 2003). 
322 Op cit note 298, Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa at 14. 
323 Neethling's definition of privacy was, for example, accepted in the Bernstein v Bernstein case. See 
later discussion on the case law and the Constitutional Court pronouncements in this Chapter. 
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information as guaranteed by Article 32 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, access to 
information is part and parcel of data protection as seen in other jurisdictions, 
therefore, the right to access information should be read together with the right to 
privacy when focusing on data protection. The South African Law Commission's 
background paper to the Protection of Personal Information Bill also refers to data 
protection as an aspect of the right to privacy that is a fundamental human right given 
b h C . . 324 force y t e onstltutiOn. 
Development of specific data protection law 
In South Africa the need for a specific law on data protection was recognized as early 
as 1994 when developing the Access to Information Law.325 The Task Group on Open 
Democracy in considering legislative changes that were required for an open and 
democratic society, as opposed to the authoritarian and secretive Apartheid state, 
identified four principle laws: ( 1) freedom of information legislation applicable to 
information held by government bodies, (2) data privacy legislation providing for the 
correction of and protection against unauthorised use of personal information held by 
both government and private bodies, (3) open meetings legislation requiring 
government meetings to be open to the public, and (4) legislation for the protection of 
whistleblowers. These laws eventually together formed the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act of 2002 (PIAl), but the data privacy legislation was deliberately taken 
out because the Task Group was of the opinion that the PIAl should only deal with 
324 Op cit note 321, 'Privacy and Data Protection: Discussion Paper 1 09' at 4. 
325 Currie, lain and Allan, Kate (2007) 'Current Developments: Enforcing Access to Information and 
Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an Information Protection Regulator for South Africa' 23 
SAJHR at 564. 
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access to information and not other privacy issues which found a better place in a 
separate piece of legislation in line with data protection statutes in other 
. . d. . 326 
JUriS tchons. 
While there was a clear objective to create data protection legislation, it has taken over 
a decade to find its shape. An alternative reason is that information privacy would find 
expression in access to information rights. This is plausible but while the right of an 
individual to access information relating to oneself is one of the commonly accepted 
data protection principle as mentioned in chapter 3, it is unclear why PIAl remained 
silent on data protection if this was indeed the intension. In any event, access rights 
only form part of data protection and does not cover all aspects related to it. Therefore 
a specific right to data protection is needed. 
The data protection law was eventually placed again on the South African legislative 
agenda in 2000. An Issue Paper by the Law Commission was published in September 
2003 and Discussion Paper No. 109 on Privacy and Data Protection was published in 
October 2005 together with the draft Protection of Personal Information Bill. A large 
volume of comments was received, the Bill was revised accordingly, and it was tabled 
at Parliament. Parliament recently approved the Bill on 22 August 2013 and the 
Presidential signed it into force on 26 November 2013. Following the parliamentary 
326 Ibid, 'Current Developments: Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating 
Proposals for an Information Protection Regulator for South Africa' at 566. Roos, Anneliese agrees that 
a separate legistlation was envisaged and provides an overview of relevant data protection principles in 
the Open Democracy Bill to illustrate this, for further detail, see: Roos, Anneliese (2000) 'Data 
Protection for South Africa: Expectations Created by the Open Democracy Bill' at 43. 
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debate, the Deputy Executive Director of the Open Democracy Advice Centre, 
Mukelani Dimba, said that 'it was a great moment of elation[ ... ] the committee heard 
from various stakeholders from all walks of life and worked very closely with civil 
society organisations and constitutional bodies to incorporate most of the proposals 
made by the public. ' 327 During the drafting phase, the South African Law Commission 
recognized that data protection could not be seen simply as a domestic issue because 
the increased ease of transmitting personal data outside borders called for a 
harmonized approach as seen in other jurisdictions. 328 
The South African Law Commission steered away from stating that the data protection 
law is human rights based, instead they stated that the law was being introduced as a 
package of laws intended to facilitate electronic commerce by setting up uniform 
rules. 329 Even if the law was not developed from a human right perspective, it does 
recognize data protection as a fundamental human right and this is echoed throughout 
the South Law Commission Paper. 330 This attitude is similar to the approach adopted 
in Europe where they focused on the objective of facilitating the transfer of personal 
data, however, they are now realizing the importance of ensuring that the law is indeed 
human rights based as evidenced by the EU data protection reform. The drafters in 
South Africa should not have followed the EU model in this regard, knowing that their 
laws were under revision; instead by explicitly recognizing the human rights 
327 See: The Freedom of Information website 'South African to create Information Regulator' 10 
December 2012 <http://www. freedominfo.org/20 12/ 12/south-africa-to-create-information-regulator/> 
328 Op cit note 321, 'Privacy and Data Protection: Discussion Paper 109' at 6. 
329 Ibid, 'Privacy and Data Protection: Discussion Paper 109' at 12. 
330 Ibid, 'Privacy and Data Protection: Discussion Paper 109.' 
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perspective they could have been at the forefront stating that data protection laws 
should be human rights based. This was a missed opportunity. 
Nonetheless, it is clear from the South African Law Commission's final report that 
'data protection forms an element of safeguarding a person's right to privacy. It 
provides for the legal protection of a person in instances where his or her personal 
information is being collected, stored, used or communicated by another person or 
institution. ' 331 The law therefore provides for a statutory right to data protection 
stemming from the right to privacy and this should be read together with the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy and access to information, the common 
law Actio Iniuriarum and constitutional jurisprudence on information privacy. The 
Protection of Personal Information Act will be discussed in more detail in section 5.2 
i) Constitutional court case NM and Others v Smith and Others 
This section looks in detail at the constitutional case NM and Others v Smith and 
Others 2007 (7) BCLR 751 (CC) (NM case) with the view to determine the gaps in the 
South African law. The analysis supports the view that the right to privacy should 
extend to HIV I AIDS status as a private fact, particularly since it relates to highly 
sensitive personal data, and questions whether the common law should have been 
331 South African Law Reform Commission Project 124 (2009) 'Privacy and Data Protection Report' 
Pretoria, South African Law Commission. 
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developed to impose liability on the negligent public disclosure of private and 
confidential information. 
It should be noted at the outset that the development of the Actio Iniuriarum in 
previous cases of defamation332 is not automatically applicable to cases involving the 
disclosure of private facts. Firstly, pnvacy m the context of defamation is 
distinguishable from pnvacy m the context of HIV/AIDS.333 This is because 
defamation involves damage to the reputation of an individual, whereas disclosure of 
HIV/AIDS status involves infringement on the autonomy to choose the conditions 
upon which private medical information should be revealed to the public. Secondly, 
the law of defamation essentially protects the publication of untrue facts. The 
disclosure of medical information, however, deals with private facts that are true. 
HIVIAIDS status is a highly sensitive private fact 
The Majority decision correctly accepts that HIV I AIDS status is a private fact. 
HIV/AIDS unfortunately carries a negative stigma in our society. Although, as former 
justice O'Regan suggests in the Minority decision, we wish not to elevate HIV/AIDS 
above other diseases, we cannot ignore the reality that the social stigma attached to 
this particular disease far outweighs other diseases. 334 Recognizing this reality does 
not surmount to the reinforcement of the stigma, instead it takes account of the social 
332 Op cit note 303, Holomisa and Bogoshi cases. Also confirmed in the NM case at para 175, op cit 
note 302. 
333 Op cit note 302,. NM case, for a further discussion on the difference between privacy and defamation 
in O'Regan J's dissent judgment at para 175-182. 
334 Ibid, N M case at para 13 8-141. 
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reality of people living with HIV/AIDS in our society. Unfortunately the social stigma 
of HIV/AIDS is reflected in the High Court judgment which suggests that people 
living in poorer sectors of society are less at risk of being socially stigmatized because 
of their levels of literacy and social standing in society.335 Statistics in newspaper 
articles show that HIV/AIDS is more prevalent in poorer communities and that 
individuals are often ostracized when their status become known to family and 
community members. The social stigma is not only attached to the broader community 
of people actively involved in politics or to those who are known for their 
contributions to society. Many indigent persons live with the harsh realities of the 
social stigma and often do not have the resources and avenues available to them to 
protect their rights. 
O'Regan J highlights the vulnerability of the applicants in this case and correctly states 
that 'this case reminds one of the profound vulnerability of those in the situation of the 
three applicants in many respects, but not least in relation to their ability to gain access 
both to medical care and legal advice [ ... ], the facts of this case serve as a reminder of 
the need to ensure that medical care and legal advice be tendered to those who are as 
vulnerable as the applicants, in the best interests of those to whom it is provided, and 
with scrupulous attention to the demands of professional ethics at all times. 336 
Discriminating between different classes of people suggests that poor people suffering 
from the disease do not form part of the broader social community. It serves as a 
secondary victimization which further enhances the stigma attached to the disease. The 
335 Ibid, NM case at para 53. 
336 Ibid, NM case at para 199. 
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Constitutional Court correctly rules that such discrimination of social class is not 
tolerable in our democratic society337 and that poor people should be afforded the same 
protections of privacy regardless of their social standing, wealth or literacy levels. 
Constitutional protection of information privacy 
With one of the most advanced constitutions m the world, the South African 
Constitution affords protection to the right to privacy.338 In the dissent judgment, 
O'Regan J puts forward two reasons why the right to privacy is constitutionally 
protected. 339 'Firstly, as human beings we enjoy a sphere of personal intimacy and 
autonomy, and we should have a right to privacy in this regard because it serves to 
protect and foster the right to dignity which is a core protection in the Constitution. As 
a result, individuals hold the rights to personal information and this right extends to 
the choice as to when such information should be divulged to the public.340 Secondly, 
privacy is entrenched in the Constitution as a result of our past. It ensures that the 
belongings and personal information of members of a democratic society are protected 
from the State. Medical information is intimately private and everyone should enjoy 
the freedom to choose when and to whom they wish to divulge this sensitive 
information. '341 This is an unequivocal recognition that the right to privacy in the 
337 Ibid, NM case at para 53. 
338 In the United States, for example, there is no expressed protection for privacy in their Constitution. 
There have been decades of debate calling on reasons for maintaining privacy as a constitutional 
guarantee as opposed to questions whether it is in the public interest to allow the public the benefit of 
disclosure. Although the right to privacy is not constitutionally guaranteed it has been invoked through 
other provisions in the Constitution. Cases involving such interpretation usually involve the First, 
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. 
339 Op cit note 302, NM case at para 131-134. 
340 Ibid, NM case at para 136. 
341 Ibid, NM case at para 136 
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Constitution includes information privacy/data protection. In South Africa the 
confidentiality of HIV/AIDS status is captured in several important sets of ethical 
guidelines on the treatment of medical data. 342 However, there is no law in force that 
governs the violations of data protection and the consequence of infringing upon the 
privacy and misuse of medical data. 
Comparative jurisprudence on highly sensitive medical data 
UNAIDS states that 'the risk of harm following a breach of confidentiality of HIV 
varies with the national or local context according to levels of stigma, lack of 
comprehensive public health safety nets, legal traditions of respect of privacy, 
religious perspectives, and other local conditions.343 Regardless of the context though, 
the importance of data protection is increased in the context of HIV I AIDS status, 
which should be treated as a private fact. Generally, the courts in the United States 
have recognized medical information as a private fact. In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County 
Sch. Corp. the Court recognised a substantial privacy interest in the confidentiality of 
medical information. 344 In Den ius v. Dunlap the Court stated that 'the "concept of 
ordered liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has 
been interpreted to include 'the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters. ' 345 In Arakawa v. Sakata the Court held that 'the release of a Social Security 
342 These professional ethical guidelines include amongst others the Health Professions Council of 
South Africa (HPCSA) Guidelines of 2001, the South African Medical Association (SAMA) 
Guidelines, and the South African Nursing Council (SANC) Guidelines (ALP 2007). 
343 Op cite note 144, 'Guidelines on Protecting the Confidentiality and Security ofHIV Information' at 
23. 
344 Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1989). 
345 Denius v. Dunlap 209 F. 3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000). 
167 
number potentially rises to the level of a federal constitutional violation, especially 
when considering the amount of highly personal information that can be recovered as 
a result of its release. ' 346 More specifically, in Urbaniak v. Newton the California 
Court of Appeal held that HIV positive status is clearly a private fact because the 
disclosure of it may be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities. 347 
In Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach the Court held that 'unlike the identities of those 
involved in crimes, the identities of those suffering from AIDS are generally not a 
matter of public interest. ' 348 In Doe v. Town of Plymouth the Court held that the 
plaintiff infected with the HIV virus had a constitutional right to privacy that 
encompassed non-disclosure of her HIV status, in this regard: 'Given the social stigma 
associated with the HIV and AIDS phenomenon, courts are especially vigilant in 
enforcing the individual privacy interest in avoiding disclosures. One court poignantly 
captured the high stakes of unwarranted and non-consensual disclosure. There are few 
matters of a more personal nature and there are few decisions over which a person 
could have a greater desire to control, than the manner in which he reveals that AIDS 
diagnosis to others. An individual's decision to tell family members as well as the 
346 Arakawa v. Sakata 133 F.Supp.2d 1223 (D. Haw. 2001). 
347 Urbaniak v. Newton 226 Cal.App.3d 1128 (1991 ). 
348 Multimedia WMAZ, inc. v. Kuba2!2 Ga. App. 707,443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. App. 1994). In this case the 
plaintiff appeared on a television program in which he was interviewed about having contracted AIDS. 
Prior to the programme, the plaintiff and defendant reached an understanding that the Plaintiffs face 
would be disguised digitally so that he could not be identified. Apparently, due to the negligence of 
station employees, the plaintiff was recognizable at the beginning of the show. The Court held that the 
plaintiff had a claim because his right to privacy was infringed. In Mason v. Regional Medical Center of 
Hopkins Cty, 121 F.R.D. 300 (W.Dist. Ky 1988) the sensitivity of HIV status was similarly pronounced 
upon when the Court held that the status of a HIV-positive individual had to be kept confidential in 
court proceedings. 
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general community that he is suffering from an incurable disease, particularly one 
such as AIDS, is clearly an emotional and sensitive one fraught with serious 
implications for the individual. ' 349 
The stigma associated with HIV/AIDS was similarly outlined in Doe v. Coughlin 
where the Court recognized the discrimination accompanying public dissemination of 
the diagnosis and the fact that family members may abandon the HIV I AIDS victim. 
The Court had to determine the nature and extent of the privacy rights of inmates who 
were tested HIV positive and balance that privacy interest against the asserted interest 
of the New York State Department of Correctional Services. The Court stated that: 
' [ ... ] The objectives of the State are served in a constitutionally impermissible 
manner. Without question, those assigned to D-2 (the cell section) will be known by 
guards and the general prison population to be infected by the HIV virus and these 
inmates also face a substantial risk of having their diagnosis revealed to family 
members and friends. To justify these invasions, the State argued that its program is 
the most appropriate means of accomplishing its interest, however, the benefits are 
insufficient standing alone to warrant permitting infringement of the prisoner's right to 
0 ,350 pnvacy. 
349 Doe v. Town of Plymouth 825 F.Supp. 1102, 1107 (D.Mass. 1993). In this case the plaintiff sued on 
the basis of emotional distress against town and police officer, alleging civil rights claims arising out of 
disclosure of her HIV positive status. The Court held that the Constitution protects two types of privacy 
interests namely, individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. 
350 Doe v. Coughlin 697 F.Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y.l998). 
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Disclosure of HIV/AIDS status 
It should be noted that the right to privacy in the context of HIV I AIDS disclosure is 
not without limitation. In Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center the Superior Court of 
New Jersey held that: '[ ... ] Although New Jersey's anti-discrimination statutes 
protected Dr. Behringer from having his surgical privileges revoked, the Medical 
Center demonstrated a reasonable risk to patients that justified suspending Dr. 
Behringer's privileges, or alternatively, requiring his patients' informed consent before 
operating. The Court found that the risk included not only actual HIV transmission, 
but also the possibility of surgical accidents. ' 351 In Doe v. City of New York the Human 
Rights Commission was sued for revealing information identifying the plaintiff as an 
HIV/AIDS victim.352 O'Neil states in his comment on the case that 'the Court 
recognized that AIDS infection is profoundly different from any other embarrassing 
revelation, and hinted that liability might follow even for the truthful disclosure of 
lawfully obtained information of obvious public importance. In this case there was 
another special feature, the purpose for which the infected worker sought the agency's 
help did not include publicizing its victory at his expense for its own ends. ' 353 
351 Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center 249 N.J.Super. 597 (1991). In this case the Medical Center 
had breached its duty of confidentiality when it failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
patient's AIDS diagnosis from becoming public knowledge. 
352 Doe v. City of New York 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994). In this case an airline employee was fired 
because he was AIDS infected. With the assistance of the city Human Rights Commission he 
successfully regained his job. The Commission then issued a celebratory press release, which without 
naming the employee, contained enough details that friends and colleagues could identify the person. 
The Commission ~as then sued for invasion of privacy. 
353 O'Neil, Robert M 'Privacy in the New Millennium: Virtual Trespass and Other Concepts' 
<http://www.abanet.org> 
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The above cases on HIVIAIDS are drawn from United States jurisprudence to 
illustrate the way in which courts in a foreign jurisdiction have addressed the 
sensitivity surrounding HIV I AIDS status. In the European context where data 
protection is explicitly recognized as a human right, the European Court of Human 
Rights stated that: 'Respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in 
the legal systems of all the Contracting Parties to the European Union. It is crucial not 
only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient, but also to preserve his or her 
confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general [ ... ]. The 
disclosure of HIV data may dramatically affect his or her private and family life, as 
well as social and employment situation, by exposing him or her to opprobrium and 
the risk of ostracism. For this reasons it may also discourage persons from seeking 
diagnosis or treatment and thus undermine any preventive efforts by the community to 
contain the pandemic. The interests in protecting the confidentiality of such 
information will therefore weigh heavily in the balance in determining whether the 
interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Such interference cannot 
be compatible with Article 8 of the EU Charter unless it is justified by an overriding 
. . h bl' . ,354 reqmrement m t e pu IC mterest. 
Thus, HIV I AIDS status is recognized as a special category of personal data that 
requires a higher standard of protection given the sensitivity of medical data and the 
social stigma attached to this disease and, as a result, confidentiality and non-
disclosure weighs heavily when balancing this right against other rights or interests. 
354 European Court of Human Rights (Chamber) Case ofZ b. Finland (Application no. 22009/93), 
Judgment, Strasbourg, 25 February 1997 at 95- 96. 
171 
Specific issues in the NM case 
The applicants in the NM case claimed that the publication of their names and 
HIV/AIDS status without expressed consent violated their rights to privacy, dignity, 
and psychological integrity. Although Article 14 of the Constitution was not directly 
invoked because of limitation in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security,355 this 
constitutional protection does apply when looking at interpretation and development of 
the common law?56 The applicants were volunteers to clinical trials conducted by the 
Immunology Clinic in the Medical Faculty of the University of Pretoria. The clinical 
trials tested a drug aimed at reducing the HIV levels of patients. The Strauss Report, 
which resulted from an investigation looking into the side effects of the drug, 
contained an annexure revealing the terms upon which the applicants consented to the 
publication of their identities and HIV I AIDS status and this did not include wide 
public dissemination. 
Facts of the case 
In a biography of Ms. Patricia de Lille (an active political figure), the author relied on 
the Strauss Report as a basis to publish the applicants' personal details. Neither the 
author nor Ms. de Lille viewed the annexure containing the limited consent of the 
applicants and they claimed damages on the basis that no expressed consent was given 
355 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) at paras 17-19 the Court held that if a 
matter is brought on the basis of common law the Court has to decide on this basis. In the NM case 
applicants invoked common law infringement and not the constitutional infringement. 
356 According to Article 39 of the Constitution: 'When interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
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to publication of their names and status in the biography. Prior to instituting litigation, 
the applicants requested that their names be removed from the book, but the 
respondents' response was that they had no obligation to do so and that any legal 
action would be defended. 357 In the High Court proceedings, the respondents claimed 
that no confidentiality phrase was attached to the Strauss Report, and that in any event, 
the details of the applicants were not private facts at the time of the publication to 
warrant the protection of the right to privacy. The respondents claimed further that 
their actions were neither intentional nor negligent and that they had not acted 
unlawfully because it was reasonable to assume that they had attained the consent of 
the applicants as consent was given to publication in the Strauss Report. 
The reason given for publishing the applicants' names and HIV I AIDS status was to 
authenticate the material in the biography.358 This reason is unjustified. Assumption of 
consent is not sufficient particularly since the annexure, which formed an integral part 
of the Strauss Report, was evidence that the consent was limited to the Straus report 
and not to other publications. Consent signifies the unambiguous intent and will of the 
individuals concerned. In determining whether consent was validly given, one needs to 
look at the individuals' intention at the time of collecting consent, the specified 
purpose for which consent was obtained, the fact that the individuals should be made 
aware of all circumstances surrounding the collection and disclosure of their personal 
data, and the intended audience if publication is foreseen. In addition, the individuals 
need to be fully informed of wide public dissemination and its consequences if this 
357 Op cit note 302·, NM case at para 7-20. 
358 Ibid, NM case at para 22-24. 
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forms part of the specified purpose. 359 It is clear from the facts that the applicants only 
gave consent for the specified purpose of the medical report in order to investigate the 
conduct of the staff at the University in conducting medical trials and the consent was 
limited to this purpose. According to international standards on data protection, 
consent to use personal data needs to be obtained for a specified purpose and using 
such personal data for any additional or unrelated purpose would require taking 
additional steps to obtain express consent for the new purpose. The applicants in no 
way gave expressed consent for publication in the biography and no real steps were 
taken by the author or Ms. De Lille to obtain the necessary consent or to even check 
the annexure that outlined the limitations of consent. In essence, the biography 
resulted in a hagiography of a political figure at the expense of infringing upon the 
privacy of vulnerable individuals. 
Analysis of the Constitutional Court judgment 
The Constitutional Court proceeded on the basis that the matter did not rmse a 
constitutional issue. This was due to the fact that the applicants' claim was based on 
the common law principle of Actio Iniuriarum. The Court, however, found that it was 
in the interest of justice to hear the matter because it raised important considerations of 
balancing between the rights to freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right 
to privacy and dignity, on the other. 360 The Court correctly concludes that consent to 
the Strauss Report did not give a blanket disclosure to publication.361 If the 
359 Op cit note 5, !OM Data Protection Manual at 41. 
360 Op cit note 302, NM case at para 27-31. 
361 Ibid, NM case at para 39. 
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respondents had taken the necessary steps to view the annexure they would have been 
aware of the fact that the consent was limited to the medical report. Private medical 
information is very sensitive and considering the negative impact that disclosure of 
HIV I AIDS status can have on the everyday lives of individuals, extra measures need 
to be in place to protect the right to privacy in this context. In a society rated with one 
the highest numbers of infected people, and where those infected face constant barriers 
within their respective communities, the potential long-term negative effects of 
disclosure have to be taken into account. The unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information, which could potentially result in harm, should give rise to a claim for 
damages. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court missed a unique opportunity to 
develop the common law in light of the constitutional right to privacy.362 
The Constitutional Court has pronounced on many occasions on the fundamentality of 
freedom of expression in a free and democratic society363 and the respondents relied 
on this in their defence. The respondents and the Amicus Curiae contended that 
developing the common law to encompass the component of negligence, as an element 
of fault, would limit the right to freedom of expression. This argument is flawed. 
While freedom of expression remains a comer stone of democracy, it cannot be 
362 This argument is supported by Steinberg, Jonny in his critique of the NM case. See: Jonny 
Steinberg, Jonny 'Generous Judgment Instils Stigma' Business Day, 24 April 2007 
<http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A445289> 
363 See: for example, S v Mamabolo (E TV and Others Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC); Islamic 
Unity Convention and Others v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC); 
Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC); Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB 
International (Finance) BV t/a SabMark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus 
Curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC); South African National Defense Union v Minister of Defence and 
Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC), and Phillips and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Witwatersrand Local Division, and Others2003 (3) SA 345 (CC). 
175 
exercised to the detriment of other constitutional guarantees.364 A balancing test is 
usually implemented in cases involving private medical records, between the 
individual's right or expectation of privacy and the public interest in accessing their 
medical records. Drawing from foreign jurisprudence, in the case of Whalen v Roe the 
Court in examining the asserted privacy rights of patients, identified two constitutional 
privacy interests: 'One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, and another is the interest in making certain kinds of important decisions that 
affect the public. In addition, publicizing the private medical information of a person 
can only be warranted if it raises a legitimate concern or interest to the public. ' 365 The 
Court in United States v Westinghouse Elec. Corp. set out seven factors to consider 
when determining whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified, these 
include: 'the type of record requested; the information it does or might contain; the 
potential harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure; the injury from 
disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; the adequacy of 
safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosures; the degree of need for access; and 
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other 
recognizable public interest militating toward access. ' 366 This case sets forward good 
criteria for balancing privacy rights with other rights and our courts could benefit from 
these guidelines when looking at data protection cases in the future. 
364 The Constitutional Court expressed this view in the cases of Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 
(CC) at paras 22-24 and South African Broadcasting Corporation v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others 2007 (2) BCLR 167 (CC) at para 24. 
365 Whalen v Roe 429 U.S 589 (1977). See also op cite note 349, Doe v. Town of Plymouth. 
366 United States v Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980). This case involved 
facilitating research and investigations of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and 
questioned whether strong public interest justified minimal intrusion into privacy with regard to the 
medical records of employees. 
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O'Regan J in the NM case agrees with the respondents that expanding the common 
law would limit freedom of expression367 and states that: 'Media Code of Ethics is 
usually relevant in determining whether public interest dictates that privacy rights 
should be limited.368 The names and HIV/AIDs status of the applicants were simply 
used to authenticate that Ms. De Lille was an HIV activist, this is not a legitimate 
reason for infringing upon the applicants' right to choose when and to whom they 
wished to disclose their personal data. There was also no public interest in printing 
their names in a biography that seems to be aimed at wide public dissemination for the 
purpose of enhancing personal political support from the general public. 
The judgment of Sachs J is particularly helpful when considering the balancing test 
between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression.369 Sachs J 
recognizes that there is a greater need for caution when the private fact involved is 
significantly private to the individual involved, and conversely that the greater the 
public interest, the greater the likelihood of limiting the individuals' right to privacy. 
In particular, he says: ' [ ... ] Given the extreme sensitivity of the information involved, 
she (Ms. de Lille) should have left no stone untumed in her pursuit of verification. Of 
even greater importance, if the slightest doubt existed, there was no need to publish the 
actual names of the applicants [ ... ]. There might be some cases where the need for 
verisimilitude, a sense of actuality, may be overwhelming [ ... ]. We are concerned with 
367 Op cit note 302, NM case at para 183-189. 
368 Ibid, NM case at para 149. 
369 Ibid, NM case at para 203-204. 
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people whose lives are dominated by anxiety and who are only slowly beginning to 
break through intense barriers of community prejudice [ ... ]. When the expressive 
interests are balanced against the privacy interests, the scales come down with a clang 
h "d f . ,370 on t e s1 eo pnvacy. 
Former Chief Justice Langa371 and O'Regan J372 correctly held that a higher standard 
should be attributed to the media who are responsible for ensuring that freedom of 
expression does not encroach on individual rights. However, ordinary citizens should 
also be held to the standard of a reasonable person in light of the circumstance of a 
particular case. Langa CJ's reasoning that Ms. de Lille would escape liability by virtue 
of the fact that she is a layperson373 is not correct. The political status of Ms. de Lille 
and the fact that she is a HIV/AIDS activist makes her well-versed in the potential 
harm that can flow from the disclosure of HIV/AIDS status. A reasonable person in 
her position would have taken all the necessary steps to attain the consent of the 
applicants prior to wide public dissemination. If the Constitutional Court developed 
the common law they would have found a case of negligence. However, O'Regan Jon 
her summary of the facts, finds that the respondents did not act negligently. This is 
mainly attributed to the significant burden that would be placed on freedom of 
expression if the media could not rely on information published by reputable 
organizations. 374 This analysis fails because when compared to lay persons, the 
370 Ibid, NM case at para 205-207. 
371 Ibid, NM case at para 94 
372 Ibid, NM case at para 180. 
373 Ibid, NM case at para 99 
374 Ibid, N M case at para 183-189. 
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University testing HIV/AIDS patients and Ms. De Lille's (as well as her author) who 
had in-depth knowledge of HIV/AIDS and the consequences of unwanted disclosure 
had an additional obligation to ensure that constitutional rights are not infringed upon 
by their publications. This includes taking steps to ensure that consent is obtained 
when publishing private medical facts for particular purposes. The fact that the 
applicants' had given the University consent to publish their names in the Strauss 
Report containing results of the test did not relieve the respondents from the obligation 
to take all the relevant steps of ensuring that proper consent was in fact obtained for 
the purpose of publishing the biography. This goes to the issue of the functional creep. 
Simply stated, providing consent to the University for the specified purpose of the 
Straus Report does not mean that applicants gave an unfettered right to other writers to 
use their personal data for other purposes that are not known to them. It should make 
no difference that the information had been previously published, the obligation is to 
confirm consent for unrelated purposes remains, particularly in matters as sensitive as 
HIV/AIDS status. 
Given the social stigma attached to HIV/AIDS status in our society, it is not 
unreasonable to require confirmation of consent. This does not imply that HIV I AIDS 
as a disease should be given preferential status. It merely takes the social reality of the 
disease into account and turns the focus to the intimacy of the private facts involved. 
The following passage of Sachs J supports this contention: 'From a legal point of 
view, then, the moral of the story is that unless overwhelming public interest points the 
other way, publishers should refrain from circulating information identifying the HIV 
status of named individuals, unless they have the clearest possible proof of consent to 
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publication having been given, or that the information is in the broad public 
domain. '375 The protection of the right to pnvacy under the common law Actio 
Iniuriarum requires the elements of wrongfulness and the intention to impair one's 
privacy. In the context of the disclosure of HIV I AIDS status, the common law falls 
short of protecting an individual's rights in the circumstance where a reasonable 
person ought to have foreseen the potential harm that would result from disclosure. As 
criticized by Steinberg, the Constitutional Court focused too much on intent when 
negligence was not in dispute and it should have gone further to develop the common 
law to include the element of negligence,376 particularly in the absence of legislation 
regulating data protection. 
Majority view 
Former justice Madala, writing for the Majority, felt that there was no need to develop 
the common law in light of the facts of this particular case.377 Many aspects of the 
facts of this case were, however, not common cause in the court a quo. Suffice to say, 
there was disagreement about the nature of the consent given and content of 
information revealed in meetings leading up to the court proceedings. The respondents 
alleged that in allowing the presence of journalists at one of the meetings, the 
applicants waived their right to privacy. On examination of the facts it was established 
that the applicants' did not reveal their status at the meeting when the media was 
present. It is also clear from the evidence that the Strauss Report was intended as an 
375 Ibid, NM case at para 183-189. 
376 Op cit 362, 'Generous Judgment Instils Stigma'. 
377 Op cit note 302, NM case at para 57. 
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investigation into the conduct of the University within the context of the clinical trials. 
The fact that the University is a reputable institution does not result in the report being 
made public for broader use contrary to the intension of the applicants. The report was 
not stored in the library archives making it accessible to the public and it was only 
circulated to those involved and who had an interest in the results of the report. As the 
former Langa CJ states: 'Whether it is reasonable to rely on another document will 
depend on the nature of the document, the nature of the institution that produced the 
document, the importance of vindicate the interests involved and the relevant 
circumstances ofthe case.' 378 
Minority view 
While it can be argued that the necessary requirement of intention for wrongfulness 
was not present in their conduct, the respondents acted negligently in publishing the 
names and status' of the applicants?79 Indeed the respondents would not have 
deliberately tried to inflict harm through their publication, particularly because their 
involvement with the applicants stemmed from an intention to assist those who 
experienced negative effects as a result of the clinical trials. In addition, the 
background and experience of the first and second respondent in dealing with 
HIV I AIDS issues indicate that they would not intentionally reveal the identity of 
378 Op cit note 302, NM case at para I 02. 
379 No defense was put forward to rebut the allegation that the respondents acted wrongfully, it was also 
never established that it was in the public interest to disclose the applicants' private medical 
information. 
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HIV/AIDS persons. Therefore, the partial dissent of Langa CJ380 and the dissent of 
O'Regan J,381 in this regard, is correct. 
Ms. de Lille and her author acknowledged that Media Ethics prevented publication of 
private facts without consent. During testimony it was alleged that steps were taken to 
obtain sight of the annexure containing the terms of consent of the applicants. Those 
steps, however, fell short of the necessary steps needed to prevent harm to the 
applicants. A reasonable author of a biography that referred to personal medical 
information and a person in the position of Ms. De Lille who is well-versed in the 
social stigma and sensitivities attached to HIV I AIDS, would have foreseen the 
consequence of their negligence in not taking all the necessary steps to ensure that 
consent for disclosure had been obtained. Clearly the element of negligence was 
present and the facts of this case did call for the development of the common law so as 
to bring it in line with constitutional right to privacy. The negligence of the 
respondents resulted in the publication of private facts, which caused harm to the 
applicants and violated their rights to dignity by encroaching upon their freedom not to 
have their private information revealed to the public. 
As confirmed by the Constitutional Court dignity is a fundamental constitutional 
right,382 and therefore, a negligent action that results in the impairment of the right to 
380 Op cit note 302, NM case at para 93. 
381 Ibid, NM case at paras 156-169. 
382 Op cit note 302, NM case at paras 48-54. 
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pnvacy and dignity should gtve nse to a claim for damages. Article 7 of the 
Constitution reads: 'The Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. 
It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom.' Dignity is a core principle in the Constitution 
and it also lies at the root of the right to privacy. 
Confidentiality of HIVIAIDS status 
The Constitutional Court acknowledges that HIV I AIDS calls for special 
considerations of confidentiality.383 Since the common law does not extend to 
negligence, it is not in keeping with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Langa CJ noted that in developing the common law, negligence as an element of 
unlawfulness should remain separate to the inquiry of wrongfulness in the test for 
liability. When looking at the invasion of privacy by publication of private facts there 
are four essential elements that must be proven for negligence, namely: the disclosure 
was public; private facts were disclosed; the matter publicised was highly offensive to 
a reasonable person; and the matter was not a legitimate concern to public. 384 The 
requirement of publicity means that the matter must be communicated to the public at 
large, or that it must be substantially certain that the information would become one of 
public knowledge, be it to large or smaller group of people. Private facts can be 
defined as those facts closely connected to a person and which preferably remains 
confidential unless expressly consenting otherwise. A cause of action arises only when 
383 Ibid, NM case at para 63. 
384 Ibid, NM case at paras 95-97. 
183 
the publicity given is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling 
. 1 . d 385 senous y aggneve . 
Prosser explains that the requirement of reasonableness is necessary because given the 
nature of society, 'no one can avoid the public gaze or public inquiry entirely and 
complete privacy does not exist in this world. ' 386 Generally a person should not be 
held liable for the public disclosure of facts about another, unless he or she should 
have reasonably foreseen that the person would likely be offended. In the 
circumstances of this case, the ruling on costs does not seem to take into account the 
disparity between the applicants and respondents. The applicants are poor individuals 
who had to channel through the court system as a result of a well-renowned political 
figure, and her writer and publishers, who blatantly refused to take steps to redress the 
harm to the applicants. They acted negligently in failing to take all steps to obtain 
consent for the publication and directly refused to remove the names from the book 
once they were informed that it was unwanted disclosure. It is unfortunate that persons 
who already suffer because of the social stigma attached to their medical condition, 
should suffer further victimization as a result of individuals pursuing their own 
agendas. A more appropriate cost order would have been for the respondents to pay 
the costs of the applicants in both courts. 
385 Ibid, NM case at paras 95-97. 
386 Prosser, William L (1960) 'Privacy' 48 California Law Review 383 at 396. 
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The commentary on this case highlights that at the time the South African law fell 
short of explicitly protecting personal data from unwanted and unauthorized disclosure 
and guaranteeing confidential treatment and non-disclosure in the absence of 
expressed consent, and even more so, given the sensitivity of the medical data which 
required higher protections. 
No legal recourse for negligence 
Moreover, the common law did not provide recourse for negligent disclosure of 
private facts, and as seen from the analysis, the facts did allow for development of the 
law to bring it line with international data protection standards found in existing legal 
instruments. The fundamental international legal instruments protect the right to 
privacy, but the international trend shows that HIVIAIDS status calls for further 
special protections with emphasis on privacy, confidentiality and consent as essential 
elements of protecting HIV I AIDS status. The Constitutional Court should have taken 
account of the social realities not only in our country, but also the global recognition 
of the sensitivity of the disease. The following section makes reference to international 
instruments recognizing the special category of HIV I AIDS status and reinforcing the 
need for privacy and confidentiality. 
International law on privacy of HIV/AIDS status 
As stated above in chapter 3.3, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) serves as the basis for the protection of privacy at the international level. The 
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UDHR is a foundation for the United Nations human rights Covenants, including the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which explicitly 
recognizes the right to privacy and the right to non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality or other status. The UDHR is customary law and the ICCPR is binding on 
the international community. Specific reference to privacy and non-discrimination as a 
right can also be found in the Convention on Migrant Workers and the Convention on 
the Protection of the Child. 'Although the right to privacy was strengthened by its 
inclusion in the United Nations Covenants, it was the Council of Europe's 1981 CoE 
Convention, which considered health data as "special", and together with 1989 OECD 
Guidelines, it established the modem parameters for the principled regulation and 
. f d" 1 d 387 secunty o me 1ca ata. 
The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDA W) binds signatory States to ensure that the respect of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are afforded to the specific group of women and girls. It 
does not specifically address HIV status, but it is accepted that HIV positive women 
and girls have the right not to be discriminated against. Although international human 
rights conventions do not specifically provide for the protection against unfair 
discrimination on the basis of HIV I AIDS status, there are provisions that have been 
interpreted to provide for protection for people living with HIV I AIDS. These include 
the right to health and access to health care contained in the 1966 Intcmational 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), CEDA W and the CRC. 
387 Knoppers, Bartha Maria 'Confidentiality of Health Information: International Comparative 
Approaches' <http://darwin.nap.edu> 
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In the absence of international instruments dealing specifically with HIV I AIDS, the 
Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights provide a human rights framework for 
member states of the United Nations. 
In 1997 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights passed a Declaration388 
emphasizing the need to intensify efforts to ensure universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, to reduce vulnerability 
to HIV/AIDS and to prevent HIV/AID-related discrimination and stigma.389 The 
annexure to the Resolution contains the following guidelines inter alia: 'Guideline 5: 
States should enact or strengthen anti-discrimination and other protective laws that 
protect vulnerable groups, people living with HIV/AIDS and people with disabilities 
from discrimination in both the public and private sectors, ensure privacy and 
confidentiality and ethics in research involving human subjects, emphasise education 
and conciliation, and provide for speedy and effective administrative and civil 
remedies; and Guideline 11: States should ensure monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms to guarantee the protection of HIV -related human rights, including those 
of people living with HIV/AIDS, their families and communities.' The central theme 
running through the Resolution is that the full realization of human rights is an 
essential element in the global response to HIV/AIDS, in particular, that 'governments 
should commit themselves to enforce legislation, regulations and other measures to 
ensure all the rights of people living with HIV, including privacy and confidentiality 
388 The Protection of Human Rights in the context of HIV and AIDS, C.H.R. Res. 1997/33, ESCOR 
Supp. (No.3) at 115, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1997/33 (1997) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/HIV-
AIDS.htm> 
389 Ibid, The Protection of Human Rights in the context of HIV and AIDS. 
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are protected and respected. 390 In 1999 a further Declaration was adopted urging States 
to implement the Guidelines adopted in the 1997 Resolution and reiterating that 
'discrimination on the basis of HIV or AIDS status, actual or presumed, is prohibited 
by existing international human rights standards, and that the term "or other status" in 
non-discrimination provisions in international human rights texts should be interpreted 
to cover health status, including HIV/ AIDS. '391 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights also sets international 
standards for handling personal data of HIV I AIDS affected persons. The title of 
Article 9 of the Declaration demonstrates the commitment of the international 
community to data protection of HIV/AIDS status, stating as follows: 'Privacy and 
Confidentiality: The privacy of the persons concerned and the confidentiality of their 
personal information should be respected. To the greatest extent possible, such 
information should not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it 
was collected or consented to, consistent with international law, in particular 
international human rights law .' 392 
390 Op cit note 144, 'Guidelines on Protecting the Confidentiality and Security of HIV Information' at 
10. 
391 The Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), C.H.R. res. 1999/49, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/RES/1999/49 
( 1999) <http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/aidsreso1ution.html> Further Declarations where 
adopted to reinforce the 1997 Guidelines, see the United Nations Human Rights website for 
international instruments dealing specifically with HIV I AIDS. 
http://www .ohchr .org/EN /Issues/HIV /Pages/Documents.aspx 
392 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by acclamation on 19 October 2005 by the 33rd session of the 
General Conference of UNESCO. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-
sciences/themes/bioethics/bioethics-and-human-rights/> 
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At the 2001 United Nations Special Session on HIVIAIDS Declaration on 
Commitment of HIV I AIDS, heads of State and governments committed 'to enact, 
strengthen or enforce legislation, regulations and other measures to eliminate all forms 
of discrimination against and to ensure the full enjoyment of all human rights and 
freedoms by all people living with HIVIAIDS.'393 In 2001 the General Assembly 
adopted a Resolution394 outlining the international community's Declaration of 
Commitment on HIVIAIDS. The Resolution recognized that the full realization of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of people living with HIV I AIDS an essential 
element in preventing stigma and related discrimination. 395 On 15 June 2006, the 
General Assembly adopted another Resolution on the Political Declaration on 
HIVIAIDS wherein it reaffirmed the commitment to recognize human rights and 
protect HIVIAIDS victims.396 It further pledged to promote full protection of 
confidentiality and informed consent so as to promote a social and legal environment 
that is supportive of the safe disclosure of HIV status.397 The right to privacy is 
expressly mentioned in the Resolution as follows: 'We (Sates) commit ourselves to 
intensifying efforts to enact, strengthen or enforce, as appropriate, legislation, 
regulations and other measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against and to 
393 Ibid, see Paragraph 58 of the Declaration. See also other instruments of the International Community 
of Women Living with HIV/AIDS <http:www.icwglobal.org> 
394 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/S-26/2 with Annex, August 2, 2001) in a 
twenty-sixth special session. 
395 Ibid, see number 16 of the Resolution. 
396 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/60/262 with Annex, June 15, 2006). 
397 Ibid, see number 25 of the Resolution states that 'Therefore we [ ... ] pledge to promote, at the 
international, regional, national and local levels, access to HIV/ AIDS education, information, voluntary 
counseling and testing and related services, with full protection of confidentiality and informed consent, 
and to promote a social and legal environment that is supportive of and safe for voluntary disclosure of 
HIV status.' 
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ensure the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by people 
living with HIV and members of vulnerable groups, in particular to ensure their access 
to, inter alia, education, inheritance, employment, health care, social and health 
services, prevention, support and treatment, information and legal protection, while 
respecting their privacy and confidentiality; and developing strategies to combat 
stigma and social exclusion connected with the epidemic.' Portions of above are 
italicized to emphasize that confidentiality and consent are essential requirements 
when handling HIVIAIDS status. Although Resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
do not have the same binding force in law as treaties, it is soft law and since it 
signifies the support and aspirations of States they are expected to live up to the 
Declarations. 
South Africa's treatment of HIVIAIDS status 
South Africa has a Draft Paper on HIV I AIDS that seeks to address unfair 
discrimination in the context of HIV I AIDS status. In the Paper discriminatory conduct 
is classified under three categories, namely: individual, structural and institutional. 
The individual category involves discrimination on an intimate level in the personal 
relationships that people living with AIDS have with others. The forms of 
discrimination in this category include harassment, disclosure of HIV status to others 
or spreading rumours about a person's HIV status. The Draft Paper seeks to include 
HIVIAIDS as a prohibited ground in the Equality Act of 2000 so as to assist in 
developing a human rights based approach in keeping with international legal 
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trends. 398 While this analysis does not necessarily support the arguments put forward 
in the Draft Paper, it does align itself with the contention that special considerations 
are necessary when dealing with HIV I AIDS status. It supports the argument that 
disclosure ofHIVIAIDS status without consent violates an individual's right to dignity 
and argues that data protection called for a change in the common law. 
It is well known that the international community recognizes that the world needs to 
take positive steps to alleviate discrimination surrounding the HIVIAIDS disease. The 
Constitutional Court had a unique opportunity to set a precedent, but they failed to 
take the necessary steps in developing the common law. 
Missed opportunity to develop the common law 
Developing the common law to include negligence would have been a response to 
protect the perceptible and eroding levels of negligence in disregarding the social 
realities of people living with HIV I AIDS and taking precautionary steps to protect 
their HIV I AIDS status, a category of personal data which is deserving of the highest 
protections. Had they taken this unique opportunity, South Africa would have been the 
lead on the continent and it would have contributed to the international jurisprudence 
recognizing that safer safeguards are needed for handling personal data such as 
HIV I AIDS status, failing which, consequences may result if negligent actions result in 
unwanted disclosure and impact on the information privacy and dignity of those living 
398 The Draft Paper can be accessed on government website< http://www.doj.gov.za> 
191 
with HIV/AIDS, this includes migrants who are often found to be affected particularly 
in the SADC region. Due to the Constitutional Court's caution in developing the 
common law, data protection remained unregulated and the gaps in the law continued. 
The discussion in the next section demonstrates that the Court still remained 
conservative on data protection six years after the NM judgement. 
ii) Constitutional Court case Mail and Guardian Media Limited and Others v 
Chipu N. 0. and Others 
Most recently the Constitutional Court was faced with the challenge of having to 
balance between public interest based on freedom of expression arguments put 
forward by the media and the principle of confidentiality as guaranteed in the South 
African Refugees Act 130 of 1998. This section will outline why the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Mail and Guardian Media Limited and Others v Chipu N. 0. 
and Others399 ( Chipu case) is flawed, in particular because it fails to appreciate the 
repercussions on the asylum seeking community and fear of reprisal to family, 
relatives and friends in their countries of origin. 
Article 27 of the Refugees Act gives full legal protection to refugees. This includes the 
fundamental rights outlined in the Bill of Rights, including the right to privacy as 
399 Mail and Guardian Media Limited and Others v Chipu N.O. and Others Case CCT 136112 (2013) 
ZACC 32; 2013 (11) BCLR 1259 (CC). 
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outlined in Article 14 of the Constitution. Privacy is reinforced in the context of 
asylum claims through the principle of confidentiality as outlined in Article 21 (5) 
which states that: 'confidentiality of asylum applications and the information 
contained therein must be ensured at all times.' The Constitutional Court had to decide 
whether absolute confidentiality is a reasonable and justifiable limitation on the right 
to freedom of expression. In its judgment delivered on 27 September 2013 in the 
Chipu case, the Majority 'declared that section 21(5) of the Refugees Act is 
inconsistent with section 16 ( 1 )(a) and (b) of the Constitution to the extent that it 
precludes members of the public or the media from attending proceedings of the 
Refugee Appeal Board in all cases and fails to confer a discretion upon the Refugee 
Appeal Board to allow the public and media access to its proceedings in an appropriate 
case. '
400 
Facts of the case 
This case concerns a media application to the Refugee Appeal Board to allow the press 
to be present at a rejected asylum seeker's appeal and to report on the proceedings to 
the public. The High Court refused to set aside the Refugee Appeal Board's decision 
to deny the application made by the media and found that although the Refugees Act 
limited the freedom of the press to receive and impart information, it was a justifiable 
limitation given the importance of confidentiality to the integrity of the asylum 
process. The applicants argued that the information relating to the rejected asylum 
seeker was already in the public domain and that public interest demanded that the rule 
400 Ibid, Chipu case at 60. 
193 
of confidentiality be lifted in particular circumstances at the discretion of the Refugee 
Appeal Board. Of particular relevance was the fact that the rejected asylum seeker in 
this case was subject to a pending extradition order initiated by his country of origin 
and the media already reported on alleged criminal activities committed by him both 
while abroad and in South Africa. Indeed, as a general rule, information that is already 
in the public domain is an exception to the principle of confidentiality, however, the 
truthfulness of the information may be unknown when it comes to media reports and 
allowing access to refugee appeal hearings and publication thereof could definitely 
jeapardize the appeal proceedings and the safety of the asylum seekers and their 
family, relatives and friends. 
Senstivity of refugee status as a private fact 
The respondents argued to the contrary that Article 21(5) of the Refugees Act 
constituted a reasonable and justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression 
because absolute confidentiality was essential for the integrity of the asylum system 
and it was necessary to protect asylum applicants as well as their families and friends 
against possible threats or danger to their safety and lives. The Amicus Curiae, the 
Southern Africa Litigation Centre, raised the concern that absolute confidentiality 
would render the asylum system vulnerable to abuse and compromise South Africa's 
obligations to ensure accountability for international crimes.401 Lawyers for Human 
Rights tried to intervene as the second Amicus Curiae but their application was refused 
because they tried to raise new evidence that the Constitutional Court found to be 
401 See Constitutional Court media summary of the Chipu case 
<http://www .constitutionalcourt.org.za/ Archimages/213 7 5 .PDF> 
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irrelevant to the question before the Court, or alternatively, that it carried little 
weight.402 Even though it was weakly substantiated, Lawyers for Human Rights did 
raise pertinent issues and the Court failed to give sufficient weight to, amongst others, 
'the sensitive nature of asylum claims based on the nature of persecution to which 
asylum seekers would have been subjected to in their countries of origin and the 
credible assessments of asylum seekers at first instance level and at appeal level 
cases. ' 403 Unfortunately the Court ruled that this does not warrant consideration to the 
question of confidentiality. While Lawyers for Human Rights did raise the fact that the 
refugee appeal system in South Africa is generally bad in practice, they failed to 
explain why absolute confidentiality was necessary in appeal cases. Had they argued 
that the Refugee Appeal Board does act de facto act as a court of first instance in many 
cases and that they considered not purely appealable issues, but rather detailed 
personal facts relating to the asylum seeker's well-founded fear of persecution, the 
Court may have accepted their application to intervene. In addition, if asylum 
applicants were aware of the media presence in their appeal application, they would be 
reluctant to disclose truthful submissions knowing that it would form part of the public 
domain. This is exacerbated by the fact that news reports are made available 
electronically and any truthful submissions made by the asylum seeker could 
jeapordize lives in their countries of origin, particularly since the internet is available 
in almost all parts of the world and is easily accessible even on mobile telephones. 
402 Op cit note 399, Chipu case at para 13. 
403 Ibid, Chipu case para 10. 
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The Constitutional Court did recognize the need for confidentiality in refugee cases 
and the serious nature of asylum claims, however, they mistakenly found that it did not 
relate to the issue between the parties, that is, whether blanket confidentiality should 
be maintained or whether there should be flexibility to allow discretion to lift the 
confidentiality.404 This seems contradictory because on the one hand the Court order 
does not provide any direct relief to the parties, but on the other hand the Court found 
the blanket confidentiality to be unconstitutional, and the latter clearly has a direct 
impact on all asylum claims. 
Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions South Africa has an international obligation to 
either extradite or prosecute perpetrators of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.405 Moreover, Article 4 of the Refugees Act provides exclusionary grounds 
for the following categories if there is reason to believe that a person: 1) committed a 
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity and prohibits the 
granting of asylum to such persons; 2) committed non-political crimes which if 
committed in South Africa would be deemed punishable; 3) has been guilty of acts 
contrary to the objects and principles of the United Nations Organization or the 
Organisation for African Unity; or 4) enjoys the protection of any other country in 
which he or she has taken up residence. This prohibition allows the country to comply 
with its international obligations and it goes further to meet the objectives of State 
security and crime prevention. 
404 Ibid, Chipu case at para 12- 14. 
405 Ibid, Chipu case at para 23. 
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The applicants insisted on being present during the appeal application to determine the 
facts of the case and to disclose to the public whether the rejected asylum seeker 
would be excluded from refugee status based on the listed grounds in Article 4 of the 
Refugees Act. The media companies based their arguments on Article 16 (a) and (b) 
which states that 'everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes 
freedom of the press and other media and freedom to receive or impart information or 
ideas.' 
Privacy vs freedom of expression 
In weighing the rights to privacy against freedom of expression the Constitutional 
Court referred to its previous decisions stating that 'the relevant factors in the 
limitation clause in Article 36 of the Constitution should be viewed on a case by case 
basis applying proportionality between the limitation on the right in question and its 
purpose as well as the existence of less restrictive means to achieve this purpose.406 
The applicants relied on the 'open justice' argument stating that fair trials must be 
open to the public as it promoted accountability of the courts and administration of 
justice.407 This argument should not have been given any weight at all because the 
appeal proceedings before the Refugee Appeal Board cannot be equated to criminal 
appeals. Refugee appeals are not part of the criminal justice system, instead, they are 
administrative in nature and given the sensitivities of refugee claims the proceedings 
are held under the 'closed court principle' which is a necessity due to privacy and 
security that is intrinsically linked to the well-founded grounds forming the basis of 
406 Ibid, Chipu case. at 47-48. 
407 Ibid, Chipu case at 53. 
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refugee claims. 
The applicants argued further that the information they sought was not of a personal 
nature and they wanted access to information relating the rejected asylum seeker's 
international criminal activity and his corrupt behaviour.408 This goes against data 
protection because the rejected asylum seeker's name is in itself personal data and 
facts revealed during refugee appeals are of a personal nature and it includes all 
personal circumstances surrounding the refugee claim which is very sensitive. For a 
refugee claim to be warranted it should be based on both objective facts related to the 
safety of the asylum seeker and others in the country of origin and prevention of 
reprisals as well as subjective facts presented by the asylum seeker about his personal 
circumstances and that of his family, relatives and friends in the country of origin. 
It should be noted that the purpose of refugee appeal proceedings is not to prosecute 
criminal activity and corruption. It is only to hear the appeal on the grounds for refusal 
and it does not go into the evidentiary proof of guilt that would be present in a 
criminal trial. Allowing media to be present in the appeal proceedings could result in 
prosecution by media for migrants and this is at odds with the South African justice 
system, which is adversarial, as opposed to a jury system. The Constitutional Court 
pointed out that 'a person who has committed a crime against humanity or who has 
committed a crime against peace is disqualified from receiving refugee status,409 yet 
40~ Ibid, Chipu case at 56. 
409 See Article 4 (l)(a) of the Refugees Act. 
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the confidentiality limitation in Article 21 ( 5) is so wide that it continues to apply even 
after a refugee application has been rejected on the grounds that the person has 
committed a crime against peace or a crime against humanity. It also questioned the 
purpose for keeping the person's information confidential after the application has 
been rejected on the exclusionary grounds.' 410 The answer to this question lies in the 
integrity of the asylum process and the fear of other asylum seekers that their 
information will be made public if their refugee claims are rejected. This is relevant to 
the question of confidentiality and the Constitutional Court unfortunately failed to 
appreciate the impact on the refugee community. 
Comparative jurisprudence on refugee protection 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the custodian of the 
1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, states that: 'Confidentiality in asylum 
procedures is particularly important because of the vulnerable situation in which 
refugees and asylum seekers find themselves. For example, unauthorized disclosure of 
personal data to third parties in the country of origin or elsewhere could inhibit an 
asylum seeker from fully explaining his or her case, or even from making a claim for 
refugee status; endanger any relatives or associates of the asylum seeker remaining in 
the country of origin; endanger the asylum seeker in the event of his or her return to 
the country of origin; and cause the asylum seeker to become a refugee sur place (i.e. 
even if the persons were not refugees when they left the country of origin they may 
become refugees due to the circumstances that may arise during their absence in the 
410 Op cit note 399, Chipu case at 57. 
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country of origin). Hence, while an asylum seeker has a duty to assist the examiner to 
the full in establishing the facts of his or her case, the examiner is not ordinarily 
entitled to disclose the asylum seeker's personal data to a third party.411 
UNHCR goes further to confirm that the need to respect confidentiality, as recognised 
by UNHCR's Executive Committee in Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII) (1997), applies to 
all stages of the asylum procedure, including if and when an application for refugee 
status is rejected because the international Data Protection Principles require that an 
individual consent to the sharing of his or her personal data with a third party unless 
there is an overriding interest at stake, either of the individual concerned, or of another 
individual or of society at large. Circumstances in which consent is not required are an 
exception, in which case disclosure must be necessary, in accordance with law, and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.412 
Constitutional court finding 
The Constitutional Court duly recognized that the limitation to freedom of information 
serves the purpose of protecting the integrity of the asylum system and of providing 
asylum applicants with protection against disclosure of the fact that they have applied 
for asylum and the information in their asylum applications, however, the 
411 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2003) 'Comments on the Source Country 
Information Systems of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development' at 4-5. 
412 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 'Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum 
Procedures), Global Consultations on International Protection' Third Track - Executive Committee 
Meetings, EC/GC/0 1112, 31 May 200 I. 
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Constitutional Court found that there was a least restrictive means of limiting the 
freedom of expression than the blanket confidentiality statutory provision which is to 
allow a discretion to lift the confidentiality in certain situations.413 To this end, the 
Constitutional Court raise the question concerning 'the purpose of the limitation 
achieved in a case where the person who, after arriving in South Africa, discloses 
publicly, maybe in a press conference, the reasons why he fled his country of origin 
and other information that is relevant to the asylum application? If the applicants in 
the present case wanted their journalists to attend the asylum appeal hearing of that 
person before the Appeal Board, why should section 21(5) preclude the applicants' 
journalists from attending that person's hearing and reporting on it?' The 
Constitutional Court found that in such a case there is no purpose served by the 
limitation and the limitation cannot be justified.414 This scenario, however, depends if 
the person consents to unlimited disclosure because the principle of consent as 
outlined in data protection legal instruments does not allow for blanket consent, it has 
to be limited to a specified purpose of the particular media press conference. Thus, the 
consent of the person cannot be applied to the appeal procedures itself, unless explicit 
consent is provided for this purpose. In addition, and more importantly, the provision 
of consent is not sufficient because the 'do no harm' principle should be taken into 
account in refugee cases, in particular the potential harm resulting from the public 
disclosure that could be imposed on the family, relatives or friends of the asylum 
seeker in the country of origin. The right to life is the core and fundamental right 
necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights and the importance of threat to life and 
safety is a paramount consideration for the State's obligation exercised through the 
413 Op cit note 399, Chipu case at para 58. 
414 Ibid, Chipu case at 59. 
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Refugee Appeal Board. 
Unfortunately the Court gave little weight to the respondents' reliance on UNHCR's 
pronouncements, stating further that it would appear that exceptions in the 1951 
Refugee Convention would be allowed on national security grounds.415 It should be 
noted that the issue before the Constitutional Court did not concern a balance between 
the statutory obligation of confidentiality and the public security; instead, it was 
freedom of expression based on public interest grounds that the Court had to weigh in 
the balancing test. Moreover, it is not warranted to apply the exception in the 1951 
Refugee Convention on national security grounds to public interest arguments, which 
in itself is generally much broader, and in this case, it is limited to freedom of 
expression which is unrelated to the intention behind the exception in the 1951 
Refugee Convention. 
Discretion on disclosure in asylum cases 
The Constitutional Court incorrectly relied on the applicants' arguments putting 
forward eight countries to demonstrate an international norm that allows for discretion 
to be applied when considering confidentiality of asylum procedures. While it could 
be argued that the Court was merely looking at comparative law, the applicants' 
arguments intended to establish that an international norm existed. Arguably, the laws 
cited constituted mere examples of countries that impose discretion in the law and just 
415 Ibid, Chipu case at 65-70. 
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because the respondents did not quote evidence to the contrary, does not provide 
sufficient grounds to warrant the incorrect assumption that the practice of eight 
countries constitute an international norm. When it comes to refugee cases, the 
UNCHR is the custodian of the 1951 Refugee Convention and signatory States are 
bound to follow UNHCR's interpretation of the language in the Convention. If a 
sample of national refugee laws fall short of meeting strict confidentiality as an 
absolute requirement, this does not mean it creates an international standard. The 
Constitutional Court also turned to the Extradition Act 67 of 1962 in South Africa 
stating that no confidentiality is required and therefore confidentiality in the Refugees 
Act should be flexible, however, the Extradition Act falls within the ambit of criminal 
court procedures and this differs from administrative refugee appeal procedures. The 
former focuses on criminal prosecutions, while the latter focuses on the State 
obligations under humanitarian and human rights law. 
Safety is a paramount consideration 
The Court could not appreciate 'why the integrity of the asylum system and the safety 
of the asylum applicants and their families and friends would be threatened by the 
publication of information in an asylum application that would not tend to disclose the 
identities of the asylum applicant, his family and friends' and further stated that 
'obviously in considering a request for access the Appeal Board all relevant factors 
including, whether or not prohibiting the publication of information that does not tend 
to reveal the identity of the asylum applicant or his or her family and friends would not 
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be a sufficient protection should be considered.' 416 This is not so obvious and it cannot 
be assumed that this is indeed a consideration. In fact a discretion to reveal the 
identities and personal circumstances of the refugee claim would not be sufficient 
protection as it could result in real harm to the asylum seeker and others and it could 
also be a deterrent to other asylum seekers providing full information for the proper 
determination of refugee claims. The Court compared a number of different national 
laws that give a discretion to presiding officers to allow a person to attend court 
proceedings.417 As mentioned above, the proceedings are different with refugee cases 
and the threat to life and safety are key considerations and this makes the Refugees 
Act different. 
Court order 
For reasons related to the separation of powers, the Court only made a temporary 
order, but it nonetheless put forward criteria for how the Refugees Act should be 
amended. The court order resulted in a temporary reading-in of words to create a 
discretionary power while the Legislature amends the Refugees Act, but the criteria for 
determining whether confidentiality should be lifted is based entirely on freedom of 
information arguments put forward by the applicants.418 The court order states as 
follows: 'It is declared that section 21(5) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 is 
inconsistent with section 16(1 )(a) and (b) of the Constitution to the extent that it 
precludes members of the public or the media from attending proceedings of the 
416 Ibid, Chipu case at para 92. 
417 Ibid, Chipu case at para 86 - 91. 
418 Ibid, Chipu case at para 86-91. 
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Refugee Appeal Board in all cases and fails to confer a discretion upon the Refugee 
Appeal Board to allow the public and media access to its proceedings in an appropriate 
case [ ... ]. Section 21(5) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 is to be read as providing as 
follows: "The confidentiality of asylum applications and the information contained 
therein must be ensured at all times, except that the Refugee Appeal Board may, on 
application and on conditions it deems fit, allow any person or the media to attend or 
report on its hearing if (a) the asylum seeker gives consent; or the Refugee Appeal 
Board concludes that it is in the public interest to allow any person or the media to 
attend or report on its hearing, after taking into account all relevant factors including 
(i) the interests of the asylum seeker in retaining confidentiality; (ii) the need to protect 
the integrity of the asylum process; (iii) the need to protect the identity and dignity of 
the asylum seeker; (iv) whether the information is already in the public domain; (v) the 
likely impact of the disclosure on the fairness of the proceedings and the rights of the 
asylum seeker; and (v) whether allowing any person or the media access to its 
proceedings or allowing the media to report thereon would pose a credible risk to the 
life or safety of the asylum seeker or of his or her family, friends or associates."'419 
Unfortunately the Court gave the temporary order in consideration of arguments 
relating to the rejected asylum seeker in question and without giving due consideration 
to the impact on other refugee cases that would be affected in the interim. The Court 
also reads-in language which goes much further than examples quoted in the eight 
jurisdictions where discretion is allowed. In those cases it refers to allowing one 
person being exceptionally allowed access and does not make explicit reference to the 
419 Ibid, Chipu case at para 115. 
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media making an application. The intention behind such discretion does not 
necessarily relate to public interest of freedom of information as the Court seems to 
assume. In addition, Parliament would have to do a thorough analysis of other foreign 
jurisdictions to determine whether or not it is an international norm to lift 
confidentiality to allow media access with interventions from the public including the 
UNHCR, Lawyers for Human Rights and other agencies involved in protecting the 
rights and interests of refugees. 
Missed opportunity to develop the law on data protection 
The Constitutional Court had a unique opportunity to pronounce, once again, on data 
protection but did not go far enough. While it recognized the issue of confidentiality, 
which is a core data protection principle, it did not take into account how allowing 
discretion to lift confidentiality could impact on future asylum claims and potentially 
jeopardize life and safety of asylum seekers and their families and relatives. The 
temporary order relates to the case in question but it has far reaching implications. 
While legislation on this is left to Parliament, this temporary order will apply in the 
interim, and legislators could take years to amend the law as an appropriate analysis 
and thorough research is required before changing the law which could potentially 
harm the lives of asylum seekers, their families and relatives, and threaten the integrity 
of the asylum process. 
Unfortunately in this case insufficient weight was given to the potential harm that 
could result from public disclosure, a reality experienced by asylum seekers and 
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refugees even beyond their refugee status determination hearing. The Court was 
conservative in its finding and thus the gaps in the law remained. This turns the 
discussion to whether the recently enacted Protection of Information Act takes the law 
further and remedies existing gaps. 
5.3 Protection of Personal Information Act 
As seen above, the Constitutional Court was conservative in its findings in the NM 
case and failed to expand the common law and in the Chipu case it failed to fully 
recognize the sensitivities surrounding confidentiality of refugee cases and the 
potential harm and threat to life of asylum seekers that could result from its interim 
court order. This section examines whether the recent Protection of Information Act 
of2013 covers the current gaps in the law. 
Project 124 on data protection 
Substantive work has gone into the South African Law Commission Project 124, 
which resulted in the promulgation of the Protection of Personal Information Bill 
published in August 2009.420 The details of Project 124 have been discussed above in 
part and do not require repetition, save to say, that the Report on the Protection of 
Personal Information and Privacy provides a very good overview and insight into the 
420 Protection of Personal Information Bill, Government Gazette No. 32495 of 14 August 2009 [B 9-
2009] <http://www.pmg.org.za/files/bills/090825b9-09.pdf> 
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current legal framework on data protection at the international level and in Europe.421 
One lacking aspect though, is the issue of migration, which is nowhere featured in any 
of the discussion papers. It is unclear why this was absent from the table. Silence on 
this issue, does not however, necessarily mean that it does not accommodate migrants 
or that it conflicts with existing rights afforded to migrants including refugees in the 
country. 
In researching the various comments made by refugee and migrant rights actors, no 
concerns were raised during the consultations. Lawyers for Human Rights, a rights-
based law centre, indicated during informal interviews that the Bill can be interpreted 
to apply to migrants as well and therefore they found no need to voice any major 
concerns. It would, for example, ensure adequate protection for the collection of 
biometric data as introduced into the Refugee Amendment Act of 2011 and this could 
help to expedite the issuance of refugee permits.422 
The law on data protection 
The Protection of Personal Information Act atms to provide a legal basis for the 
collection and processmg of personal data, give legal force to Data Protection 
Principles, provide protection against unauthorized disclosure by private and public 
bodies, and regulate its application to ensure conformity with the EU Directive. It 
421 South African Law Reform Commission Project 124 (2009) 'Privacy and Data Protection Report' 
Pretoria, South African Law Commission. 
422 Informal interview with Ramjathan-Keogh, Kaajal, Head Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme, 
Lawyers for Human Rights conducted in Johannesburg. 
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serve as the overarching legal instrument on the protection of personal data for both 
private and public sectors by giving effect to the core Data Protection Principles that 
have evolved over time in various jurisdictions around the world. It establishes 
minimum requirements for processing personal data, provides for the establishment of 
an Information Protection Regulator (which is the equivalent of a Data Protection 
Supervisory Body in Europe), outlines procedures for issuing codes of conduct and 
regulates the flow of personal information across the borders of South Africa. 
Other relevant legislation in South Africa, that exists to date, include the Electoral Act 
of 1998, the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000, and the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act of 2002, as well as the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information 
Act of 2002. The Promotion of Access to Information Act only covers access to 
information; it does not extend to the collection and processing of personal 
information. This has been a gap from the outset, but as stated in chapter 4 above it 
was foreseen that a separate law on information privacy would eventually follow. The 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act provides a regulatory legal 
framework for processing electronic records and puts forward a list of data protection 
principles along the lines of the commonly accepted principles at international level. 
However, the principles are not mandatory, instead the language in the Act is tentative 
and businesses have an option to apply the principles to consumers. The principles 
therefore lack legal force. The Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act prohibits surveillance of all personal 
communications, but this Act has a narrow focus and does not cover other aspects of 
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the right to information privacy/data protection. As outlined by Currie and Klaaren, 
the Promotion of Personal Information Act should be read together with existing 
legislation because addressing the gaps and making amendments to existing laws were 
foreseen during the development of this new law that aims to be all-encompassing.423 
Analyzing the Protection of Persona/Information Act 
In line with the international trend, the Protection of Personal Information Act adopts 
the twin goals of ensuring protection of the right to data protection and facilitating the 
free flow of personal data across borders as outlined in the EU Directive. However, it 
is tailored specific to the South African context. The preamble expressly recognizes 
the constitutional right to privacy and affirms that it includes the right to protection 
against the unlawful collection, retention, dissemination and use of personal 
information. The latter part gives effect to a statutory right to the protection of 
personal information and the language in the first part confirms case law findings that 
the constitutional right to privacy includes this right to data protection. 
Nature of the Act 
The Act is a hybrid law that draws extensively on the EU Directive, but also on the 
1980 Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the 2005 Asia-Pacific 
423 lain Currie, lain and Klaaren, Jonathan (2011) 'Evaluating the Information Bills: A Briefing Paper 
on the Protection of Information Bill.' 
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Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework. Its hybrid nature was confirmed 
during the Parliament debates where it was described as a hybrid legislation that 
incorporates both human rights while providing for economic expediencies.424 To this 
end, it follows the EU Directive focusing on the commonly accepted Data Protection 
Principles and the transborder flow of personal data, but also draws on the 1980 
OECD Guidelines and APEC Privacy Framework focusing on the economic value of 
data exchange. 
The Protection of Personal Information Act, like its parent in Europe, is a 'framework 
law: instead of stipulating in casuistic fashion detailed provisions for regulating the 
processing of personal information, the 'Information Protection Principles' are instead 
rather diffusely formulated general rules for such processing. Specific allowance is 
made for the subsequent development of more detailed regulatory norms as the need 
arises. '425 The principle-based approach with a concentration on the spirit of the law is 
in accordance with international instruments. Currie says the main reason for this 
approach is to avoid circumvention of the law that is further enhanced by allowing for 
Codes of Conduct and other sector-specific legislation, some of which already exists, 
for example PAIA, the Protection of State Information Bill, the National Credit Act, 
424 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) 'Protection of Personal Information Bill; Constitution I 7th 
Amendment Bill: briefing; UN Security Council proclamations in respect of entities involved with 
terrorist activities' Recent Meetings for NCOP Security and Constitutional Development, 15 November 
2012 <http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20 121114-department-justice-and-constitutional-development-
protection-state-in> 
425 Currie, lain (20 1 0) 'The Protection of Personal Information Act and Its Impact on Freedom of 
Information' at 6 <http://www .opendemocracy .org.za/wp-content/up1oads/20 1 0/1 0/The-Protection-of-
Personal-Information-Act-and-its-Impact-on-Freedom-of-Information-by-Iain-Currie.pdf> 
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the Consumer Protection Act and the National Health Act.426 In addition, to bring 
South African in line with other jurisdictions, another benefit of the law is the 
potential to enhance investment from outside the country, as this will in tum, create 
much-needed jobs in South Africa. 
State security exception 
Article 6 provides for exclusions amongst others for 'processing personal data by or 
on behalf of the State if it is for reasons of State security, including activities that are 
aimed at assisting in the identification of the financing of terrorist and related 
activities, defense or public safety.' The State security exception seems broad, but it is 
similar in language to the exceptions in the EU Directive and the specific laws on data 
protection in other jurisdictions. It should be noted that it is not an open-ended 
exclusion, the drafters deliberately included a limitation with a proviso that the 
exclusionary grounds are 'to the extent that adequate safeguards have been established 
in specific legislation for the protection of such personal information or if it relates to 
processing personal data of children.' The condition goes further than the EU 
Directive, which only states that 'adequate legal safeguards' should be in place. In the 
Act it is explicitly stated that adequate safeguards must be clearly established and 
embedded in specific legislation, thereby narrowing the State security interests and 
requiring legal justifications and safeguards to be enacted in legislation for the 
limitation to the right to data protection before the derogation can apply. 
426 Ibid, 'The Protection of Personal Information Act and Its Impact on Freedom of Information'. 
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Special consideration for children 
A special category is introduced in Article 35 for children, this is commendable when 
compared to laws in other jurisdictions, and demonstrates South Africa's commitment 
to acknowledging the vulnerable status of children. It is also in line with the European 
Commission's opinion in the EU data protection reform emphasizing that children 
deserve specific protection, as they may be less aware of risks, consequences, 
safeguards and rights in relation to the processing of personal data.427 
Stricter safeguards for sensitive personal data 
Like other laws, extra special safeguards are required for 'sensitive personal data' as it 
is called in other jurisdictions. The drafters called this 'special personal information' 
in Part B of the Act and it is based on the prohibitions in the EU Directive. The 
definition normally given for sensitive personal data in international data protection 
texts refers to 'data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs or trade union membership, and data concerning health or sexual 
life as well as data on offences, criminal convictions or security measures.428 This 
caters for personal data in refugee cases that require extra safeguards because well-
founded fear of persecution are based on these grounds as well as HIV I AIDS status on 
medical grounds as pointed out in the NM and Chipu cases above. The reason for 
treating certain types of personal data with extra precaution stems from the concern 
427 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions 'A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection in the European Union' COM (2010) 609 final 9, Brussels, 4 November 2010 
<http://ec.europa.el.J/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com _ 20 I 0 _ 609 _ en.pdf> 
at 6. 
428 Op cit note 158, Data Protection at !CPO-Interpol: Assessments, Issues and Outlook at 13. 
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that misuse of the personal information could have more severe consequences of 
impeding individual's rights, for example, discrimination can result from processing 
the special personal information and this can have long term and lasting negative 
effects on the individual concerned. 
Specific provision for biometric data 
Interestingly a further category of biometric data is introduced and this puts South 
Africa at the forefront of the issue as many existing laws in other jurisdictions are 
currently being amended to accommodate biometrics. For the purpose of the Act, 
biometrics is defined as 'a technique of personal identification that is based on 
physical characteristics, including fingerprinting, DNA analysis, retinal scanning and 
voice recognition.' The explicit reference to photographs is excluded in the Act, but 
this could be read into the general definition of personal data that identifies an 
individual. The inclusion of biometrics is quite progressive because the definition not 
only focuses on fingerprints which is the dominant biometric feature used for 
identifying individuals (along with photographs), but it takes account of the use of 
other types of biometric features which are rapidly expanding with the availability of 
advanced technology. Hosein and Nyst state that South Africa has one of the oldest 
biometric registration systems in the world stemming back to 1925 when the 
government collected fingerprints from non-white citizens for the purpose of racial 
registration.429 This raises the important question of identification systems that have 
the potential to be used for discriminatory and segregation purposes. Since the 
429 Hosein, Gus and Nyst, Carly (2013) Aiding Surveillance: An Exploration of How Development and 
Humanitarian Aid Initiatives are Enabling Surveillance in Developing Countries at 34. 
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definition of biometrics in the Act includes DNA analysis, from the pnvacy 
perspective, caution should be applied because DNA facilitating genetic profiling can 
assist in the creation of racial and ethnic profiling. 430 
The European Court of Human Rights in the case of S and Marper v United 
Kingdom, 431 made a distinction between the level of interference with the right to data 
protection in Article 8(1) of the EU Charter when taking and retaining DNA as 
opposed to taking and retaining fingerprints. The Court held that 'taking and retaining 
an individual's DNA was regarded as particularly intrusive, given the amount of 
genetic and health information it contains and the purposes for which such samples 
and related data could potentially be used, both now and at a future date. '432 It is 
therefore important that government entities and their outsourcing private companies 
using biometric systems do so within the limits of the law and without discriminatory 
motives. Due to the risks involved it is recommended that DNA be excluded from 
biometrics when using it for immigration purposes. 
According to Ramjathan-Keogh, Kaajal, Head Refugee and Migrant Rights 
Programme at Lawyers for Human Rights, 'the use of biometrics in migration 
management is better for refugees because it is tool to identify people and it allows for 
430 Ibid, Aiding Surveillance: An Exploration of How Development and Humanitarian Aid Initiatives are 
Enabling Surveillance in Developing Countries at 39. 
431 Sand Marper v 'united Kingdom, [2008] ECHR 158I. 
432 Ibid, Sand Marper v United Kingdom. 
215 
the issuance of documents. For example, during the xenophobic riots and attacks on 
migrants in 2008 refugee permits were lost and fingerprint verification would have 
been the easiest way to reissue refugee permits or to validate permits as refugees often 
lose their documents. Biometrics is also very useful for preventing asylum shopping 
and to curb fraudulent applications. From Lawyers for Human Rights perspective 
biometrics has more positive elements than negatives.' She further highlighted that the 
'nature of their work involves collecting sensitive information from refugees and 
migrants and that sometimes sharing personal data is inevitable. In the first 
consultation clients will a sign power of attorney at first level and if, for example, they 
refer a matter to UNHCR for assistance, the case file containing all sensitive and 
personal information would be transferred only upon instruction of the client and with 
their written consent. 
Respecting confidentiality 
In practice however confidentiality is not always respected, for example, there have 
been instances where asylum seeker and refugee clients were placed into witness 
protection programmes with limited access to their personal information and 
whereabouts, but despite being in witness protection the refugees were discovered and 
their whereabouts become known thereby jeopardizing their safety.' She attributes this 
to corruption and says Lawyers for Human Rights has to often balance corruption 
against the protection of asylum seekers' personal information and their safety. She is 
of the opinion that corruption has a significant role in balancing State interest and the 
rights of migrants. What is needed to increase individual protection and respect for 
individual lives, IS incentives and sanctions, as well as protection for 
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whistleblowers.433 The Protection of Personal Information Act does include sanctions 
and this could be extended to corruption if personal data is mishandled and if a case is 
made governmental officials who have access to personal information in witness 
protection programmes and take bribes to reveal information and whereabouts of 
refugees could be sanctioned through this Act. 
Practical protections are important, but legal protections are even more important to 
ensure accountability and to protect individuals' safety and kept their personal data 
confidential especially in very sensitive cases that require witness protection. 
Unfortunately in South Africa corruption poses a threat to privacy and the Act should 
allow enforcement of law with sanctions to adequately protect individual rights. 
Data collection for unspecified purposes 
Mariano, Bernardo, Regional Director of Southern Africa at the International 
Organization for Migration, questioned 'what is done with biometrics collected from 
asylum seekers that are not successful in their asylum applications and are migrants 
aware of what happens to their personal data? The South African government has a 
database that includes registration data of Zimbabweans seeking asylum as well as 
their biometrics and photographs. There is interest from the government to use the 
database to match fingerprints for criminal purpose. In addition, the government is 
trying to have better access on patient data to profile diseases. Profiling migrant data 
433 Informal interview with Ramjathan-Keogh, Kaajal, Head of Refugee and Migrant Rights 
Programme, Lawyers for Human Rights conducted in Johannesburg. 
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can be done based on disaggregated data by private and public hospitals, but there are 
attempts by the Ministry of Health to have access to the database. However, there are 
no parametres governing such access. A concern is that migrants are stigmatized for 
bringing diseases and this fuels xenophobia.' There is an argument to gain access to 
health data in the public interest, but this should not trump data protection safeguards 
that are needed and laws that should regulate how health data is handled. 
Lack of humanitarian clause 
The need for special provisions for children and biometrics has been called upon by 
the Working Party on Data Protection in Europe and South Africa is thus advanced in 
this area. The prohibition on processing special or sensitive personal data does not, 
however, make explicit reference to humanitarian grounds, which is also a gap in the 
current existing laws elsewhere. The need to include a humanitarian clause was raised 
by Amnesty International and UNHCR during the drafting of the UN Guidelines on 
data protection because collecting sensitive personal data is integral to the operations 
of international humanitarian aid workers and the prohibition would circumvent the 
goal of protecting the individuals and their rights.434 Therefore an exception to the 
prohibition on processing special personal information based on humanitarian grounds 
should have been clearly stated. Perhaps it can be read into Article 3 7 of the Act in 
that the Data Protection Supervisory Body has the discretion to grant exceptions to the 
Data Protection Principles, but this means that all national humanitarian agencies 
would have to go through the procedural step to apply for an exemption before it can 
434 Annexure to the·United Nations General Assembly 'Human Rights and Scientific and Technonogical 
Developments: Guidelines for the regulation of computerized personal data files' Report of the 
Secretary-General [A/44/606]24 October 1989 at 13. 
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process special or sensitive personal data. This does not seem feasible as humanitarian 
assistance is often in response to emergency situations. 
For South Africa it could relate to large influx of migrants who need assistance at 
border posts. Humanitarian situations involve not only international agencies, but also 
local agencies with mandates focused on humanitarian relief and in the scope of their 
functions all types of special categories of personal data may be needed for the 
purpose of providing protection or provision of food, medical treatment and safety, to 
name but a few. Article 27 (c) of the Act does refer to data processing that is necessary 
to comply with an obligation of international public law, but this does not address the 
issue because it applies to the State obligations under international law and does not 
necessarily cater for individuals or entities collecting special personal data as agents or 
that are de facto carrying out the international obligations of States in terms of their 
humanitarian work and neither for national NGOs doing humanitarian and protection 
work. An explicit reference to humanitarian reasons would have been advancement to 
the law. 
Accountability 
Ramjathan-Keogh, Kaajal, raised two concerning issues in the context of migrant and 
refugee assistance, in particular: 1) cell phone companies have personal data and 
provide or sell it to other companies without consent and it is used for profit without 
any recognition of the vulnerabilities of the people involved, and 2) there is an 
increase in soliciting credit history and trying to sell a product without consent or 
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knowledge of the person and using it for the profit of private companies. ' 435 Indeed, 
this is a concern and it is heightened when private companies take advantage of 
vulnerable groups. The Protection of Personal Information Act does cover these issues 
as it regulates handling of personal data by private companies and particularly requires 
consent of individuals before they can process their personal information for any 
purpose. 
Marketing and criminal behaviour 
Compared to other jurisdictions, there are additional sections on unsolicited marketing 
by electronic communications and detailed provisions on monitoring of criminal 
behaviour, these can be seen as additions to the law in light of the South African 
context and due to concerns currently being raised in the international community. 
Exemptions 
Article 37 of the Act allows for exemptions to be granted to specific Data Protection 
Principles by the appointed Data Protection Supervisory Authority for reasons of: 'a) 
public interests, provided it outweighs to a substantial degree, the interference with 
privacy of the data subject; orb) ifthere is a clear benefit to the data subject or a third 
party that outweighs, to a substantial degree, any interference with the privacy of the 
data subject or third party that could result from such processing.' To allow for such 
exceptions, certain conditions can be set by the Data Protection Supervisory Body for 
435 Interview with Ramjathan-Keogh, Kaajal Head Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme, Lawyers 
for Human Rights conducted in Johannesburg. 
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granting such exceptions. This illustrates that it is qualified exceptions and data 
protection is not simply overridden for the interests of the State. 
Data protection supervisory body 
Currie argues that the Promotion of Personal Information Act will not only interact 
with the Promotion of Access to Information Act, but it will also supplement it in a 
number of ways, with the intention of improving it particularly the fact that 'the 
freedom of information regime has been hamstrung by the absence of an accessible 
and affordable dispute-resolution mechanism and a specialized regulator with 
oversight powers. ' 436 Klaaren in his assessment of the avenues of the courts as a 
means to enforce the right to access to information notes that 'on the whole, the 
experience of P AlA in the court shows the hallmarks of specialist and niche litigation 
strategy, rather than being a tool of normal professional practice. ' 437 He goes further to 
question State reliance on a judicial enforcement model and concludes that effective 
implementation of the right of access to information can most effectively be 
complemented and supplemented by the appointment of Supervisory Body and 
supplementing codes of conduct.438 
436 Op cit note 425, 'The Protection of Personal Information Act and Its Impact on Freedom of 
Information' at 7. 
437 Klaaren, Jonathan (2010) 'PAIA Though the Courts: Case Law and Important Developments in 
PAIA Litigation 2005-2009' (Open Democracy Advice Centre) School of Law, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
<http://www. wi ts.ac .za/files/rescO 5a 7 6 f83 bb24 34ab05 da4464 78 8c0e6. pdf> 
438 Ibid, 'PAIA Though the Courts: Case Law and Important Developments in PAIA Litigation 2005-
2009' at 9. 
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The introduction of the Information Regulatory Body as seen in chapter 5 of the Act 
seeks to vest responsibility in a Supervisory Body for application and enforcement of 
the rights and obligations outlined in the Act, for developing codes of conduct and 
guidelines, and most importantly, for taking up dual role of being the Information 
Regulatory Body for the P AlA to cure its defect. According to the EU Working Party 
on Data Protection, an 'effective data protection system has three components: 1) 
compliance with the rules must be ensured by making data subjects and controllers 
aware of their rights and duties and by the presence of effective sanctions for breach of 
the rules; 2) individuals must be able to enforce their rights rapidly and effectively and 
without prohibitive cost by approaching an independent institution; and 3) individuals 
must be able to obtain appropriate redress for breach of the rules, including 
compensation, by recourse to a system of independent adjudication or arbitration.439 
The Protection of Personal Information Act seems to meet this standard and would be 
considered as a law that is 'adequate' by the European Data Protection Authority who 
is responsible for assessing the standards of laws outside Europe. Currie and Allan 
argue further that even if these standards are met, an effective data protection system 
requires an independent Data Protection Authority as seen in Europe emphasizing its 
independence. 
The responsibilities of the Authority include an oversight function; powers to monitor, 
investigate, and intervene; the capacity to engage in legal proceedings and the 
439 Op cit note 15, 'Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an 
Information Protection Regulator' with reference to the European Commission Working Party on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 'Working Document: Transfers 
of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 2 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive' 
(1998) ('Working Document 12') at 7 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/ 1998/wp 12 _en. pdf> 
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discretion to make decision and relief subject to judicial appea1.440 The EU model 
places emphasis on enforceable data protection rights, and as seen in the failings of 
PIAl, a statutory rights regime will be ineffective if there is no adequate, effective and 
enforceable rights mechanism.441 
The introduction of a Data Protection Authority will kill two birds with one stone as it 
can serve to enforce both the right to access to information and the right to data 
protection. This will not only cure the defect in the PIAl, but it will also result in an 
Authority that can resolve disputes without having to resort to courts at first 
instance.442 In addition, the Article 18 provides that responsible parties are required to 
notify the data subjects of their processing activities and Article 22 provide for 
mandatory notification to Regulator in the event security compromises. This 
introduction of notification into the law is much in line with the latest proposed 
amendments made to the EU Directive, as introduced in the EU data protection 
reform, which aims to ensure that private and public entities are proactive in ensuring 
compliance with their data protection obligations.443 Countries with traditions of data 
protection laws, such as Australia, are also amending their laws to include mandatory 
data breach notification provisions for agencies and organisations that are regulated by 
the law. 
440 Ibid, 'Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an Information 
Protection Regulator' at 573. 
441 Ibid 'Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an Information 
Protection Regulator' at 578. 
442 Ibid, 'Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an Information 
Protection Regulator' at 564. 
443 See chapter 3.2 above for a discussion on the EU data protection reform. 
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Room for improvement 
The German law IS often hailed as the most successful national laws on data 
protection. Waldo et al, as well as, Flaherty confirm this, the latter says in his 
comparative analysis of data protection laws in five countries that the German 
'advisory model' is indeed an effective one to replicate.444 Interestingly Germany was 
the first country to have a specific law on data protection and this stems from its 
background where the State used trojan ways to spy on the movement of people and 
infringe upon their rights. South African is analogous in its former 'generations of 
egregious violations of privacy that seeped into public administration'445 and which 
resulted in laws that disrespected individual rights at the expense of broad State 
interests. We can therefore learn from the German legislation on data protection that 
aimed to address violations into the private space. 
One particular factor to note for future amendments to the South African law is the 
'legal obligation imposed on entities to appoint internal privacy officers and its 
encouragement of the systematic application of data protection that is integrated into 
the design and development of information systems and infrastructure. ' 446 The 
German law also has effective oversight and enforcement mechanisms that can be 
attributed to a number of factors: namely, the countries commitment and dedication to 
data protection, the legalistic nature of administrative and corporate cultures, and the 
444 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 382- 397. See also 
Flaherty, David H {1989) Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States at 17, 19 and 183. 
445 See the judgment of Sachs J in Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South A rica 1998 ( 4) 
SA 1127(CC)at316. 
446 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 382. 
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strong persuasive personalities who have been appointed as data protection 
commissions while serving in the role of the Data Protection Authority. The German 
law does have flaws in that the Authority does not have the power to issue legally 
binding orders and the mass rules are so dense that it is unwieldy and creates 
confusion, and there is also an issue with lack of transparency during 
. 1 . 447 Imp ementatlon. 
Chapter 9 Institution 
The new South African law introduces the Data Protection Authority which could be 
established as a Chapter 9 institution under the 1996 South African Constitution to 
regulate two pieces of legislation with vested powers to make binding decisions while 
serving as a recourse before resorting to court litigation. Currie and Allan agree that a 
Chapter 9 institution is the best option because the Data Protection Authority has to 
fall manifestly outside the government it order to meet its objectives of being 
independent and impartial in exercising its functions without fear, favour or prejudice 
as clearly envisaged by the language in the Act.448 Section 181 (2) the Constitution 
states that such institutions 'are independent and subject only to the Constitution and 
the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice.' De Vos explains that Chapter 9 
institutions were envisaged to be credible independent watchdogs 'steeped in the 
447 Ibid, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 397. 
448 Op cit note 15 'Enforcing Access to Information and Privacy Rights: Evaluating Proposals for an 
Information Protection Regulator' at 575. 
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disciplining paradigm of human rights' and supporting constitutional democracy.449 If 
established as a Chapter 9 institution, the Data Protection Authority would be well 
placed to serve as a guardian and protect the constitutional right to privacy including 
data protection. 
Strengthening individual rights 
As an insight to the current debate in Europe, it should be noted that the European 
model falls short because of its initial focus on cross border data sharing and there is 
now a move toward elevating the focus to the rights of the individuals. In addition, the 
transposition of the EU Directive into national laws has been slow and even though 
most countries have laws in place now, there are low levels of enforcement, 
compliance and awareness at the national levels, and the Data Protection Authorities 
lack resources that have an impact on effective implementation of the laws.450 South 
Africa should ensure that there is sufficient awareness of the rights and obligations 
embedded in the Protection of Personal Information Act and the appointed Data 
Protection Authority needs have muscle to be actively involved in raising awareness, 
ensuring redress and assisting in legal enforcement of the statutory delict which the 
law creates for individuals facing infringement of their right to data protection. Even 
though the Information Regulatory Body for South Africa will serve as a first recourse 
and alternative to resorting to courts,451 the courts still have a role to play in civil suits 
449 DeVos, Pierre (2012) 'Balancing Independence and Accountability: The Role of Chapter 9 
Institutions in South Africa's constitutional democracy' at 160-161. 
450 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 398. 
451 Op cit note 423, 'Evaluating the Information Bills: A briefing paper on the Protection oflnforrnation 
Bill' at 24-26. 
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and in interpreting the law and enforcing data protection as legal right. In terms of 
chapter 10 of the Act, the courts may issue warrants if there are reasonable grounds of 
interference or suspected offences in violations of the Act, there are provisions for 
civil remedies for aggrieved data subjects whether or not there is intent or negligence, 
court review and appeal procedures are available, and criminal sanctions will apply if 
an enforcement order issued by the Data Protection Authority is not upheld. 
Harm test and remedies 
In their evaluation of the controversial Protection of State Information Bill, Currie and 
Klaaren point to a harm test that would significantly improve the draft.452 They argue 
that this would put the focus on the harm and consequences caused rather than the act 
of disclosure itself, and in so doing, it moves away from the requirement of mens rea 
(criminal intent). This harm test is evident in the Protection of Personal Information 
Act as it caters for circumstances of negligence and allows recourse in the law, a 
defect that existed in the South African law as illustrated in NM case. While 
negligence is not a requirement for accountability in terms of Act, language such as 
'reasonable foresight' is echoed throughout, and this provides for a remedy in the 
event that personal data is processed negligently. For migrants this is an important 
element because they often have little recourse to remedies and proving intent is a high 
standard. The common law only covers wrongful acts of invasions to privacy and the 
constitutional right to privacy does not explicitly mention data protection even though 
it is read-in by courts in their interpretation of the right to privacy. Currie explains that 
452 Ibid, 'Evaluating the Information Bills: A briefing paper on the Protection of Information Bill' at 24. 
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the Protection of Personal Information Act creates a statutory delict of 'interference 
with the protection of the personal information of a data subject' .453 Thus, the 
concomitant right of data protection and data subjects having the right not to have their 
data protection rights infringed upon is a statutory right that stems from the 
constitutional right to privacy. 
Remedy for breach is embedded in the law in that any breach of the guaranteed data 
protection principles or breach of provision in a code of conduct can be reported 
through a complaints mechanism to the Data Protection Regulator who is responsible 
for 'intervening to enforce the right against the alleged interference, investigating the 
complaint, deciding to take no action (if, inter alia, the complaint is moot, trivial or 
frivolous) or institute a civil action for damages arising from an interference with the 
protection of the personal information of a data subject. '454 The Act therefore provides 
for civil remedies and civil sanctions to the aggrieved data subject whether or not there 
is intent or negligence established. This cures the defect in the common law that only 
allows for remedies if wrongful acts are established as was evident in the NM case. 
Ongoing international reform to improve the domestic law 
A criticism the Protection of Personal Information Act lies in the timing of its 
enactment. It comes into force at a time when the global trendsetters on data protection 
453 Op cit note 425, 'The Protection of Personal Information Act and Its Impact on Freedom of 
Information' at 7. 
454 Ibid, 'The Protection of Personal Information Act and Its Impact on Freedom oflnformation' at 7. 
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are revising their laws to enhance protection of individual rights. As such, it does not 
benefit from the debates that will enhance those laws and keep South Africa at the 
forefront of the issue. However, given the long delay in creating this specific law, the 
urgency to enact it goes without saying. The Legislature can always amend the law in 
line with latest international developments. In the meantime South Africa can benefit 
from a comprehensive law giving force to a data protection right and since it is 
adequate for European standards it can be useful in trade relations. The Act explicitly 
refers to factors for the Information Regulatory Body to consider in ensuring that any 
public interest in allowing the processing of personal data outweighs the public 
interest in adhering to the Data Protection Principles, this includes considering any 
general developing international guidelines relevant to the better protection of 
individual privacy. This is an important factor in the balancing test that allows for 
imposing stricter conditions on data collection and transfer in keeping with the latest 
developments at the international level. 
Trans border flow of data 
The adequacy of other laws for the transfer of personal data outside South Africa 
differs to the EU model in that the criteria for adequacy is not embedded in the law. 
Instead, it merely refers to the recipient of the data transfer having to be subject to a 
law, binding code of conduct or contract. In the EU Directive the contractual 
obligations is an alternative to adequate laws being in place. This intention of the 
drafters to keep it less burdensome for neighbouring States can be linked to the South 
African context and the region where data protection laws are for the most part absent. 
The contractual obligations imposed on neighbouring States in the absence of data 
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protection laws is a good starting point, but the law falls short in setting the threshold 
higher. It should have included the requirement of adequate laws in the Act, and in the 
interim where countries do not have laws in place, the contractual obligations with 
adequate safeguards embedded in the contractual terms could have sufficed. The 
alternative of codes seems to stem of the OECD and APEC models adopted by the 
United States focusing on industry legislation. This however creates piecemeal 
protection that is, in itself, not sufficient to encourage the development of legislation 
in neighbouring States. The requirement of adequate laws is the way in which the EU 
has managed to drive the expansion of data protection laws globally. This is a missed 
opportunity because South Africa could similarly be the driver in SADC and the 
African Union for the development of data protection laws in the region. The 
alternative is for South Africa to still act as the lead and encourage neighbours to place 
data protection on their legislative agendas through other political forums such as 
Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA). 
South Africa to lead the region 
MIDSA is a forum for training and policy debate focusing on issues relating to 
migration management in the region. Crush et al (2005) are of the opinion that the 
absorption of MIDSA into SADC as an eventuality will have important impacts on 
harmonizing national laws on migration and data collection systems, and this could in 
tum, promote more effective migration management in the region.455 This is indeed an 
455 Crush, Jonathan; Vincent Williams, Vincent and Peberdy, Sally (2005) 'Migration in Southern 
Africa' A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission 
on International Migration at 24 
<http://lastradainternational.org/?main=documentation&document=2276> 
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aspiring goal and with the complex issues of mixed migration currently on the MID SA 
agenda, this objective may be realized in the not too distant future. 
The Protection of Personal Information Act is indeed advancing the law in South 
Africa, and since data protection legislation has been almost 20 years in the making, 
its enactment is long overdue. It will create a data protection culture in the country 
and it will serve as guidance for other African states, in particular for member states of 
the African Union or SADC that could benefit from the transborder flow of 
information provided adequate level of laws are in place in the region. The Act fills 
the big gap in the law in that it recognizes data protection as a right, but it does not 
explicitly recognize it as a human right. This is now left open to interpretation and the 
Data Protection Regulator as the avenue of first recourse, and later to the courts, who 
will have to interpret this with reference to the background papers where reference is 
made to a human rights approach. A human rights based approach helps to draw the 
line between balancing State interests and individual rights and clarity in the text of 
the law would have been in line with the recent EU data protection reform where the 
emphasis is placed on individual rights to balance the scale with extensive powers of 
the State and private entities. 
As mentioned above, the South African law in some respects goes further than the EU 
model and this, coupled with the criteria for balancing rights as extrapolated from 
constitutional jurisprudence can be usefully and appropriately applied to the areas at 
the intersection between data protection and migration, and this could in tum, assist in 
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the development of comprehensive migration policies which incorporate data 
protection safeguards. 
Since migration by its very nature involves cross border movements, the South 
African law cannot be reviewed in isolation. South African laws have to be examined 
within the regional context because national laws on migration and protection of 
migrant data will inevitably have an impact on neighbouring countries. The next 
chapter will assess whether any legal instruments exist at the SADC level and whether 
the European Union model can be replicated in this region, which is significantly 
different to the European context. 
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SIX 
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6. REPLICATING THE EUROPEAN MODEL IN THE SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
The legal concept of privacy rights is rooted in European and North American 
philosophy of individual rights. When it comes to Africa the legal regimes on data 
protection are the least developed in the world and this is probably due to the lack of 
the right to privacy in the African Union legal instruments. This chapter looks at 
concept of Ubuntu and the complexities of migration in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)456 and questions whether the European model on 
data protection can be replicated in this region. 
6.1 Concept of Ubuntu 
'Ubuntu is the fundamental belief that 'motho ke motho ba batho ba bangwe/ umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu', which literally translated means, a person can only be a person 
h h h ,457 t roug ot ers. 
In the African context, the right to privacy is not included in any of the African Union 
456 The 14 member states are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
457 Mokgoro J Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa Paper delivered at the first Colloquium Constitution 
and Law, Potchefstroom, 31 October 1997. 
<http://www .a j o I. info/ index. php/pe lj! artie le/view File/ 4 3 56 7/2 7 090> 
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regional legal instruments on human rights, with the exception of the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Rights (1999). In particular Article 10 states 
that: 'No child shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family home 
or correspondence, or to the attacks its honour and reputation, provided that the 
parents or legal guardians shall have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over 
the conduct of their children. The child has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.' This is interesting because the right to privacy 
does not find expression in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights ( 1981 ), 
yet it is explicit in the 1999 law on the rights of the child. Is it possible that the drafters 
came to a later realization of the importance of the right to privacy 18 years later when 
drafting the regional law on the rights of the child? This seems to be a reasonable 
explanation because the legal regime on human rights in African predates the 
enactment of the law on the rights of the child and there are also national laws in 
Africa that recognize the right to privacy as a human right afforded to all individuals 
without limiting it to persons under the age of 18 years. 
Questioning absence of privacy in regional law 
Olinger, Britz and Oliver attribute the omission of the right to privacy in the African 
Charter to communal considerations that have to be taken into account in the context 
of Africa and argue that community interests override individual protection needs 
because of the concept of Ubuntu. 458 Although the concept of Ubuntu is a South 
African transformative concept, as explained by former constitutional judge Mokgoro, 
458 Olinger, H N; Britz J J and Olivier M S (2005) 'Western Privacy and Ubuntu- Influences in the 
Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill' at 9- 10 <http://mo.co.za/open/ubuntu.pdt> 
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it can be seen as an African philosophy of life. Cornell and Muvungu argue further 
that Ubuntu goes beyond its roots in Africa, it is an ethical notion, and when translated 
into the law it helps to expand the thinking of a modem legal system's commitment to 
universality and is important in any human rights discourse.459 
Bygrave agrees with Oliver et al that communal considerations that override the 
individual is the reason for the underdevelopment of a data privacy regime in the 
African Charter of Human Rights, and therefore unlike all the other major 
international human rights documents, it does not have provisions on the right to 
privacy.460 This reasoning is not without criticism. While communal considerations are 
integral to African philosophy, it is not necessarily the reason for the lack of privacy 
laws and the title of the Charter illustrates otherwise stating that the intension is to 
cover both individual (human) and collective (peoples') rights. Bygrave does argue 
convincingly that there is a need to argument advancement of data privacy provisions 
while respecting cultural values. Rotenberg similarly notes that the only exception in 
main fundamental human rights instruments is the African Charter for Human Rights 
because other instruments, namely the UDHR (Article 12), ICCPR (Article 17), 
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers (Article 14), and the Convention on 
Protection of the Child (Article 16), together with the main regional human rights 
treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR - Article 8), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 
459 Cornell, Drucilla and Muvungu, Nyoko ed.s Ubuntu and Law: African Ideals and Post-Apartheid 
Jurisprudence at xi and as explained in the synopsis. 
460 Bygrave, Lee A (2004) 'Privacy Protection in a Global Context-A Comparative Overview' at 319-
348 and 328. 
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11 ), the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (Article 18(b) - (c), as well 
Article V of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) 
1 . . h . h 461 express y recogmze pnvacy as a uman ng t. 
Olinger et al argue that the Ubuntu culture requires consent of the family, clan and 
community; and this requirement goes against the notion of autonomous individual 
decisions, which is central to the right to privacy. They argue further that Ubuntu does 
not focus on the individual, as privacy does in western cultures. Instead, the emphasis 
is on the society as a communal entity and this contradicts the concept of 
individualism.462 These arguments seem to be refuted by the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR) which states that 'everyone has 
inalienable rights as members of the human family,' an underlying principle to which 
the 1981 African Charter prescribes. 
Philosophy of Ubuntu finds legal expression 
Former justice Mokgoro, described Ubuntu as a 'philosophy of life, which in its most 
fundamental sense represents personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality; a 
metaphor that describes group solidarity [ ... ] and where the fundamental belief is that 
a person can only be a person through others[ ... ]. Thus, its value has also been viewed 
as a basis for a morality of co-operation, compassion, communalism and concern for 
461 Op cit note 122, 'Data Protection Day: Joint High Level Meeting From European to International 
Standards on Data Protection Remarks of Marc Rotenberg.' 
462 Op cit note 458, 'Western Privacy and Ubuntu- Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill' at 
9- 21. See also Wikipedia for further philosophical discussion on in African and Western cultures 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubuntu_(philosophy)> 
237 
the interests of the collective respect for the dignity of personhood, all the time 
emphasizing the virtues of that dignity in social relationships and practices. ' 463 Indeed, 
Ubuntu focuses on the community, but the individual is an integral part of the 
community. As concluded by Olinger et al, while there initially appears to be tension 
between the concept of Ubuntu and the right to privacy, the two can co-exist in a 
modem society464 as seen in the South African context. 
Ubuntu is a fundamental value that is echoed throughout the Constitution of South 
Africa Act, 1996 (Final Constitution), which is the supreme law of the land. Although 
Ubuntu it is not expressly mentioned, as was the case in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution), it nevertheless 
remains fundamental and as stated inS v Makwanyane 'it is a concept which stresses 
humanness, social justice and fairness [ ... ] and it runs like a golden thread along 
cultural lines. '465 The right to privacy as guaranteed under Article 14 of the Final 
Constitution includes the protection of dignity and this is in harmony with Ubuntu.466 
In addition, the adoption of the United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of 
Computerized Personal Data Files (1990) by the member states of the United Nations 
underlines the reality that data protection stemming from the right to privacy is not 
. 1 'fi ld' . 467 s1mp y a 1rst wor western notion. 
463 Op cit 457, 'Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa' 
464 Op cit note 458, 'Western Privacy and Ubuntu- Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill' at 
9-14. 
465 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA (CC) at 307-308. 
466 Op cit note 458, 'Western Privacy and Ubuntu- Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill' at 
14. 
467 Op cit note 3, Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age at 382. 
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the absence of the right to privacy in the 1981 
African Charter remains and when looking at the entire African continent there are 
currently only a very few countries in this region with comprehensive data protection 
laws in force. One can only speculate as to why no binding law on the right to privacy 
exists for all individuals in the supranational laws in Africa. Perhaps children's rights 
call for an explicit reference to the right to privacy given their lack of legal capacity to 
consent? The more plausible argument is that the absence of the right to privacy of all 
individuals is an oversight. The recognition of the right to privacy in the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Rights (1999) is likely due to the 
growing concerns with privacy issues post the enactment of the African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights (1981). As it stands now, the right to privacy is afforded 
to children and not to adults. This creates a legal lacuna that needs to be addressed by 
legislators at the African Union level. Nevertheless, the fundamental right to privacy is 
guaranteed at the international level by Article 12 of the UDHR and this applies in the 
absence of regional law and States are bound to respect the right to privacy that should 
be afforded to everyone without discrimination and must ensure non-arbitrary 
interference with this right. 
Data protection in the African context 
Flaherty rightfully points out that 'there still does not exist a truly global convention or 
treaty dealing specifically with data protection although interest in the right of privacy 
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increased in the 1960s and 1970s with the advent of information technology.468 
Nowadays, data protection considerations and concerns are increasing even more due 
to advanced technology being employed in Africa by governments and also by 
migrants themselves when moving across borders either voluntarily or as a result of 
forced migration. Consequently, there are a number of countries with draft data 
protection laws in the making. According to deliberations at the South African 
Parliament held on the Protection of Personal Information Act, the process of 
developing a Convention on the Protection of Personal Information was in discussion 
at the African Union.469 This, however, seems to have fallen off the priority table 
given other pressing problems in Africa. In the interim, some African countries have 
already started developing adequate legislation to enable transfer of personal data to 
facilitate data exchange with Europe, and other countries are following suit.470 
In the modern information age, data protection is a reality that cannot go without 
legislative regulation. If data protection were to be recognized as a legal right at the 
international level, it could lead to the development of regional law in Africa 
recognizing not only the right to privacy but also the right to data protection as dual 
and complementary rights. One suggestion would be to include this in one text 
recognizing both as fundamental rights and to append it to the African Charter on 
468 Flaherty, David H (1989) Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of 
Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States at 22. 
469 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) 'Protection of Personal Information Bill: Departmental and 
Public representations' See PMG website for compilation of parliamentary debates 
<http://www. pmg.org.za> 
47° For example, two existing national laws can be found in Senegal (Law No. 2008-12 of 2008 on the 
Protection of Personal Data) and in Morocco (Law No. 09-08 Relative to the Protection of Individuals 
with regards to their Personal Data of 2009). See also op cit note 13 for a global overview of existing 
and emerging national laws on data protection. 
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Human Rights. 
6.2 Regional Specific Dynamics 
SADC is one of the most prominent sub-regional organizations in Africa with its 
member states committed to addressing regional integration and the free movement of 
people.471 However, it is yet to meet the objective of enforcing a Protocol on the Free 
Movement of Persons in SADC much akin to the free Schengan visa regime in 
Europe. 
Regional law on migration 
In the absence of a regional legal instrument, cross border migration in the region is 
governed by national migration and refugee legislation, but the focus is on law 
enforcement, border control and exclusion.472 In a survey conducted by the Southern 
African Migration Project (SAMP) it was emphasized that although there is longevity 
of SADC as a formal institution, there is an absence of any sense of solidarity between 
countries in the SADC and this has direct implications for migration issues. The 
survey concluded that an urgent challenge confronting the SADC and migration 
agencies in the region is to develop strategies and build a real sense of regional 
471 Martens, Jonathan (2007) 'Moving Freely on the African Continent: The Experiences of ECOWAS 
and SADC with Free Movement Protocols' at 349 in International Migration Law: Developing 
Paradigms and Key Challenges. 
472 Op cit note 455, 'Migration in Southern Africa' at 24. 
241 
consciousness amongst citizens and policymakers.473 One of the main challenges in 
reaching consensus on migration issues is the economic disparity between SADC 
member states and the fear of being the hub for migrants that would create further 
challenges to citizens having to compete for scarce jobs. Equally important are their 
diverse historical backgrounds, development levels and political structures that often 
cause them to drift apart while attempting to realise the goal of facilitating the 
movement of persons within the SADC region.474 
Xenophobia hampers regional harmonization 
Landau, Loren, Director of Forced Migration and Refugees Studies Programme, 
indicated in the informal interview that 'even though South African politicians 
publically commit to regional integration and show nominal recognition of South 
Africa's humanitarian obligations, such objectives and responsibilities are not 
reflected in legal or administrative mechanisms on immigration. '475 This he attributes 
to xenophobia attitudes that have an impact on the notion of free movement of people, 
free trade and freedom to choose residence in any country in the region.476 The media 
is a key contributor to xenophobia because it perpetuates negative stereotypes of 
473 Pendleton, Wade 'Migration and Xenophobia in South Africa <http://www.iiz-
dvv .de/index.php?article _id=725&clang= I> 
474 Oucho, John 0 (2007) 'Migration in Southern Africa: Migration Management Initiatives for SADC 
Member States' Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper !57 
<http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=29462> 
475 Informal interview with Landau, Loren, Director of Forced Migration and Refugees Studies 
Programme, conducted in Johannesburg. 
476 One example of xenophobia referred to in a political comment is as follows: 'South Africa is faced 
with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom 
to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country' is evidence 
hereof. See: Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, 'After Amnesty: The Future of Foreign Migrants in South Africa,' 
Keynote Address, 20 June 1997. 
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migrants and often to do not distinguish between migrants travelling lawfully and 
those travelling irregularly, nor do they highlight the complexities of mixed migration 
and the special needs of vulnerable migrants. 
Data protection issues are a reality in the region 
Mayet, Achmed, Senior Litigator at Legal Aid South Africa, indicated in the informal 
interview that 'during the xenophobic attacks in 2008, the Legal Aid collaborated with 
Lawyers for Human Rights, Red Cross in South Africa, Human Rights Commission 
and UNHCR to look at criminal aspects of related charges brought against migrants 
for being illegally in the country and charges brought against individuals for violence 
and disturbing the peace. The aim of the joint collaboration was to check how many 
people came to Legal Aid for assistance to determine if claims were really based on 
h b. ,477 xenop o 1a. 
Mayet emphasized that cross sharing of information between the different law clinics 
and agencies called for heightened confidentiality. While confidentiality is dealt with 
by client-attorney privilege, to protect themselves against civil claims if they disclose 
information without consent in contravention of client confidentiality, necessary 
safeguards are put in place by the law clinics to allow sharing of files for the purpose 
of assisting clients. In the xenophobia case they had a large number of clients, and as a 
477 Informal interview with Mayet, Achmed, Senior Litigator at Legal Aid South Africa conducted in 
Johannesburg. 
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consequence, they operated under 'Chinese Walls' 478 to ensure confidentiality when 
lawyers represented more than one client. This was needed to prevent conflict of 
interest and also to ensure that the personal details of migrants were kept strictly 
confidential given the potential harm that could be inflicted on migrants if their 
personal data became known to the public. 
Migration viewed positively 
The UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, in his world migration address said that 'we 
are seeing austerity measures that discriminate against migrant workers, xenophobic 
rhetoric that encourages violence against irregular migrants, and proposed immigration 
laws that allow the police to profile migrants with impunity, but with economic 
downturns it is worth remembering that whole sectors of the economy depend on 
migrant workers and migrant entrepreneurs help to create jobs. '479 Crush et al correctly 
state that policies in SADC that focus on anti-immigration do not take account of the 
realities of globalization, the skills market and local economic development needs.480 
Indeed, if countries in the region where more proactive in developing national policies 
that attract economic immigrants, it could help with economic growth and 
employment opportunities in their own countries. As recommended by the World 
Migration report, migration needs to be viewed positively,481 otherwise if it is viewed 
478 The creation of a 'Chinese Wall' is an information barrier implemented within a firm organization to 
prevent exchanges of information that could cause conflicts of interest. See Wikipedia for further detail 
<http:/ /en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese _wall> 
479 Ki-moon, Ban 'Secretary-General's Message for 2012 on International Migrants Day18 December' 
<http://www. un. org/ en/ events/m igrantsday /20 12/sgmessage. shtml> 
480 Op cit note 455, 'Migration in Southern Africa' at 12. 
481 See op cit note 8 and note II, The World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Well-Being and 
Development. 
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as a threat rather than an opportunity the market for those facilitating irregular 
migration will remain and flourish. 
Irregular migration 
The lack of a legal regime does have a link to the increase in the number of irregular 
movements across borders because migrants will continue to turn to unlawful methods 
for economic and survival reasons, and this in turn, fuels the trade in forgery of travel 
documents, police corruption and increase in exploitation of trafficked persons.482 
Migration has increased throughout the SADC in recent years. Crush et al say this is 
'due in part to the end of Apartheid in South Africa, the integration of South Africa 
into the region's linkages to the global economy, increased rural and urban poverty 
and unemployment, the impact of HIV I AIDS, as well as a history of forced migration 
and the mass relocation of people. ' 483 While the numbers of migrants travelling 
irregularly have increased in the region, this is not unique to the region; States are 
facing this same challenge in all regions of the world. 
Rights based approach 
Ngandwe rightfully points out that 'States have to adopt a rights based approach to 
migration and refugee laws and policies. Comprehensive approaches to irregular 
migration, beyond treating it as a law and order issue, are needed to address its root 
482 Op cit note 455, 'Migration in Southern Africa' at 13. 
483 Ibid, 'Migration in Southern Africa' at 30. 
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causes, and to protect the basic human rights of workers with irregular status in line 
with international norms.' Moreover, 'once domestic laws and policies are in harmony 
with international law, there will be synergy in legislation and policy at national level 
and on an international plane.484 Indeed in their efforts to manage migration 
comprehensively and effectively, SADC should be mindful of the mixed flows of 
people making their way to the tip of Africa. Vulnerable migrant groups such as 
refugees, trafficked persons and unaccompanied migrant children often also travel 
without the requisite travel documentation, yet they require States to exercise their 
obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law to protect them. A 
regional response to mixed migration can assist SADC member states to meet their 
international law obligations and at the same time they can create regional strategies 
and laws to address migration more comprehensively and this incudes data protection. 
Trafficked persons 
According to Martens, Jonathan, Senior Specialist on human trafficking issues at the 
International Organization for Migration, 'since trafficked persons are often exploited 
by sophisticated criminal networks, the need for data protection is paramount. This is 
because criminal groups have the capacity to carry out retributive action against 
victims of trafficking and their families and relatives back horne. In addition, victims 
of trafficking are also vulnerable to stigmatization and ostracization on account of the 
484 Ngandwe, Phazha Jimmy (2013) 'The Paradox of Migration and the Interests of the Atomistic 
Nation-States: The Southern African Perspective' at 444- 445. 
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exploitation suffered. '485 The absence of an internationally binding law on data 
protection has resulted is an array of different national data protection laws. While 
some laws require non-disclosure of personal data, others do not, and this can result in 
serious risks and endanger trafficked persons and their families. For example, access 
to bank details of family members could result in individuals being kept as ransom 
because they are a good target and reprisal against the trafficked person is a common 
technique used by traffickers. The need for strict data protection safeguards are 
heightened with the potential threat to life and when weighing the principle of 
confidentiality with the need to access personal data to investigate trafficking crimes, 
the 'do no harm' principle which is central to victim assistance will always trump any 
third party interest. 
Regional discourse 
At the UNHCR Regional Conference on Refugee Protection and International 
Migration: Mixed Movements and Irregular Migration from East Africa and the Great 
Lakes to Southern African held in 2011, the following vulnerable groups amongst 
others travelling in mixed migratory flows where highlighted to ensure that 
immigration officers at borders take account of their special needs; 1) Women: 
identification of 'women-at-risk' through pre-screening is essential because they need 
separate sleeping and washing arrangements in reception centres, as well as the 
presence of appropriate female staff who are also involved in conducting interviews 
relating to their travel experience; 2) Trafficked persons: special procedures are needed 
485 Informal interview with Martens, Jonathan, Migrant Assistance Specialist at the International 
Organization for Migration conducted in Geneva. 
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to identify potential victims of trafficking to ensure they are separated from traffickers 
and to prevent traffickers and smugglers from accessing reception centres; and 
assistance is needed to receive asylum seekers and in preparing asylum claims; 3) 
Victims of torture or trauma: availability of basic medical facilities and psychological 
support is important, and specific assistance with asylum applications or other 
procedures are needed; 'Children, particularly unaccompanied and separated migrant 
children require the appointment of guardians, systematic determination of their best 
interest, assistance with access to asylum procedures and preparation of their asylum 
1 0 d 1 0 d 0 486 c aim, an a tematlve accommo at10n arrangements. 
Children 
UNCHR states that the 'best interests of the child' principle requires 'comprehensive 
child protection systems comprised of laws, policies and procedures designed to 
prevent and respond effectively to child abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence. '487 
Under the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child ( CRC) all children, regardless 
of their nationality, enjoy inalienable human rights. This is echoed in the cardinal 
principles of the 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
Children are by their nature vulnerable because they lack legal capacity and are 
dependent on the support of parents to look out for their best interests. During the 
migration process, and more increasingly in mixed migration, there is inevitably 
significant numbers of minors who are unaccompanied and they are even more 
486 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 'Regional Conference on Refugee 
Protection and International Migration: Mixed Movements and Irregular Migration from East Africa 
and the Great Lakes to Southern African' Dares Salaam, Tanzania, 6-7 September 2011, Summary 
Report at 30-33 <http://www.unhcr.org/4d7f7ef7ll.pdf> 
487 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2008) 'UNCHR Guidelines on Determining the 
Best Interests oft he Child' at 17. 
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vulnerable because they lack the support of their parents to help them deal with 
traumatic experiences. 
In South Africa, for example, unaccompanied migrant children sometimes face further 
difficulties as they continue without support structures, often find it difficult to access 
Refugee Reception Offices and as a result remain in the rural border areas without 
documentation where they are vulnerable to arrest and deportation.488 Unaccompanied 
migrant children require the State to appoint legal guardians who can best serve their 
interests. Even though the unaccompanied migrant children who are under 18 years of 
age will not have the legal capacity to consent to the collection and processing of their 
personal data, their views and opinions should be taken into account depending on the 
age and level of maturity. The consent of their legal guardians should therefore be 
supplemented by the consent of the child in cases where the child is capable of 
appreciating and understanding the reasons why personal data is collected and for 
what reasons it will be used. This is in line with Article 12 of the CRC and it will also 
help to identify and address the specific needs of the unaccompanied migrant children. 
Asylum seekers and refugees 
All SADC member states have ratified or comply with the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and the more inclusive 1969 OAU Convention Governing 
488 Makhema, Mpho (2009) 'Social Protection for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC)' Discussion Paper No. 0906, Social Protection and Labour, the 
World Bank' at 34 < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-
Discussion-papers/Labor-Market-DP/0906.pdf> 
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the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The countries in the regiOn, 
however, follow different refugee models and South Africa is only the country that 
does not require refugees to live in designated areas or camps.489 Despite claims based 
on well-founded fears of persecution, asylum seekers and refugees often face 
secondary vicitimization and are blamed for crime and unemployment in the region, 
sometimes this is warranted but not always. While some refugees may indeed be 
involved in crime, statistics has not proven that migrants are a contributing factor to 
the level of crime rates. 
Often refugees are well skilled and qualified professionals in their country of origin, 
but they are willing to take low skilled jobs to survive in their new destination country. 
If SADC were to focus on making use of their profession skills it could create 
sustainable economic growth and job development for lower skilled labourers. What is 
needed is a data collection exercise that would result in an analysis of the varied skills 
available among the refugee communities. Such data collection exercises would have 
to be undertaken in accordance with a common research methodology while upholding 
adequate data protection standards. 
Data protection for SADC 
Since SADC mms to develop regional strategies on common Issues experienced 
amongst member states, it would also be useful for SADC to develop a data protection 
regional law for the region that would facilitate data exchange using the same set of 
489 Op cit note 455, 'Migration in Southern Africa' at 26-26. 
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data protection standards to ensure uniformity. Collecting personal data of migrants is 
crucial to understanding the root causes of migration and it is necessary to analyze the 
needs of vulnerable migrants arriving at border posts. As acknowledged by Roos, 
when collecting personal data every aspect of the data processing cycle is influenced, 
including the manner of its collection, periods of retention, further processing, 
disclosure to third parties and any further issues that may apply to the processing of 
the information.490 Having a data protection regulatory framework in place is 
therefore important. Principle 2 of the UNHCR 10 Point Plan on Mixed Migration and 
Refugee Protection focuses on data collection and analysis with the view to capacitate 
States to build protection-sensitive systems when managing migration.491 Accordingly, 
data collection methods, analysis and the exchange of personal data in this context 
need to be in accordance with internationally accepted data protection standards. It is, 
thus, important to mobilize SADC to put data protection on the policy, legislative, and 
political agenda and to incorporate it into comprehensive responses to migration 
management. 
Data protection concerns 
The different groups of migrants travelling in mixed migratory flows lie at the 
intersection between migration and international protection and they accurately reflect 
the diversity of migrants as it includes unaccompanied migrant children, victims of 
human trafficking and human smuggling, disabled persons, asylum seekers and 
490 Roos, Anneliese (2008)'Data Protection' in Information and Communications Technology Law at 
374. 
491 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2011) 'Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: 
The 10-Point Plan in Action' at 53< at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d9430ea2.html> 
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refugees, stranded migrants and economic migrants.492 As stated in chapter 2, 
unwanted and inappropriate disclosure of personal data, particularly sensitive data 
could result in a wide range of risks. This is exacerbated for vulnerable migrant groups 
such of asylum seekers and refugees, unaccompanied migrant children and trafficked 
persons who have specific needs when travelling alongside other migrants in mixed 
migratory routes. 
With mixed migration there are inevitably significant numbers of irregular migrants, 
some who travel for economic reasons, but also others who fall in the blurred line of 
travelling irregularly and who are at the same time fleeing persecution and human 
rights abuses. A law enforcement approach to migration management and border 
control is therefore not sufficient as it obscures the States' international human rights 
obligations in protecting the specific needs and vulnerabilities of certain migrants. To 
address this, the World Migration Report encourages States to approach migration 
management in a coherent and systematic manner by taking account of the human 
rights and the positive aspects of migration. 
Human rights and data exchange 
Notwithstanding the challenges of adopting regional laws to facilitate free movement, 
SADC has made significant progress on the issue of trade.493 The dominance of the 
492 Ibid, 'Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: The 10-Point Plan in Action.' 
493 Op cit note 471, 'Moving Freely on the African Continent: The Experiences ofECOWAS and SADC 
with Free Movement Protocols' at 360. 
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European Union in international trade and politics has led to the development of data 
protection laws beyond the borders in Europe.494 Similarly if SADC recognizes the 
transborder flow of data as a trade issue, it may have better success in developing and 
implementing a regional law on data protection. Data protection laws have the twin 
goal of protecting human rights and facilitating data exchange across borders. The 
latter has economic value and has been used as a trade incentive by Europe to 
encourage the development of national laws on data protection even outside Europe. 
South Africa is currently increasing its presence on the continent and many South 
African companies have offices throughout the region that would engage in business 
requiring the handling of personal data of South Africans across borders. Cross border 
trade by business and movement of people and goods through informal trade is evident 
in SADC even if such movements are not regulated. Oucho says that 'regional 
incentives and integration is meaningless unless people within a defined area of 
jurisdiction share experiences, exchange interests and move with their products across 
borders.495 Research into this area is needed and the data collection requires a common 
data protection standard to ensure that personal data and the outcome of qualitative 
data can be easily analysed and mutually beneficial to countries in the region. Data 
protection is, thus, an important issue for trade relations and SADC can replicate a 
regional data protection framework law as implemented in Europe in order to address 
the complexities in the region. 
494 Op cite note 458, 'Western Privacy and Ubuntu- Influences in the Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill' at 
9-13 
495 Op cit note 474, 'Migration in Southern Africa: Migration Management Initiatives for SADC 
Member States.' 
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South Africa lead by example 
South Africa could spearhead discussions between SADC member states based on its 
recently enacted data protection law. However, it would have to explicitly highlight 
and ensure that migration issues are also present to ensure that the interface between 
data protection and migration is covered. According to Bernardo, Mariano, Regional 
Director of Southern Africa at the International Organization for Migration, South 
Africa cannot drive this initiative on its own; instead support from three or more 
middle-income countries is needed. A factor to consider is that South Africa is one of 
the countries in the region that has the technological capacity to integrate biometric 
systems and process data electronically. Other countries are still processing personal 
data manually, thus, compatibility needs to be taken into account when developing 
laws to facilitate data exchange in the region. 
Mixed migration affects many countries including Tanzania, Mozamibique, Namibia, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, but each country has an individual state-by-state 
response to address the challenges.496 Migration involves cross border movements, and 
questions relating to migrants' rights and how to assist specific needs of vulnerable 
migrants, require cooperation and coordination to approach migration in a holistic 
manner. In addition, the impact of national law on migration goes beyond borders and 
this has an impact on other countries in the region. 
496 Informal interview with Mariano, Bernardo, Regional Director of Southern Africa, at the 
International Organization for Migration conducted in Geneva while on travel duty. 
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Replicating the European data protection model 
Similar to other migration issues, data protection of the personal information of 
migrants should be addressed from a regional perspective. Of significance is the fact 
that data protection was already discussed by SADC in 2012 within the context of the 
workshop on the harmonization of a draft cyber-security legal framework which aimed 
at reviewing, amending and validating regional model laws on electronic transactions, 
protection of personal data and the fight against cybercrime.497 This initiative was 
instigated by Botswana who was in the process of developing a national law on cyber 
security and had concerns with the change to paperless information gathering methods 
which gave rise to stealing of personal identities and hacking of databases. 
Draft model data protection law 
During the workshop delegates drafted three draft Harmonized Model Laws including 
a Draft Harmonized Data Protection Law. The draft model law was validated by the 
SADC delegates and critical next steps where discussed. 498 Even though this model 
draft law would not have any binding force and would merely be seen as a best 
practice model, it could be seen as the stepping stone to develop a regional law on data 
protection. Since South Africa has recently enacted its data protection legislation, it 
would be perfectly placed to reopen discussions and emphasize the need to create a 
497 
'Media Statement on the Validation Workshop of SADC Harmonized Cyber Security Legal 
Framework' held at the GICC in Gabrone from the 27'h February to 2nd March 2012 
<http:l/tis.sadc.int/files/1813/3232/7429/media _statement_ cyber _security_ version_ 2.pdf> 
498 Ibid, 'Media Statement on the Validation Workshop of SADC Harmonized Cyber Security Legal 
Framework' at 3. 
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binding regional instrument to govern data protection and to include necessary aspects 
of migration that are region-specific. The model law on data protection could then be 
attached as an annexure to the binding law to ensure harmonization in the region. 
Although the dynamics in Europe and SADC are different, the challenges surrounding 
migration and data protection are similar albeit complicated by the traditional lack of 
harmony amongst member states in SADC. The South African law is a good starting 
point because the approach taken by the drafters included tailoring the European 
model to best fit the South African context. This saves counties in the region from 
having to reinvent the wheel and start research initiatives from afresh. 
By drawing on the South African law, it could be used as a benchmark for developing 
a regional legal instrument. While a top down approach is usually better, in the 
absence of a legally binding instrument on data protection at the international level, 
laws can be developed from the bottom up and this could give States the opportunity 
to share experiences and collaborate in finding solutions to challenges arising in the 
area at the interface between data protection and migration. MIDSA and other 
international fora could be used to keep the momentum going, and this could in tum, 
assist the SADC block to reach consensus to strengthen privacy and data protection 
rights in this region. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to look at the intersection between migration and data 
protection. Specifically, to what extent should States be allowed to intrude into the 
private sphere of the individual migrant? Should advanced technology drive policy or 
should we rather adopt a cautionary approach and develop laws that are flexible in its 
reach? Where do migrants fall in the discussion when developing laws on data 
protection and is the current legal framework on data protection at national, regional 
and international level sufficient to address the rights of people on the move? 
The last decade has witnessed the increased use of advanced technology to manage 
large volumes of personal data and monitor migratory movements. Since migration 
law and policy tend to focus on border control as its main objective, the use of 
advanced technology within the migration context poses a real challenge to the human 
rights of people on the move. Migration management has gained political salience due 
to globalization, terrorism and irregular movements within and across borders. To 
ensure effective migration management, initiatives should not only cover deterring 
clandestine movements across borders and combating terrorism, but it should also 
cover protecting human rights at all stages of the migration cycle. This will help States 
to address migration more comprehensively. The security interests of States and the 
rights of individuals are not, and should not be mutually exclusive. While State 
sovereignty envisages the right to protect borders and to determine nationality, 
admission and conditions of stay and removal; once in the country States are obligated 
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by international law to protect respect and enforce human rights without any 
discrimination and regardless of whether the individual is travelling in a regular or 
irregular manner. 
A commonality between the two spheres of data protection and migration is that there 
currently exists no global overarching binding legal instrument, and as a result, the 
area at the interface between the two is in itself challenging. The rights of migrants are 
dispersed across different bodies of international law. Similarly, the regulation of data 
protection is only covered by the UN Guidelines, which has had little influence on 
State's actions due to its non-binding nature. The application of a human rights 
approach to both migration and data protection is essential to ensure that the exercise 
of State sovereignty is reasonably justified when it intrudes on individual rights. A 
human rights approach seeks to ensure that the exercise of State sovereignty is 
legitimate and proportional, and more importantly, that it has a justified reason 
embedded in the law to which States can be held accountable. 
Although some countries have specific data protection laws, government agencies and 
law enforcement authorities have been given significant exemptions to protect the 
interests of States. In other countries, laws have not kept up with advanced technology 
or they simply do not have specific data protection laws, leaving significant gaps. 
States are aware of their international obligations, but they need to go further, to 
establish adequate national legal regimes confirming the legal rights of individuals. 
States should acknowledge the risks associated with unwanted and inappropriate 
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disclosure of personal data, including endangering the safety and security of 
individuals because this is an inescapable reality in the migration context. The 
increased use of advanced technology, such as biometric systems, is indeed a means 
by which to manage borders and gather information to protect State security, but it 
should not be used at the expense of infringing the rights of individuals, particularly 
the right to privacy and data protection, human dignity, non-discrimination, free lawful 
movement and family unity. While biometrics should be used with caution, the 
technology itself can also enhance data protection and this aspect should not be 
neglected. This applies equally to the use of crisis mapping, when used as a tool in 
humanitarian interventions. As argued by Hornung, technology and privacy are 
intertwined because 'technology influences people's understanding of privacy, and 
people's understanding of privacy is a key factor in defining the direction of 
technological development. '499 A major concern is that technology often drives policy 
when the opposite is needed. Laws and policy imperatives should regulate the use of 
advanced technology. The recommended starting point is the promulgation and 
ratification of an international legal instrument that is binding on States and that 
recognizes the need to collect and process personal data, while ensuring adequate data 
protection safeguards. 
The right to data protection stems from the right to privacy, which is protected as a 
human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and this right is reiterated 
in international treaties such as the ICCPR. Even though the UDHR is soft law, it 
499 Op cit note 23, 'Regulating Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Seizing the Opportunity of the Future 
European Data Protection Framework.' 
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forms part of customary law, and this together with the international treaties creates 
positive obligations on the international community. This thesis argues that the right to 
privacy forms the basis for establishing a separate legal right to data protection which 
is needed due to the rapid growth of technology and the imbalance between the power 
of the State and the power of individuals to assert their rights. Privacy and data 
protection is, however, not without limitation and matters of public interest or 
legitimate government purposes may often override the scope of this protection. Core 
principles of data protection include confidentiality and consent and this is based on 
the notion that every individual has the right to choose when and to whom they wish to 
reveal their personal data. While there may be legitimate purposes for limiting 
individual rights, a big brother approach is not welcomed in the 21st century where 
democracy allows for the equality of all and separates the public from the private 
sphere. 
The information age has brought the rapid expansion of technology and this is being 
used to manage migration, often in the absence of any regulatory laws. Since 
technology will continue to advance in the coming years, a legally binding framework 
law on data protection is needed which is flexible enough to cater for future 
advancements in technology. The approach of having a framework law that allows for 
the creation of code specific rules to protect the right to data protection is the correct 
one. The provisions on sensitive data are most relevant to migrants because this is 
needed, for example, to issue travel documents or permits as a means by which to 
address the rights and needs of persons fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution and 
to determine the special needs of other vulnerable migrants such as migrants with 
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HIV/AIDS, trafficked persons and unaccompanied migrant children who often cross 
borders irregularly and usually live outside a regulatory framework. If the personal 
data of migrants are used inappropriately and disclosed without authorization it could 
result in wide range of risks ranging from discrimination to physical harm and loss of 
life. It is, thus, important to always properly balance the benefit of collecting personal 
data with the risk of unauthorized disclosure. 
The growing gap between the rapid increase in the use of advance technology and the 
lack of laws regulating data protection calls for immediate action by States. There is 
no need for a specific data protection law to cover migrants. The creation of a binding 
international treaty on data protection could broadly cover people on the move. States 
would have obligations to equally protect the rights of these individuals when 
engaging in the collection, processing and sharing of personal data for State purposes 
such as border control and terrorism. It would also help to ensure that there is indeed a 
balance between State interests and individual human rights with an emphasis on 
avoiding migrant profiling, discrimination and xenophobia. A data protection treaty 
would give rise to legally binding obligations requiring the enactment of national laws 
to give effect to the dual purpose of facilitating the use of advanced technology while 
equally ensuring that personal data is handled with due care and in accordance with 
acceptable data protection standards and human rights obligations. States, legislators 
and policy-makers should always bear in mind that any restriction to individual rights 
must not impair the essence of the right and that the relation between the right and the 
restriction, or between the principle and the exception, should not erase the right. 
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Principally, the laws authorizing restrictions must include precise criteria and the law 
itself has to establish the modalities under which rights may be restricted; otherwise it 
leaves unfettered discretion to those responsible for implementing and enforcing the 
law. The factors put forward by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism 
for determining whether intrusion into the privacy sphere is reasonable and justified 
are useful and may serve as a model in this area. These include: 'the type of record 
requested; the information it does or might contain; the potential harm in any 
subsequent non-consensual disclosure; the injury from disclosure to the relationship in 
which the record was generated; the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized 
disclosures; the degree of need for access; and whether there is an express statutory 
mandate or articulated public policy militating toward access for public interests 
reasons. '
500 
When weighing competing rights and interests, the nature of the right, the importance 
of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose, and the less restrictive means to achieve the purpose should 
be taken into account. Since there is no absolute standard for determining 
reasonableness and justifiability and there is no immutable standard of privacy 
expectation, this balancing test will depend on the circumstances to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.501 If individuals have to carry the burden of protecting their own 
privacy rights, then the law and regulation should assist individuals in asserting such 
500 See chapter 4.1 discussed earlier. 
501 See chapter 5 discussed earlier. 
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rights. This is because privacy is at an inherent disadvantage when decision-makers 
weigh privacy against other interests where the benefits of the State's interest appear 
to be more pressing. The onus is therefore on States to reduce this disadvantage by 
establishing formal mechanisms to advocate for the right to data protection, especially 
because rights on paper are often of little value if it is not respected and enforced. Data 
Protection Supervisory bodies can play this role as independent guardians of 
fundamental rights and freedoms with respect to the protection of personal data. As an 
interim mechanism before application to courts, Data Protection Supervisors can 
facilitate review and appeal procedures that are more easily accessible to individuals 
and less costly than court procedures. Such review and appeal procedures will also 
help to ensure due process and regulate the wide-ranging powers of police and 
intelligent agents using personal data gathered through surveillance for investigatory 
reasons. 
In South Africa the Protection of Personal Information Act is clear in its intent, it aims 
to regulate the collection and processing of personal data by the State and private 
bodies. Extensive academic research has guided the development of this law and the 
South African Law Commission has done a good job to eloquently describe the history 
of the right to data protection and to analyse existing laws in other jurisdictions in 
order to ensure that the South Africa's law is in line with the international trend. South 
African case law includes relevant factors for balancing the right to privacy with other 
constitutional guarantees and this is transferable to future cases involving data 
protection. Since personal data is easily accessible through the internet and social 
media, it has a cross-border dimension and the South African law cannot be seen in 
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isolation. If data protection were to be recognized as a legal right at the international 
level, it could also lead to the development of a regional law in Africa recognizing not 
only the right to privacy but also the right to data protection. One suggestion is to 
include the right to privacy and data protection into one legislative text recognizing 
both as human rights and to append it to the African Charter on Human Rights to give 
it the legal force it requires. Placing data protection on the legislative agenda at the 
African Union may, however, take time due to capacity and legitimacy problems a the 
African Union and because other urgent issues on the continent require attention. In 
the interim, the SADC could benefit from drawing on and replicating the European 
data protection model that will have to be tailored for the regional specific needs. A 
s a sub-regional organization that is already focused on migration issues, SADC has 
the potential to be instrumental in developing a comprehensive approach to migration 
strategies by including data protection in their discussions. It is true that SADC has 
had little muscle due the economic disparity and diverse political priorities between its 
member states. However, the increase in mixed migration flows in Southern Africa has 
placed the need for collaboration between member States back on the agenda. Recent 
discussions between some SADC member states include exploring regional solutions 
to address migration management and the protection of personal data of migrants 
could contribute to this discussion, particularly if the value of data protection is seen 
from the economic perspective. In any event, the application of the data protection law 
in South Africa will have to be examined within the regional context because it will 
inevitably have an impact on neighbouring countries. With the EU data protection 
reform there is a shift that tilts the scale from data sharing and cross border flow of 
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information to individuals having the right to have their personal data adequately 
protected. This human rights approach could be the starting point for African counties 
and it will help to advance democracies amidst economic and political challenges. It 
also has the potential to place the SADC block, which is rich in resources, as an equal 
player to Europe. The data protection law in South African has taken almost 20 years 
to find its shape, it is now finally enforced and South Africa should use this 
opportunity to open discussion with its neighbours in order to set a good standard data 
protection model for the region. 
It is equally important for States to look at the practical challenge of giving expression 
to human rights in the context of migration management. Mere legislation is not 
enough because human rights should be guaranteed de jure and de facto. Cooperation 
and training is essential and it should be seen as major tools in rethinking how best to 
address the complex issues that arise at the interface between data protection and 
migration. 'The factors driving migration are numerous and complex: many migrants 
migrate in search of greater opportunities to earn a better living, to live in a more 
agreeable environment or to join family or friends abroad. Of course, a significant 
number of migrants do not move of their own free will but are forced to do so -
refugees escaping persecution, for instance; people devastated by conflict or natural 
disaster; or victims of trafficking [ ... ] and the consequences of migration for the lives 
of individual migrants can easily be overlooked. [ ... ] Instead of being the passive 
subjects of enquiry, migrants should be given the opportunity to tell their stories. This 
emphasis on the experiential dimension[ ... ] could open the door to policymaking that 
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IS more attuned to human needs.502 The vmce of the migrant IS important m 
developing laws addressing the interface between data protection and migration. It will 
also help to ensure that laws are implementable which will, in tum, enhance the 
protection of the human rights of migrants. 
At the international level the increase of privacy concerns and data protection has led 
to the Madrid Resolution and the Joint Proposal for Setting International Standards 
on Privacy and Personal Data Protection. While the Draft Law received input from 
Data Protection Supervisors and privacy advocates around the world, its failure is 
simply due to the absence of the participation of States and policy makers. A 
comprehensive approach involving dialogue between all stakeholders from both the 
private and public sector is necessary to ensure global consensus and the Draft Law 
can lead the next step discussions. 
The German Chancellor alluded to having the global law take the form of a Protocol to 
be attached to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This 
approach would be similar to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime of 2000. One 
common critique of the Trafficking Protocol is that it falls short from the human rights 
perspective because it is viewed through the criminal lens by virtue of its attachment 
502 Op cit note 11, The World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Well-Being and Development at 
175. 
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to a cnme prevention international treaty.503 To cure a similar defect, the data 
protection law could supplement the ICCPR, which is a human rights treaty. 
Since the use of technology must be compliant with the prevailing norms and 
international standards governing the right to data protection, this thesis supports the 
view that data protection should have a firm legal basis to ensure that State interests do 
not overshadow individual rights. The ongoing public debate surrounding the use of 
advanced technology and the threat that it poses on individuals and democracies calls 
for an urgent need to develop a binding law on data protection to prevent identity theft, 
discriminatory migrant profiling, and continuous surveillance that disregard individual 
human rights. The importance of data protection must become a legislative priority at 
the international, regional and national level, lest we fall prey to invasions of privacy 
as demonstrated by the ongoing leaks made by Edward Snowden in the United States 
of America where the absence of legislation and regulation resulted in unwanted and 
secret disclosure under the guise of protecting people from terrorism which is now 
threatening global relations. 
The choice between the rights of individuals and the use of modem technology to 
protect State interests in managing migration creates a false dichotomy because 
technology and data protection can mutually exist. There is indeed a tension between 
State sovereignty, globalization, migration, and human rights; but they can be 
compatible if the exercise of States sovereignty is done in conjunction with the 
503 See for example, Danziger, Richard; Martens Jonathan and Guajardo, Mariela (2009) 'Human 
Trafficking and Migration Management at 261 - 298. 
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exercise of State obligations under international human rights and humanitarian laws if 
echoed in national laws protecting individual rights and equally ensuring that the 
objectives of States interests are fulfilled. It is understandable that drafters require 
time, but the societal needs today are far too great to lag behind and legislators need to 
act in haste to keep up with the growth in advanced technology that are impacting on 
existing individual rights. 
This thesis does not argue that States are unaware of their international obligations. 
Instead, it seeks to emphasize that States need to go further, to establish adequate legal 
regimes confirming the legal right to data protection in order to protect all nationals 
and migrants alike. Given the broad scope of the research further areas of research 
were identified as future topical issues. First, the volume of research material on 
privacy, data protection and migration as separate areas gave rise to interesting issues 
at their points of intersection, however, only limited issues could be covered in this 
thesis as the focus turned to the South African context. The topic of the research is 
relevant to the international community and more needs to be written from the global 
perspective as the law continues to develop. Second, while States have sovereignty to 
control borders, this right is sometimes outsourced to private entities who engage in 
cross border activities and become de facto state agents while not being subjected to 
the same obligations as de jure State agents. The question of whether States are 
responsible for de facto agents needs further discussion. It would, thus, be interesting 
to determine the extent to which the outsourcing of migration management is covered 
in the developing law on data protection at the international level. Third, in the 
absence of an internationally binding instrument on data protection, the policies and 
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codes of conduct in organizations working directly with migrants are disparate. 
International organizations often provide States with technical expertise on migration 
issues, which in tum, inform the development of national laws and policy. A detailed 
survey of these varying data protection standards used by international organizations 
would thus be useful, but most UN agencies are still in the process of developing their 
internal laws on data protection. This assessment can only take place once such laws 
are implemented and will have to be canvassed in another paper. 
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8. ATTACHMENTS: 
8.1 ANNEXURE A- INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
This thesis focuses on the balance between States interests and individual rights and 
looks specifically at the meeting point and challenges in the area at the interface 
between migration and data protection. Your expertise and experience would be very 
helpful to help draw the line to ensure that State interests do not overshadow 
individual rights. This interview is based on a semi-structured questions and the flow 
of the discussion will depend on your area of expertise. 
What categories of migrants are assisted by your organization and can you 
explain the types of assistance provided? 
Does your organization collect and process personal data of migrants either 
directly or indirectly? 
For what purpose(s) does your organization collect personal data and who are 
the actors/partners involved internally and externally? 
Are there any laws, policies, rules and procedures followed by your 
organization when collecting and processing the personal data of migrants for 
the purpose of your work and has your organization had any challenges in its 
implementation? 
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Are there any safeguards in place when handling personal data e.g. information 
storage and security around electronic and paper records and any conditions 
surrounding access to files in the office? 
Are migrants aware of the reasons for collecting and processing their personal 
data, how do you go about obtaining consent prior to collecting personal data, 
and have you had any challenges in this regard? 
Does your organization engage in risk assessments or have a procedure for 
identifying sensitive categories of personal data prior to collecting it from 
migrants and can you explain any partners that would require access to such 
data in order to assist the migrants? 
Do you have any experience in relation to requests by third party to access 
client information, and if so, which kinds of entities usually make such access 
requests? 
What are your opinions on the use of biometrics in migration management and 
do you foresee any implications on the human rights of migrants? 
Did you have any cases involving personal information access or infringements 
on privacy rights of your clients? 
Are you aware of any privacy issues of migrants arising out of the xenophobic 
attacks in South Africa? 
Has your organization been involved in mixed migration, privacy rights, or 
specific data protection issues? 
Where you/your organization engaged in comments made on the Protection of 
Personal Information Bill in South Africa? 
What are your views on the impact of the Protection of Personal Information 
Bill on the South African law and does it adequately cover migrant groups? 
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Do you think there is a need for special protections when it comes to certain 
types of sensitive personal data such as refugee status or HIV status? 
Are you aware of any laws in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) covering data protection and are member states keen to discuss this as 
part of their migration management strategies and policy initiatives? 
What are the specific migration challenges in the region and do you foresee 
SADC member states taking data protection more seriously and placing it on 
the agenda for discussion? 
What are your thoughts on reconciling State interests stemming from 
sovereignty and individual migrant rights stemming from universal human 
rights afforded to them regardless of their nationality or immigration status? 
What are your views on the EU Directive on data protection and its latest 
reforms? 
Traditionally data protection is seen within the realm of privacy, do you think 
there is a need for a separate right on data protection? 
What are your views on creating a separate multilateral agreement on data 
protection to enforce data protection as a universal legal right? 
Do you have any recommendations on how to address the gaps in the law to 
better protect migrants when collecting their personal data for migration 
management and humanitarian purposes? 
What do you foresee as challenges both legally and in practice in the area at the 
interface between data protection and migration and do you have any views on 
how to address such challenges? 
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8.2 ANNEXURE 2 -KEY TERMS DEFINED 
Since this thesis focuses on data protection in the context of international migration, 
the key terms that are used are drawn from the 10M Glossary on Migration, 2nd 
Edition. As acknowledged by the authors, there is an absence of universally accepted 
definitions when it comes to migration. This is because migration is a dynamic 
concept, addressed traditionally within national contexts, and even its implications and 
effects are interpreted from varying perspectives within a given country. 504 
Asylum: A form of protection given by a State on its territory based on the principle 
of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognized refugee rights. It is 
granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his or her country of nationality 
and/or residence in particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
Asylum seeker: A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a 
country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee 
status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative 
decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-
national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on 
humanitarian or other related grounds. 
Biometrics: The study of measurable biological characteristics. "Biometric 
504 Op cit note 2, International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration 
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identifiers" (Bls) are pieces of information that encode a representation of a person's 
unique biological make up (e.g. fingerprints, retinal scans or voice scans). Some 
governments have introduced the use of biometrics as an improved security measure in 
issuing passports, visas or residence permits. 
Border control: A State's regulation ofthe entry and departure of persons to and from 
its territory, in exercise of its sovereignty, whether this is conducted at the physical 
border or outside of the territory in an embassy or consulate. 
Border management: Facilitation of authorized flows of persons, including business 
people, tourists, migrants and refugees, across a border and the detection and 
prevention of irregular entry of non-nationals into a given country. Measures to 
manage borders include the imposition by States of visa requirements, carrier 
sanctions against transportation companies bringing irregular migrants to the territory, 
and interdiction at sea. International standards require a balancing between facilitating 
the entry of legitimate travellers and preventing that of travellers entering for 
inappropriate reasons or with invalid documentation. 
Child: An individual being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier (Art. I, UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, I989). 
Crimes against humanity: As identified in Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, I 998, crimes against humanity are crimes "committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack." The crimes contemplated under this definition include 
murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
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imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or 
collective on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender (as defined in 
paragraph 3 of Art. 7), or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced disappearance of 
persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health. 
Globalization: A process of interaction and integration among the people, 
corporations, and governments of different States; a process driven by international 
trade and investment and aided by information technology. This process has effects on 
the environment, culture, political systems, economic development and prosperity, and 
human well-being in societies. 
Human rights: Those liberties and benefits based on human dignity which, by 
accepted contemporary values, all human beings should be able to claim "as of right" 
in the society in which they live. These rights are contained in the International Bill of 
Rights, comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and have been developed 
by other treaties from this core (e.g. The Convention on the Protection of All Migrant 
Workers and Members ofTheir Families, 1990). 
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Humanitarian assistance: Aid that addresses the needs of individuals affected by 
crises. It is primarily the responsibility of the State but also supported by international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Movement. This assistance is provided in accordance with the humanitarian 
principles, particularly the principles of humanity (human suffering must be addressed 
wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, 
such as children, women and the elderly; the dignity and rights of all victims must be 
respected and protected), neutrality (humanitarian assistance must be provided without 
engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or 
ideological nature), and impartiality (humanitarian assistance must be provided 
without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race 
or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be 
given to the most urgent cases of distress). 
International migration law: International norms and principles relating to migration 
deriving from State sovereignty- such as the right to admit, detain and expel migrants, 
to combat trafficking and smuggling, to protect borders, to confer nationality - and 
from human rights instruments. These two elements constitute the main pillars of 
international migration law. Instruments of international migration law are spread 
across various branches of law, such as human rights law, humanitarian law, labour 
law, refugee law, consular law, trade law and maritime law. 
Country of destination: The country that is a destination for migratory flows (regular 
or irregular). 
Country of origin: The country that IS a source of migratory flows (regular or 
irregular). 
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Country of transit: The country through which migratory flows (regular or irregular) 
move. 
Data protection: The systematic application of a set of institutional, technical and 
physical safeguards that preserve the right to privacy with respect to the collection, 
storage, use and disclosure of personal data. 
Data subjects: Individuals that can be directly or indirectly identified by the reference 
to a specific factor or factors. Such factors may include a name, an identification 
number, material circumstances and physical, mental, cultural, and economic or social 
characteristics. 
Discrimination: A failure to treat all persons equally where no objective and 
reasonable distinction can be found between those favoured and those not favoured. 
Discrimination is prohibited in respect of "race, sex, language or religion" (Art. 1 (3), 
UN Charter, 1945) or "of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (Art. 
2, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). 
Exploitation: The act of taking advantage of something or someone, in particular the 
act of taking unjust advantage of another for one's own benefit (e.g. sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude 
or the removal of organs). 
Family unity (right to): A family's right to live together and, as a fundamental unit of 
a society, to receive respect, protection, assistance and support. This right is not 
limited to natio~als living in their own State and is protected by international law 
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Forced migration: A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, 
including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made 
causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people 
displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, 
or development projects). 
Freedom of movement: A human right comprising three basic elements: freedom of 
movement within the territory of a country (Art. I 3(1), Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, I 948: "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each state."), the right to leave any country and the right to return 
to his or her own country (Art. I 3 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I 948: 
"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country."). See also Art. I 2, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Freedom of movement is also referred to in the context of freedom of movement 
arrangements between States at the regional level (e.g. European Union). 
Genocide: "Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as: killing members of the 
group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" (Art. II, 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I 948, Art. 6, 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, I 998). 
Irregular migrant: A person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition 
of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. 
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The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host 
country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently 
taken up unauthorized employment (also called clandestine/undocumented migrant or 
migrant in an irregular situation). The term "irregular" is preferable to "illegal" 
because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' 
humanity. 
Irregular migration: Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the 
sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted 
definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is 
entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents 
required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, 
the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international 
boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the 
administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to 
restrict the use of the term "illegal migration" to cases of smuggling of migrants and 
trafficking in persons. 
Migrant: At the international level, no universally accepted definition for "migrant" 
exists. The term migrant was usually understood to cover all cases where the decision 
to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of "personal 
convenience" and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it therefore 
applied to persons, and family members, moving to another country or region to better 
their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves or their 
family. Notwithstanding this definition, for the purpose of this thesis, the term migrant 
is referred to more broadly and includes all forms of movement whether free or 
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coerced. 
Migration: The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an 
international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any 
kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes 
migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for 
other purposes, including family reunification. 
Migration management: A term used to encompass numerous governmental 
functions within a national system for the orderly and humane management for cross-
border migration, particularly managing the entry and presence of foreigners within 
the borders of the State and the protection of refugees and others in need of protection. 
It refers to a planned approach to the development of policy, legislative and 
administrative responses to key migration issues. 
Mixed flows I mixed migration: Complex migratory population movements that 
include refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed 
to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants. 
Personal data: All information that could be used to identify or harm data subjects. 
Refugee: A person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (Art. 1 (A) (2), 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 
1967 Protocol).In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
Art. 1 (2), 1969 Organization of African Unity (OA U) Convention defines a refugee as 
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any person compelled to leave his or her country "owing to external aggressiOn, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either 
part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality." Similarly, the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country 
"because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, 
foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order." 
Separated children: Children who are separated from both parents, or from their 
previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other 
relatives. These may, therefore, include children accompanied by other family 
members. In the terms of the Statement of Good Practice, 2004 in the Separated 
Children in Europe Programme (SCEP), separated children are "children under 18 
years of age who are outside their country of origin and separated from both parents or 
their previous legal/customary primary caregiver." The SCEP uses the term 
"separated" rather than the term "unaccompanied" because "while some separated 
children appear to be "accompanied" when they arrive in Europe, the accompanying 
adults are not necessarily able or suitable to assume responsibility for their care." See 
also child, minor, unaccompanied children 
Smuggled person/migrant: A migrant who is enabled, through providing financial or 
material benefit to another person, to gain illegal entry into a State of which he or she 
is not a national or a permanent resident. 
Smuggling: "The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the 
person is not a national or a permanent resident" (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol Against the 
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Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Smuggling, contrary to 
trafficking, does not require an element of exploitation, coercion, or violation of 
human rights. 
Sovereignty: Sovereignty as a concept of international law has three major aspects: 
external, internal and territorial. The external aspect of sovereignty is the right of the 
State freely to determine its relations with other States or other entities without the 
restraint or control of another State. This aspect of sovereignty is also known as 
independence. The internal aspect of sovereignty is the State's exclusive right or 
competence to determine the character of its own institutions, to enact laws of its own 
choice and ensure their respect. The territorial aspect of sovereignty is the authority 
which a State exercises over all persons and things found on, under or above its 
territory. In the context of migration, this means the sovereign prerogative of a State to 
determine which non-nationals should be admitted to its territory subject to the 
limitations of the non- refoulement principle, human rights, and provisions in bilateral 
or regional agreements (e.g. free movement or integration agreements). 
State: A political entity that has legal jurisdiction and effective control over a defined 
territory and the authority to make collective decisions for a permanent population; a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force; and an internationally recognized 
government that interacts, or has the capacity to interact, in formal relations with other 
entities. The criteria of statehood for purposes of international law are commonly held 
to be possession of a permanent population, a defined territory, government and 
capacity to enter into international relations with other States (Art. 1, Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933). 
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Terrorism: In the absence of a generally accepted definition under international law, 
"terrorism" can be defined as the intentional and systematic use of actions designed to 
provoke terror in the public as a means to certain ends. Terrorism can be the act of an 
individual or a group of individuals acting in their individual capacity or with the 
support of a State. It may also be the act of a State, whether against the population 
(human rights violations such as forced labour, deportation, genocide, etc.), or in the 
context of an international armed conflict against the civil population of the enemy 
State. Certain categories of terrorist acts are specifically mentioned by the 
international treaties annexed to the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Financing of Terrorism, 1999. This same Convention qualifies terrorism as "any act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not 
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an 
act."(Art. 2(J)(b)). 
Trafficker (human): An intermediary who is involved in the movement of person in 
order to obtain an economic or other profit by means of deception, physical or 
psychological coercion for the purpose of exploitation. The intent ab initio on the part 
of the trafficker is to exploit the person and gain profit or advantage from the 
exploitation. 
Trafficking in persons: "The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
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consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation" (Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within 
the borders of one State or may have a transnational character. 
Unaccompanied minors I children: Persons under the age of majority in a country 
other than that of their nationality who are not accompanied by a parent, guardian, or 
other adult who by law or custom is responsible for them. Unaccompanied children 
present special challenges for border control officials, because detention and other 
practices applied to undocumented adult non-nationals may not be appropriate for 
children. 
Undocumented migrant: A non-national who enters or stays in a country without the 
appropriate documentation. This includes, among others: a person (a) who has no legal 
documentation to enter a country but manages to enter clandestinely, (b) who enters or 
stays using fraudulent documentation, (c) who, after entering using legal 
documentation, has stayed beyond the time authorized or otherwise violated the terms 
of entry and remained without authorization. 
Victim of human trafficking: Any natural person who is subject to trafficking in 
human beings. 
Vulnerable group I migrants: Any group or sector of society that is at higher risk of 
being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, natural or environmental 
disasters, or economic hardship, than other groups within the State; any group or 
sector of society (such as women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, 
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indigenous peoples or migrants) that is at higher risk in periods of conflict and crisis. 
Xenophobia: At the international level, no universally accepted definition of 
xenophobia exists, though it can be described as attitudes, prejudices and behaviour 
that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are 
outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity. There is a close 
link between racism and xenophobia, two terms that can be hard to differentiate from 
each other. 
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8.3 ANNEXURE B- ABBREVIATIONS 
APEC- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APEC Privacy Framework- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Privacy Framework 
(2005) 
CEDAW - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (1979) 
CoE Convention - Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing ofPersonal Data (1981) 
Constitution- Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
CRC - Convention on the Rights of the Child ( 1989) 
CRPD - Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) 
EU Directive - Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (1995) 
EU Charter - Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) 
EDPS - European Data Protection Supervisor 
Madrid Resolution -
HLD- High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 
HIV I AIDS - Human Immunodeficiency virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
ICAO - The International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICC - International Criminal Court 
ICCPR- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
ICRC - International Committee for the Red Cross 
ICTR- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICESCR- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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Interim Constitution - Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
Interpol - International Criminal Police Organization 
IOM - International Organization for Migration 
Johannesburg Principles- Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information 
Madrid Resolution- International Standards on the Protection of Privacy and Data 
Protection (2009) 
MIDSA Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa 
MW A - International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (1990) 
OHCHR- United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights 
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD Guidelines - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(1980) 
PIA - Privacy Impact Assessment 
P AlA - Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000 
Refugees Act - Refugees Act of 1998 
SADC - Southern African Development Community 
SAMP- Southern African Migration Project 
UN- United Nations 
UDHR- United Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
UNAIDS- Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS 
UNDP- United Nations Development Program 
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UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UN Guidelines- United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized 
Personal Data Files (1990) 
OCHA- United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
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